20 Out
14:00 Master's Defense Fully distance
Budget-balanced and strategy-proof auctions for multi-passenger ridesharing
Leonardo Yvens Schwarzstein
Advisor / Teacher
Rafael Crivellari Saliba Schouery
Brief summary
Travel sharing services have become popular, and travel pricing is a crucial problem for these systems. We propose and analyze a new budget-balanced and strategy-proof mechanism, the Weighted Minimum Surplus (WMS) auction, for the problem of dynamic travel sharing with multiple passengers per trip. We also propose and analyze a budget-balanced version of the VCG mechanism, the VCGs. Under the hypothesis of alternatives \ emph {downward closed}, we obtain a lower limit for the surplus social welfare and the surplus profit of the WMS. We present an exact algorithm based on integer linear programming to solve these auctions. Encouraging experimental results are obtained for the profit and social welfare of both WMS and VCGs.
Examination Board
Rafael Crivellari Saliba Schouery IC / UNICAMP
Carla Negri Lintzmayer CMCC / UFABC
Eduardo Candido Xavier IC / UNICAMP
Orlando Lee IC / UNICAMP
Lehilton Lelis Chaves Pedrosa IC / UNICAMP
Maycon Sambinelli CMCC / UFABC