# FROM: http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/t31d1new.html 2004-02-17
# TWilliam of Ockham, Dialogus
# TPart 3, tract 1, book 1
# TCopyright © 1999, The British Academy
# The text and translation of 3.1 /Dialogus/1 were prepared by
# John Scott and revised by John Kilcullen. The draft was commented on
# by George Knysh, who suggested a number of corrections and improvements.
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Prologue
@section 1 {3.1.1}
@section 2 {c0}
@section 3 {tt}
Prologus
@section 3 {en1d}
{Student:} Following in some way the footsteps of
Solomon, "I have proposed in my mind to inquire about and to
investigate wisely everything that is being done under the sun"
[Ecclesiastes 1:13], that is in the church militant, concerning which
not all Christians these days think in the same way. For since some
people quarrel about the catholic faith, calling each other heretics,
some of them think that the true church militant exists among certain
people, others that it exists among others. Let us therefore turn our
attention -- so far as our occupations and studies are in accord with
the quality of the present time (because, as blessed Augustine
asserts [in his letter] to Count Boniface, as found in 23, q. 4, c. /Si
ecclesia/ , "Everything should be suitable to its
times") -- to the third part of our dialogue, which from the
beginning I have wanted to be entitled, "Of the actions of those
who are quarrelling about the orthodox faith". I want it to be
divided into nine tractates, each of which I believe should be
divided into various books. The first two will be preparatory and a
preamble to those that follow, in which we will examine the deeds of
various Christians,
(*) the first, therefore, discussing the power of the pope and the clergy;
(*) the second the power and rights of the Roman Empire, and in this
we will consider many things about the rights of kings and princes
and also some laymen;
(*) the third the deeds of John XXII, who some people think was
deprived for heretical wickedness of all ecclesiastical dignity long
before he departed this world, and others that he was a Catholic and
ended his days as a true pope;
(*) the fourth the deeds of the lord Lewis of Bavaria, whom some
people do not regard as a true emperor, while others think the opposite;
(*) the fifth the deeds of Benedict XII, whom many people, but not
all, reverence as a true supreme pontiff;
(*) the sixth the deeds of brother Michael of Cesena,
(*) the seventh the deeds and teaching of Guiral Ot, one of whom some
affirm to be the true general of the order of Friars Minor and others
the other;
(*) the eighth the deeds of brother William of Ockham;
(*) the ninth the deeds of other Christians -- kings, princes and
prelates and their subjects, laity and clergy, secular and religious,
Friars Minor and others -- who adhere to, obey, agree with, are
united with, favour or are known in any way to offer advice or help
to, any one or ones of the above named people, or who persecute,
attack, harass or condemn them, or some of them, as blamable.
@end {en1d}
@section 3 {en2m}
{Master:} Both your urgency and a desire to be useful
persuade me to undertake the above, but fear of incurring the
accusation of those who will perhaps say that I am daring to dispute
illicitly about the power of the highest pontiff dissuades me,
especially since both canon and civil laws seem to assert that
whoever presumes to dispute about the authority of the ruler commits
a sacrilege. If it is acceptable to you, therefore, I will not
involve myself in the matters above, especially since I can not, I
believe, get access to the necessary books.
@end {en2m}
@section 3 {en3d}
{Student:} Do not let that fear hold you back, because
just as we see catholics disputing as an exercise about the faith
without risk of just accusation (for doctors of sacred theology
publicly dispute about the faith in the schools, and arguing as
sharply as they know how against the truth of faith they incur no
charge, though neither at the time nor ever afterwards do they
determine the truth of the disputed question; bachelors also and
lawyers bring forward arguments and authorities against the truth as
strongly as they can without blame, indeed often praiseworthily), so
it is possible praiseworthily to dispute as an exercise about the
power of the highest pontiff. Since, therefore, you would not be
going to say anything against the power of the pope as an assertion
or as an expression of doubt but only as a recital, as has been done
between us in the whole of this dialogue from the beginning, you
should not be afraid to investigate the power of the pope and all the
other things I have mentioned as requiring discussion, especially
since I know you are ready to confess in private and in public, at an
opportune place and time, when it will be beneficial, every truth
about the power of the pope, and any other [truth] that you are bound
to believe explicitly. And do not let lack of books hinder you,
because even if you can not make a perfect work, yet to produce
something will not be useless, because you will give those who have a
supply of books occasion to produce finished works.
@end {en3d}
@section 3 {en4m}
{Master:} It can be shown in many ways that it is
permissible to recite falsities without assertion or doubt and to
state them in the person of others, and that it is not necessary on
every occasion to confess with one's mouth even catholic truth (since
this falls under an affirmative precept, which always obliges but not
for always). And therefore, disregarding the calumnies of the wicked,
I will acquiesce in your urging and, to exercise the wits of the
studious both about the power of the pope and about the other matters
which you have considered should be inquired into, I will recite even
views and opinions which I regard as wrong, even heretical. I will
argue for these as strongly as I can, and you can also do this
sometimes if you see fit. So begin the first tractate without delay.
@end {en4m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 1
@section 2 {c1}
@section 2 {c1}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 1
@section 3 {en5d}
{Student:} The multitude of Christians does not doubt,
I believe, that the keys of the kingdom of heaven were given by
Christ to the Roman pontiff, that is to blessed Peter: they do not
doubt, therefore, that some power was granted by Christ. Many texts
of the holy fathers also seem to assert that he received some power
by human decree. About both of these powers, if he does have both, I
will ask many questions: Namely, what power does he have, and by what
right [or law] (divine or human), over spiritual matters and
ecclesiastical persons? What power, and by what right, over the laity
in spiritual matters? What power, and by what right, over the
possessions and temporal rights that pertain to the Roman church
alone? What power, and by what right, over the possessions and
temporal rights known to pertain to other clerics? What power, and by
what right, over the persons, possessions and temporal rights of the
believing laity? What power, and by what right, over the possessions
of unbelievers, and even over their persons?
Later, moreover, I propose to examine some similar [questions] about
the power of the clergy. First of all, however, I have decided to ask
//whether
the power of the pope extends to everything which is not against
divine law or natural law//, for this question seems to
comprehend all the questions above about the power of the pope, and
the judgments and opinions about it which you will strive to set
forth will perhaps give me occasion to inquire about each of them in particular.
@end {en5d}
@section 3 {en6m}
{Master:} On this question we find diverse and
conflicting opinions.
(*) One is that the pope has by Christ's decree such fullness of power,
both in temporal and spiritual matters, that he can do anything,
regularly and in every case, which is not expressly against the law
of God or against natural law.
(*) Another [opinion] is that by divine law he
has such fullness of power in spiritual matters but not in temporal matters.
(*) A third opinion is that he has such fullness
of power partly by Christ's decree and partly by human decree.
(*) A fourth [opinion] is that he does not have
such fullness of power, either by divine law or by human law, either
regularly or occasionally or in some case; and there are different
ways of putting this [view].
(*) A fifth [opinion] is that he does not have
such fullness of power simply and regularly, either by divine law or
by human law, but by divine law or by a special decree of Christ he
does have such fullness of power occasionally or in some case.
@end {en6m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 2
@section 2 {c2}
@section 2 {c2}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 2
@section 3 {en7d}
{Student:} Let us discuss those opinions so that we
can understand the truth more sharply and profoundly. So bring
forward some arguments for the first.
@end {en7d}
@section 3 {en8m}
{Master:} The first opinion seems to be based on the
words of the Gospel, indeed of Christ himself, who said to Peter, as
we read in Matthew 16[:19]: "I will give you the keys of heaven
and whatever you bind on earth will be bound also in heaven and
whatever you loose on earth will be loosed also in heaven." From
these words we gather that Christ gave to blessed Peter, and so to
his successors, fullness of power without any exception, so that he
is able to do anything -- because everything should be embraced by a
general statement (di. 19, /Si Romanorum/ and 1, q. 1, /Sunt
nonulli/ and 14, q. 3, /Putant/ .)
@end {en8m}
@section 3 {en9d}
{Student:} It seems that that argument can be
attacked, for often a general statement should not be understood
generally ( /Extra, De iureiurando, Ad nostram/ and 1, q. 1, /Duces/
[i.e. /Iudices/ ]). Thus also "a general statement is
often restricted", as the gloss on /Extra, De
appellationibus, Sua nobis/ notes. Very many examples of this are
found in the divine Scriptures. For in Matthew 3[:5-6] it is said
that "all the region about the Jordan went out to him and they
were baptised by him in the Jordan", and yet many did not go out
and were not baptised by John. Luke 3[:15] too says "everyone
was thinking about John that perhaps he was The Anointed One",
and yet many did not think this, for example those who did not
believe in an "Anointed One" and those who did not think
that John was a prophet. Numerous other examples can be brought
forward in which a general statement should not be understood
generally but should be restricted.
Let us leave aside for the moment, however, all except some few
which speak about power and subjection, in addition to the
words of Christ set down above. Now the Apostle says in
Ephesians 5[:24] that "as the church is subject to Christ, so
are wives in all things to their husbands", where the words "in
all things" should not be understood generally without any
exception even with respect to things that are licit, because
wives are not subject to their husbands in everything that is
licit, since in respect to many licit things husband and wife
are judged equals ( /Extra, De divortiis, / c. / Gaudemus/ ).
The Apostle also says in Colossians 3[:20,22], "Sons, be
obedient to your parents in everything", and "Slaves, be
obedient to your earthly masters in everything", and in
Ephesians 6[:5] he says "Slaves, be obedient to your earthly
masters with all fear and trembling", and in 1 Tim. 6[:1],
"Those who are under the yoke of slavery are to consider their
masters worthy of all honour", and in Titus 2[:9], "[Tell]
slaves to be subject to their masters, pleasing them in
everything", and in 1 Peter 2[:13,18] we read, "Be subject
to every human being for God's sake", and "Slaves, be
subject in all fear to your masters, not only to those who are good
and gentle but even to those who are bad-tempered". And in 1
Tim. 2[:11] the Apostle says, "Let a woman learn in silence with
all submission". In all these [examples] the general words
should not be understood generally and without any exception, because
in many matters wives are not subject to husbands, nor sons to
parents, nor slaves to masters nor the faithful to all human beings.
Similarly, therefore, from the fact that Christ said to Peter,
"Whatever you bind", etc, it can not be inferred that all
mortals are subject in everything without any exception to the
successors of blessed Peter in such a way that they [Peter's
successors] have in all things licit in themselves fullness of power
over all men, both in temporal and spiritual matters.
@end {en9d}
@section 3 {en10m}
{Master:} That objection is rejected in two ways.
First, because if, according to the sacred canons, we should not
exclude, limit or determine when a canon does not exclude, limit or
determine (31, q. 1, /Quod si dormierit/ ; 2, q. 5, /Consuluisti/ ;
di. 55, /Si evangelica/ ), so much more should we not exclude,
limit or determine when the Lord does not exclude, limit or
determine. But Christ did not exclude, limit or determine anything in
granting power over everyone to Peter, but said indiscriminately and
generally, "Whatever you bind", etc. Neither should we,
therefore, exclude anything from his power, or limit or determine it
in any way. Therefore Peter received fullness of power from Christ in
all temporal and spiritual matters.
Further, a benefit given by a prince should be interpreted very
broadly ( /Extra, De simonia/ last chapter, /Extra, De
decimis, Ex parte/ ). The power conferred on Peter by Christ, the
prince of princes, should therefore also be interpreted very broadly
so that nothing at all is removed from his power, either in spiritual
or temporal matters.
The above objection is rejected in a second way by an authoritative
text of Innocent III, who says, as we read in /Extra, De
maioritate et obedientia/ , c. /Solite/ , "The Lord
said to Peter, and in Peter to his successors, 'Whatever you bind on
earth will also be bound in heaven', etc. He who said 'Whatever'
excepted nothing." From these words we gather that nothing in
either temporal or spiritual matters should be excepted from the
power given by Christ to blessed Peter and his successors. The pope
has such fullness of power, therefore, from Christ.
@end {en10m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 3
@section 2 {c3}
@section 2 {c3}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 3
@section 3 {en11d}
{Student:} We will return later to this saying of the
Saviour. Would you, therefore, bring forward some other arguments?
@end {en11d}
@section 3 {en12m}
{Master:} It is proved [as follows] that the pope has
such fullness of power in temporal and spiritual matters. That man
who should by divine precept be obeyed in everything and not resisted
at all in anything has fullness of power of this kind immediately
from God. The pope, however, should by divine precept be obeyed in
everything and not resisted at all in anything, as Gregory attests,
saying in di. 12, c. /Preceptis/ , "Let not apostolic
precepts be resisted with unbending pride, but, through obedience,
let those things that by the holy Roman church and apostolic
authority are commanded salutarily be carried out"; and later,
"Let all priests who do not want to be separated from the
strength of the apostolic rock upon which Christ founded the
universal church maintain the decree of its authority." We
gather from these words that because of the authority granted by
Christ to the Roman church it should be obeyed in everything and not
resisted at all in anything.
Pope Stephen seems to assert this too, as we read in di. 19, c. /Enimvero/ ,
when he says, "For indeed, since the holy Roman church, which
Christ wished us to rule over, [has been put forward] as a mirror and
an example, whatever it has enacted and whatever it has ordained
should be observed perpetually and inviolably by everyone", etc.
We gather from these words that because of Christ's decree the Roman
church should be obeyed in everything.
Hence, as we read in the same distinction, c. /Ita dominus/ ,
Pope Leo says, "The Lord wanted the sacrament of this gift so to
pertain to the office of all the apostles that he located it chiefly
in most blessed Peter, the highest of all the apostles, so that
through him, as head, he [the Lord] might pour out his gifts on the
whole body"; and later, "If anyone tries to infringe its
power, he is intending with most impious presumption to violate the
most sacred strength of this rock, built up as we have said by God's
work". We are given to understand by these words that anyone who
is found disobedient in any way to the power of Peter and his
successors is infringing a decree of God. It is by the decree of
Christ, therefore, that the pope should be obeyed in everything.
This is also proved by argument, because that person should by
Christ's decree be obeyed in everything whose every teaching should
be received as if uttered by the divine voice; but all the precepts
of the pope, just as also his laws, should be received as if uttered
by the divine voice (di. 19, /Sic omnes/ ); by God's decree,
therefore, he should be obeyed in everything.
Further, by God's precept that person should be obeyed in everything
who without heresy [i.e., without his being a heretic] cannot be a
schismatic while all others can be schismatic by being divided from
that one. But the pope can not be schismatic unless he becomes a
heretic, whereas all others can be schismatic even if they are not
immediately heretical. By God's precept, therefore, the pope should
be obeyed in everything.
The major [premise] is proved by this, that someone who does not by
God's precept have to be obeyed in everything can command many things
in which others are not bound to obey him. On account of commands of
this kind, therefore, in which they are not bound to obey him, there
can arise between the one giving the orders and the ones to whom they
are given discord, division, dissension and tearing, and, as a
result, schism, because schism, which is a Greek word, denotes
tearing (24, q. 1, /Scisma/ ). In such a case, therefore,
either the one giving the commands or those to whom commands of this
kind are given are schismatic; but those to whom such commands are
given are not schismatic because they are not entangled in any crime
by not obeying, since they are not bound to obey. The one giving the
commands, therefore, must be regarded as schismatic because of unjust
commands, even if he does not become a heretic.
The first part of the minor [premise], that is that the pope cannot
be schismatic without heresy, is proved by the fact that a schismatic
is defined as one who withdraws from the unity of the universal
church (24, q. 1, /Scisma/ , c. /Loquitur dominus/ , c. /Alienus/
and c. /Quia ex sola/ ). But unless he becomes a heretic the
pope does not withdraw from the unity of the universal church, since,
as long as he remains in the faith of Peter, the unity of the
universal church begins from him (24, q. 1, /Loquitur dominus/ ).
Unless he becomes a heretic, therefore, the pope cannot be schismatic.
The second part of the minor [premise] is quite clear because
everyone other than the pope can become schismatic without heresy, at
least in the beginning, by not obeying the universal church in those
matters in which he is bound.
From these [points] we gather that by God's precept or by the decree
of Christ Peter and his successors should be obeyed in everything and
not resisted at all in anything. By the decree of Christ, therefore,
the pope has in both temporal and spiritual matters fullness of power
to be able to do all things not of themselves illicit, so that these
things cannot be made illicit solely by human decree or will [i.e. be
made illicit for him by the will of others].
@end {en12m}
@section 3 {en13d}
{Student:} Before you go on to other arguments, relate
why it is said that by the decree of Christ the pope can do all
things "not of themselves illicit", etc.
@end {en13d}
@section 3 {en14m}
{Master:} This is said on account of the vows, oaths,
promises, pacts and any other means by which men bind themselves to
things to which they are otherwise not bound, because by such means
there is no derogation of the power of the pope at all, but rather,
not withstanding all such things, he can do anything and should be
obeyed in everything, because in all such cases the power and
authority of the pope are understood always to be excepted ( /Extra/ ,
/De iureiurando, / c. /Veniens/ , /Extra, De
electione, / c. /Significasti/ ).
@end {en14m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 4
@section 2 {c4}
@section 2 {c4}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 4
@section 3 {en15d}
{Student:} We will touch on that matter in particular
in various places. so would you bring forward some other arguments?
@end {en15d}
@section 3 {en16m}
{Master:} That the pope has such fullness of power by God's decree is
proved. For anyone who is freed from all positive laws has such
fullness of power, since someone who does not have this
fullness of power can be restrained by some human law, because
he does not have power over all human laws. The pope, however,
is freed from laws so that he is above all human laws since he
can dissolve even imperial laws, as many canons seem to assert
(di. 9, c. 1. para. / Quicumque/ , col. 16). Therefore by God's
decree the pope has such fullness of power.
Further, the vicar of Christ has fullness of power by the decree of
Christ himself, since Christ had such fullness of power and, in
commissioning Peter as his substitute, forbad him nothing in such
matters. The pope has such fullness of power, therefore, by Christ's
decree, since he is Christ's vicar.
Again, the pope has fullness of power and does not have any power
from man; therefore he has fullness of power from the decree of God
alone. The major [premise] is gathered and established from various
sacred canons (2, q. 6, c. /Decreto/ and c. /Qui se scit/ ).
Diverse sacred canons also seem to assert [the minor]. Thus
Innocent III says, as we find in /Extra, De iudiciis/ , /Novit/ :
"For since we rely not on a human constitution but rather on a
divine one, because our power is not from man but from God, no one
who is of sound mind does not know that it pertains to our office to
correct any Christian for any mortal sin." And, as we read in
di. 22, c. /Sacrosancta/ , blessed Anacletus says, "This
apostolic see, the head and the hinge [of all churches], was indeed
constituted, as has been said before, by the Lord and not by anyone
else", etc. From these words we gather that the pope has no
power from man.
This also seems provable by argument. For no one should be called a
heretic because he denies to anyone power he is known to have from
man alone, because even if such a person errs yet he does not err
against sacred Scripture, which is not from man but from God. But
anyone who denies the pope his power should be regarded as a heretic,
as Pope Nicholas attests, as we read in di. 22, c. 1. The pope,
therefore, receives his power from God alone.
Again, that the pope has fullness of power from God is shown. For it
is from the same [source] that the Roman pontiff has fullness of
power and the power of granting indulgences, as is intimated in /Extra,
De penitentiis et remissionibus, Cum ex eo/ , near the end. But
the Roman pontiff has the power of granting indulgences from God
alone and not from man. Therefore he has fullness of power from God alone.
Again, anyone whose judgement and power it is not permitted to judge,
or even to dispute by calling his power into doubt, has fullness of
power from God. For men are permitted to dispute about the power of
someone who does not have fullness of power from God and to examine
as a matter of doubt what power he has and does not have; about a
judgement of such a person it is also permitted to judge whether he
has presumed to judge not according to the power conceded to him but
according to power he has usurped. But no one is permitted to judge
or even to dispute as a matter of doubt the judgement and power of
the highest pontiff. Therefore he has fullness of power from God.
The major [premise] seems evident, the minor is shown by various
authorities. For as we read in 9, q. 3, /Patet/ , Pope Nicholas
says, "It is perfectly clear that a judgement of the apostolic
see, than whose authority there is none greater, should not be
reviewed by anyone; nor is anyone permitted to judge one of its
judgements." Pope Gelasius also, as we find in the same Cause
and Question, c. /Ipsi/ , says, "And they have ordered
that its judgement should never be judged and they have decreed that
its sentence must not be dissolved; rather they have commanded that
its decrees should be followed." And in 17, q. 4, /Qui autem/
it is written as follows, "No one is permitted to dispute the
judgement of the highest pontiff"; and in the same place we read
thus, "They also commit a sacrilege who either commit something
against the holiness of divine law through not knowing it, or violate
and offend it by neglect, or contend and dispute about the ruler's
judgement." And in the same Cause and Question, c. /Nemini/ ,
Pope Nicholas says, "No one is permitted to judge a judgement
of the apostolic See or review its sentence, and this because the
primacy of the Roman church was by a gift of Christ divinely located
in Peter, the blessed apostle." We gather from these and many
other [canons] that no one is permitted to judge or dispute a
judgement or the power of the Roman church because its power was
granted to it by Christ. Therefore it has fullness of power from Christ.
This is proved again by the following argument. The pope has fullness
of power from the same person as the one from whom he has the keys to
the kingdom of heaven. But he has the keys to the kingdom of heaven
from Christ. Therefore, he also has fullness of power from Christ.
The minor [premise] is clearly established by the words of Christ
when he said to Peter, "I will give you the keys of the kingdom
of heaven." (Matt. 16[:19]) The major [premise] is proved
because all the power which the pope has pertains to his keys, in
that all the pope's power is by reason of order or of jurisdiction.
The power which he has by reason of order, however, pertains
according to everyone to the keys. The power which he has by reason
of jurisdiction also pertains to the keys, as Augustine attests, who
writes to Boniface, as we find in di. 50, c. /Ut constitueretur/ ,
"That it was established in the Church that after penance for
some crime no one should receive, return to or remain in holy orders
was not done from despair of pardon but out of firmness of
discipline; otherwise there will be disputation against the keys
given to the Church, about which it was said, 'Whatever you bind on
earth will also be bound in heaven.'" We gather from these words
that the power of punishing criminals which belongs to the Roman
Church by reason of jurisdiction, not order, pertains to the keys of
the Church. By a similar argument, therefore, every other power which
belongs to the Church by reason of jurisdiction pertains to those
same keys.
In addition to this, it is proved that the pope has fullness of
power immediately from Christ, because anyone to whom the
greater has been granted by someone seems to have been granted
by the same person also the lesser ( /Extra, De decimis, Ex
parte/ [col. 565]; 27, q. 2, /Sunt qui dicunt/ [col. 1067); but
it is a greater thing to dispense against the Lord and against
the Apostle than to be able to do those things which are
neither against divine law nor against the law of nature. The
pope has power from Christ, however, to dispense against the
Lord and against the Apostle, as the gloss on 25, q. 1, c.
/Sunt quidam/ attests when it says, "It can be adequately
maintained that the pope dispenses against the apostle -- yet
not in those matters which pertain to the articles of faith;
and in the same way he dispenses in connection with the gospel
by interpreting it, as in /Extra, De testibus / c. /Licet./ ,
near the end." It [the gloss] proves this also by
examples. For the pope dispenses against the Lord in the case
of an oath and a vow. For the Lord says through the prophet,
"Vow and perform" [Psalm 75:12], and in Matthew
5[:33], "Carry out your oaths to the Lord", and yet
the pope dispenses in these matters (15, q. 6, /Iuratos/ ;
/Extra, De voto/ in many chapters). Much more is it the case,
therefore, that the pope can do anything which is not against
the law of God or against natural law.
Moreover, someone whose sentence should be feared whether it is
unjust or just has fullness of power so that he is able to do
all things; for if his sentence should be feared whether it is
unjust or just, his command should be feared and kept, whether
it is just or unjust. But the sentence of a pope should be
feared, whether it is just or unjust (11, q. 3, /Sententia / );
the pope, therefore, can do all things.
Further, he who ought not be rebuked by anyone for any deed at
all has fullness of power from Christ so that he is able to do
all things. For if he did not have such fullness of power he
could exceed his power and consequently sin in such matters.
Any sinner, however, even a prelate, can and should be
corrected and rebuked for every sin, especially if there is no
probable fear that he will become worse because of the
correction. This follows from the words of the gospel, "If
your brother has sinned against you, go and correct him when
the two of you are alone", etc. [Matthew 18:15], which
extend to everyone, as we gather from the sacred canons. The
pope, however, should not be rebuked or corrected by anyone
(di. 40, /Si papa / ). Therefore, the pope has fullness of
power so that he is able to do all things. But he does not have
such fullness of power from man. He has it, therefore, from
Christ.
Further, he who can not err against the faith has fullness of
power from God so that he is able to do all things, because he
who can not err against the faith can not err against good
morals and, consequently, whatever he does is beyond blame and
done permissibly, and so he can do anything he wants to do. The
pope, however, can not err against faith. Many arguments were
brought forward to prove this in chapter 4 of book 5 of the
first part of this dialogue. The pope, therefore, has fullness
of power from Christ.
Moreover, he who has from Christ fullness of power over a
general council also has, /a fortiori/ , fullness of power from
Christ over all others. The pope, however, has from Christ
fullness of power over a general council. Yet he does not have
this power from a general council, since one council can not
impose a law or obedience on another because an equal does not
have power over an equal. If he has it, therefore, he has it
from someone who is superior to a general council. It has no
superior, however, except Christ. If the pope has such fullness
of power, therefore, over a general council, he has it from
Christ.
It remains to prove, therefore, that the pope has such power
over a general council, and this seems to be shown by clear
authorities. For, as we read in /Extra, De electione, / c.
/Significasti/ , Pope Paschasius says, "... since it is by
the authority of the Roman church that all councils have been
held and have received their strength, and [since] in their
statutes the authority of the bishop of Rome is clearly
excepted"; and Gratian says in 25, q. 1, /Si ergo/ ,
"The sacred canons establish something in such a way that
they reserve to the holy Roman church the authority to
interpret them, for they alone can interpret the canons who
have the right of making them. Hence in some chapters of the
councils when it is determined that something should be
observed it is immediately added, 'Unless the authority of the
Roman church [has commanded otherwise]', or 'Saving, however,
in all things, the apostolic authority'". We gather from
these and very many others that the pope has fullness of power
over a general council. /A fortiori/ , therefore, he has
fullness of power over all others.
Moreover, anyone who has power from Christ over those things
which are against natural equity /a fortiori/ has power from
Christ over everything licit which is not opposed to natural
equity, because, as was touched on before, anyone to whom the greater has been
granted seems also to have been granted the lesser thing. But
the pope has power over things that are opposed to natural
equity; therefore he has fullness of power from Christ so that
he is able to do anything which is licit and not opposed to
natural equity.
The major [premise] does not seem to need proof. The minor is
proved, because it is opposed to natural equity for boys who do
not know how to rule themselves to have the care and rule of
souls. For natural reason directs that no one who does not know
how to rule himself should govern others. Indeed gospel truth
also suggests this, when Christ says in Matthew 15[:14],
"If the blind leads the blind, however, they both fall
into a ditch". Alexander III, following a direction of
right reason, seems to imply this as well, as we read in
/Extra, De etate et qualitate preficiendorum/ , c. /Indecorum/
, where he says: "It is shameful that those who have not
learnt to govern themselves should rule churches, since those
admitted to the rule of churches should be persons of
outstanding discretion and conspicuous honesty of life."
Gregory IX seems to agree with this when he says, as we read in
/Extra, De electione, Cum in magistrum/ , "... since no
one should be appointed to mastership who has not taken on the
role of disciple, and no one should be set above others who has
not known what it is to be under another", etc. It is
clear from these and very many other [authorities] that natural
equity demands that boys, who do not know how to rule
themselves or others, should not be appointed to the rule and
care of souls. And yet the pope can issue orders against this
natural equity, as the gloss on /Extra, De etate et qualitate
preficiendorum/ c. /Eam te/ testifies when it says, "If
the pope should write with certain knowledge on behalf of a
minor, his mandate should be obeyed, because it is a kind of
sacrilege to doubt whether someone the ruler has chosen is
worthy (17, q. 4, para. /Qui autem / and /Code/ , /De crimine
sacrilegii/ , law 2." Alexander III also seems to have
commanded this, as we read in /Extra, De etate et qualitate
preficiendorum, Ex ratione/ , since he does not remove the boys
appointed under ten years old from the churches granted to them
by the bishop of Coventry, but knowingly tolerates them and
orders that they be tolerated.
@end {en16m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 5
@section 2 {c5}
@section 2 {c5}
Capitulum 5
@section 3 {en17d}
{Student:} You have touched on arguments, very strong ones I think,
for the above opinion. For the moment, therefore, do not bring
forward any others in support of it, because those will be
clearly refuted and perhaps the others could easily be
answered.
@end {en17d}
@section 3 {en18m}
{Master:}
There are some who regard the above opinion as false,
dangerous, pernicious and heretical, and they try to prove
this in many ways. For Christian law is, by Christ's
institution, a law of freedom with respect to the old law,
which was, with respect to the new law, a law of servitude.
But if the pope had from Christ such fullness of power that he
can do anything not contrary to divine law or the law of
nature, the Christian law would be, by Christ's institution, a
law of unbearable servitude, and of much greater servitude
than the old law was. The pope therefore does not have from
Christ such fullness of power in both spiritual and temporal
matters.
The major [premise] seems provable by very clear texts of
divine Scripture, for blessed James in his letter (1:25) calls
it the law of perfect freedom when he says, "Whoever
looks into the law of perfect freedom and perseveres in it,
being not a hearer who forgets but a doer who acts, will be
blessed in his doing." And the Apostle says in Galatians
(2:3-5), "Nor was Titus, who was with me, being a
gentile, forced to be circumcised. But because of false
brothers who were brought in and came to spy on the freedom we
have in Christ Jesus in order to bring us back into servitude
-- we did not submit to them for a moment, so that the gospel
truth would remain with you." By these words we are given
to understand that the law of the gospel is a law of freedom
by which Christians have been snatched from servitude, not to
be led further into slavery. The Apostle also seems to assert
this in [Galatians] 5[:12-13], when he says, "I wish that
those who unsettle you were cut off. For you, brothers, were
called into freedom; only do not use your freedom as an
opportunity for the flesh, but in love help one another."
Again, as we read in Acts 15[:10], blessed Peter says,
"Why are you putting God to the test by placing on the
neck of the disciples a yoke which neither our fathers nor we
have been able to bear?" From these words we gather that
not so heavy a yoke of servitude has been put on Christians as
was put on the Jews. Thus also blessed James said, just after
the words of Peter in the same place (Acts 15:19-20), "I
judge that we should not trouble those gentiles turning to
God, but should write to them to abstain from the pollutions
of idols, from fornication, from what has been strangled and
from blood." And this opinion of James was approved by
the apostles and the elders, indeed by the Holy Spirit. Whence
there follows, in the same place [Acts 15:22-3], "Then
the apostles and elders, together with the whole church,
decided to choose men from among themselves to send to Antioch
with Paul and Barnabas. They sent Judas, surnamed Bersabas,
and Silas, leaders among the brethren, who carried a letter
that began "The brothers, both the apostles and the
elders", and continued further down: "It has seemed
[good] to the holy spirit and to us to impose no further
burden on you than these essentials, that you abstain from
things sacrificed to idols, from blood, from what has been
strangled and from fornication. If you keep yourself from
these you will do well" [Acts 15:28- 29]. We gather from
these words that Christians have by gospel law been freed from
manifold servitude and that gospel law is a law of less
servitude than was the old law. Augustine seems clearly to
imply this when, as we read in di. 12, c. /Omnia/ , he says in
response to the questions of Januarius about people who had
oppressed the Christian religion with excessive servitude:
"Now although it can not be found that they are against
the faith, yet they oppress that religion, which God's mercy
willed to be free and to have the fewest and most easily
celebrated sacraments, with servile burdens, so much that the
condition of the Jews is more bearable: for even if they have
not recognised the time of freedom, yet it is the sacraments
of the Law to which they are subject, not human
presumptions."
Again, the Apostle [writes] to the Galatians, "We are
children not of the slave but of the free woman. By this
freedom Christ has set us free. Stand firm and do not be
curbed again by the yoke of servitude" [4:31-5:1]. And
the Apostle [writes] in 2 Corinthians 3[:17], "Where the
spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom." We gather from
all these that the new law is of greater freedom than the old
law.
The minor [premise] of the above argument
-- namely that the new or gospel law would be of more
unbearable and greater servitude than the old law was, if the
pope by Christ's institution had such fullness of power in
both spiritual and temporal matters -- seems to need no proof.
For if this were so, all Christians would be slaves and no
one's condition would be free. For all would be slaves of the
highest pontiff, with the result that the highest pontiff
would have as great a power in temporal matters over the
emperor, kings, princes, all the laity and over absolutely
every Christian, both as to their persons and as to their
possessions, as any temporal lord ever had or could have over
any slave, so that the pope could freely deprive kings,
princes and all other Christians of their kingdoms and all
their possessions and could keep them himself or confer them
on another, and he could subject kings and princes to anyone
else at all and make them slaves of those people. For these
and similar things are against neither divine law nor the law
of nature, because if they were against divine law or the law
of nature, they would not be permitted to kings themselves or
other Christians and, as a result, no one would be permitted
to give his goods to another or submit himself to the power of
another. And so it is certain that with respect to temporal
matters Christian law would be of greater servitude than the
old law, if the pope were to have in temporal matters fullness
of power of this kind. For those who were under the Mosaic law
were not in such a way subject to any mortal in temporal
matters, because neither the king nor the chief priest had
such lordship; and thus Naboth praiseworthily refused to give
and sell his vineyard to the king who wanted to buy it. [See 3
Kings 21.]
Also with respect to spiritual matters, or with respect to
those things that pertain or can pertain to outward divine
worship, the gospel law would be of greater servitude than was
the law of Moses. For the pope would have this kind of
fullness of power in spiritual matters, and out of this
fullness of power the pope could impose on
kings, princes and all Christians more and heavier corporal
observances of this kind than were ordained in the old law, and no
Christian would be permitted not to obey him in matters of this kind,
if the pope had such fullness of power.
From these [points] it follows that the above opinion about the
highest pontiff's fullness of power should be regarded not only
as false but also as heretical, since it is clearly against
sacred Scripture, which asserts that the Christian law is a law
of freedom, and consequently Christians are not made the slaves
of any mortal by Christian law but are free, as far as the
nature of gospel law is concerned. It is also, they say,
pernicious and dangerous, because if the pope made use of such
power by depriving kings and other Christians of their kingdoms
and possessions, just on the authority of his own will, and
subjecting them to servitude or servile works, then schisms,
dissensions, wars and battles would arise among Christians, and
peril and cost to the whole of Christianity.
@end {en18m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 6
@section 2 {c6}
@section 2 {c6}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 6
@section 3 {en19d}
{Student:} Because that [argument] is, I think, the
chief basis or reason, or one of the main ones, why some people say
that the pope does not have such fullness of power, I want to object
against it, so that from the replies you will report to the
objections against it, its character will become more clear.
[1] Thus it seems that Christian law is not
called a law of freedom in the sacred Scriptures because by it
Christians become free in the sense that they are not subject to the
highest pontiff in all things, as the preceding reasoning implies,
but it is called a law of freedom because through it Christians are
made free from the servitude of sin or of the Mosaic law. And thus
many of the texts you brought forward speak explicitly about freedom
from the servitude of the Mosaic law, for example those from
Galatians 2 and 5, from Acts 15 and from Galatians 4. And other texts
can be understood as referring to freedom from the servitude of sin.
Through these it can not be proved, therefore, that by Christian law
Christians are made free from the servitude by which they are bound
to the highest pontiff, that is, so as not to be subject to him in
all temporal and spiritual matters not against God's law or the law
of nature.
[2] Thus it is also proved by argument that
the texts of divine Scripture should not be understood as referring
to the freedom and subjection by which Christians are subject to the
highest pontiff. For if Christian law were the law of freedom in this
sense, no one would be permitted to subject himself to the highest
pontiff (or to any other mortal at all) [in things] that are not
against God's law or the law of nature, because no one is permitted
to act against Christian law.
[3] And thus if, as some people say, the Friars
Minor are bound by their rule to obey the highest pontiff in
everything, their rule would be heretical, because it would be
against Christian law, which is a law of freedom liberating
Christians so that they are not subject to any man.
[4] Further, according to blessed James, as
quoted above, Christian law is a law of perfect
freedom. Perfect freedom, however, is opposed to all servitude. If
Christian law is a law of freedom, liberating Christians so that they
are not subject to any man, it follows therefore that no one should
be the slave of any man at all. And so kings, princes and other
laymen, and also the church, would have no slaves. This clearly
conflicts with the civil laws and the sacred canons.
For these reasons it seems that the above argument does not prove
that the pope does not have fullness of power in both spiritual and
temporal matters. But would you explain how a reply is made to them?
@end {en19d}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 7
@section 2 {c7}
@section 2 {c7}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 7
@section 3 {en20m}
{Master:} It is said in response to the first
of these that although some texts make special mention of freedom
from the servitude of Mosaic law, nonetheless they should all be
understood as being about freedom from any servitude as great as was
the servitude of Mosaic law. At least with
respect to some matters this [is to be taken] negatively, that is,
with the meaning that no one is obliged by the gospel law to as great
a servitude as was the servitude of the old law, although some
Christians, by reason of a fault, or of their own will, or for any
other reason -- not by gospel law -- may be held bound by a servitude
as great or even greater.
For if through gospel law Christians were bound, with respect to
exterior works, by any servitude as great as or greater than the
servitude of the old law, gospel law could not be said to be more a
law of freedom than the Mosaic law, however much Christians had been
liberated from the servitude of the Mosaic law. For someone liberated
from one servitude and oppressed with another as great or greater is
not freer than he had been before, just as someone freed from one
bodily bond and bound with another equal or stronger has not been
freed but more bound. Now since, according to the truth of divine
Scripture, gospel law is more a law of freedom than the old law was,
Christians are subjected through gospel law neither to the servitude
of Mosaic law nor to any other exterior servitude greater than or as
great as the servitude of the old law was. Therefore those texts also
which speak about the freedom of Christians in the context of the
servitude of the old law should be understood to mean freedom from
any servitude as great as the servitude of the old law was. Since the
servitude by which someone is obliged to obey another in everything
not contrary to divine law or the law of nature is greater than the
servitude of the old law was, the texts quoted above should be
understood, therefore, to mean freedom also from that servitude. And
so, they say, it is clearly proved by those [texts] that the
aforesaid opinion about the highest pontiff's fullness of power is
heretical, as being contrary to divine Scripture.
@end {en20m}
@section 3 {en21d}
{Student:} Before I go on, I raise an objection against
that. For it does not seem that even if the pope had such fullness of
power Christians would be oppressed by servitude greater than or as
great as the servitude of the old law was. For some religious
superiors have, or can have, such power over their brethren, because
some religious can promise obedience to their superiors in
everything, and yet those religious would not be oppressed by
servitude as great as the servitude of the old law was because such
religious would not be slaves -- for religious are not slaves of
their superiors, nor are the superiors lords of their brethren.
@end {en21d}
@section 3 {en22m}
{Master:} The answer to this is that although the pope
can have such power over someone who wishes to become his slave and
subject himself to the pope's power in everything, yet neither the
pope nor any religious superior has such power over any religious at
all -- that is, over those who vow or have vowed obedience, poverty
and chastity. For any such religious are bound to observe the rule
that they vow. For this reason, neither the pope nor anyone else has
such fullness of power over them, and they are not the slaves of the
pope or of any other superior, as the word "slave" is often
taken in the legal sciences, because neither the pope nor any other
can employ them in servile tasks, abandoning the things that belong
to the substance of their rule, or order them to own property or
contract marriage; yet these things are licit in themselves, although
they have become illicit for religious because of the vow they have
voluntarily taken.
@end {en22m}
@section 3 {en23d}
{Student:} We will examine the power of the pope over
religious later, so do not speak any more about that at the moment.
But say whether, according to them, it can be proved not only through
the fact that the texts brought forward affirm that Christian law is
a law of freedom but also through other words found in those texts
that by gospel law Christians are not bound to as great a servitude
as the servitude of the old law was.
@end {en23d}
@section 3 {en24m}
{Master:} They say that this could be proved through
all the aforesaid texts, though not equally clearly through them all.
@end {en24m}
@section 3 {en25d}
{Student:} Tell me through which ones, according to
them, this can be proved more clearly.
@end {en25d}
@section 3 {en26m}
{Master:} They say that this is clearly proved by means
of the text taken from Acts 15. For at the inspiration of the holy
spirit the apostles announced to the gentiles freedom from the yoke
of servitude, as a consolation for them and so that they would not
lament that they were troubled with burdensome servitude. Thus, in a
passage quoted, James said [Acts 15:19], "I judge that we should
not trouble those gentiles turning to God"; and about those
gentiles who had turned to God, when they received the letter from
the apostles and elders about the freedom we have been talking about,
it is written in the same chapter [Acts 15:31]: "When they had
read it they rejoiced at its consolation". But if these gentile
converts had been freed from the servitude of God's law and subjected
to a greater servitude to Peter and his successors, they would have
both lamented justifiably their greater trouble and not had material
of consolation. They were freed, therefore, from any servitude
greater than or as great as the servitude of the Mosaic law. This is
implied in the words of the apostles, when they say [Acts 15:28-9],
"It has seemed good to the holy spirit and to us to impose on
you no further burden than these essentials: that you abstain",
etc. For if they wanted to impose "no further burden" on
them they did not want to impose on them either a servitude greater
than or a servitude as great as the servitude of the old law.
@end {en26m}
@section 3 {en27d}
{Student:} It seems that those words, "to impose
on you no further burden", should not be understood so
generally. For although the apostles did not impose the burdens of
the old law on Christians, they did nonetheless impose on them many
things besides those named in the above words. For they made many
canons in which they commanded many things besides those enumerated
in the words above, as is clear in the /Decreta/ di. 16, c. /Propter/
and 12, q. 1, c. /Dilectissimis/ , c. /Sint manifeste/
and c. /Ex hiis/ . The words from Acts 15 quoted above,
therefore, should be understood only to refer to the burden of the
Mosaic law.
@end {en27d}
@section 3 {en28m}
{Master:} The reply to this is that although the
apostles made many canons and commanded many things besides those
enumerated in Acts 15, yet they did not command anything to subjects
who had not been asked and were not consenting, except things that
were of divine law and natural law and things that necessity or
public utility demanded, the commanding of which could not be
neglected without damage. It is in things of this kind that the
highest pontiff has power now.
@end {en28m}
@section 3 {en29d}
{Student:} That last statement, I think, can not be
explained briefly in the meaning of those who make it, so, because we
will consider it later, let us put it aside for the moment. Tell me
whether they say that it is clearly provable through any other text
already brought forward that when Scripture speaks about the freedom
of gospel law it should be understood to be referring also to freedom
from some other servitude besides the servitude of Mosaic law.
@end {en29d}
@section 3 {en30m}
{Master:} They say that this can be shown from the text
of the Apostle when he says in 2 Corinthians 3[:17], "Where the
spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom." For in that place the
Apostle is not speaking about freedom from the servitude of the Old
Law in particular, but [is speaking] more generally. The Apostle
means, therefore, that where the spirit of the Lord is, not only is
there freedom from the servitude of the Old Law but also there is
freedom from any servitude with respect to exterior works that is as
great as the servitude of the old law.
This is shown by texts from the holy fathers. For the holy fathers
prove by that text from the Apostle that clerics are permitted to
become monks even if their bishops are unwilling. For, as we read in
19, q. 2, c. /Due/ , Pope Urban says, "Those who are
driven by the Spirit of God are led by the law of God, and who is
there who can worthily resist the holy spirit? Let anyone, therefore,
who is led by this spirit, even if his bishop opposes him, go free
with our authority. For the law has not been laid down for the just.
But 'where the spirit of God is, there is freedom', and if you are
led by the Spirit of God you are not under the law." And
Innocent III says in /Extra, De regularibus/ , c. /Licet/ ,
"It is permitted to certain monks. . . Yet because 'where the
spirit of God is, there is freedom' and those who are driven by the
spirit of God are not under the law, and because the law has not been
laid down for the just, it seems to have been granted to them for
this reason, and not that anyone under the pretext of greater
religion should rashly or lightly flit across to another order to the
detriment or injury of his own order." From these we gather that
through the freedom granted to Christians it is proved that clerics
are allowed to cross over into a religious order and religious to
cross to a stricter order. Yet this could not be proved if by the
"freedom of Christians" the apostle meant only freedom from
the servitude of the Mosaic law. This also seems explicitly provable
from the text of Augustine quoted above. For
in those words Augustine judges, through the freedom which by God's
mercy the Christian religion has acquired, that they should be
reproved who were so oppressing that religion with various burdens
"that the condition of the Jews is more tolerable" than
that of Christians -- yet it was not with the burdens of Mosaic law
that they were oppressing Christians. Augustine thought, therefore,
that the Christian religion has not only been liberated from the
burdens of the old law but also from other burdens that would oppress
as much as or more than the burdens of Mosaic law.
@end {en30m}
@section 3 {en31d}
{Student:} Tell me how reply is made to the arguments
in chapter 6 above that I used to prove that the texts adduced in
chapter 5 should not be understood of the freedom from that
subjection by which, according to the first opinion, Christians are
subject to the highest pontiff.
@end {en31d}
@section 3 {en32m}
{Master:} According to some people the reply to the first of
these is that texts about the freedom of gospel law should not, with
respect to all of them, be understood affirmatively but, with respect
to many of them, should be understood negatively, as was mentioned before,
just as the words of the apostle, "Let there be one spirit"
in husband and wife [1 Corintians 6:16-17], and the words of the
Saviour, "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word will
stand" [Matthew 18:16], and many other [texts] should be
understood negatively. For it is not the case that those who were
slaves before their conversion to the faith became free because of
that conversion. But no one was led by gospel law into greater
servitude than the servitude of the old law and, therefore, no one
may become the slave of the pope by gospel law. However, without
transgressing that law, anyone can make himself the slave of the pope
if he wants to do so of his own free will; or if for some other just
and licit reason he becomes the slave of the pope, there is no
derogation of gospel law. For although the gospel law does not lead
one into this kind of servitude, it does not, on the other hand,
prohibit it.
They say, moreover, that it is false when it is said in the same
place [above] that the Friars Minor are bound
to obey the pope in everything -- although certain Friars Minor, it
is reported, do not maintain this view, asserting that they would be
permitted, even bound, to take wives if the pope at his will alone
were to command this. We will treat these matters later in this tract
and also in the ninth tract of this third part of our dialogue. For
the Friars Minor are not bound to obey the pope when he orders
something against the substance of their rule, and their rule should
be considered, therefore, not heretical but catholic.
The reply to the fourth argument
you put is that Christian law is not called a law of freedom because
it frees Christians from every servitude but because it does not
oppress Christians with as great a servitude as that by which the
Jews were oppressed; and kings and other Christians, therefore, are
allowed to have slaves, though no Christian becomes anyone's slave
through Christian law. To blessed James it is said that he does not
mean that Christian law is a law of perfect freedom in the sense that
no Christian is subject to any man at all, for Christians are subject
to the pope and many of them are subject to princes and other
Christians. But he says that it is a law of perfect freedom because
through it the Christian religion is subject by divine institution to
few sacraments, sacramentals or ceremonies, and through it no
Christian is made the slave of any mortal and, also, is not subjected
to the power of any man, except in those matters which pertain to
necessity or to his own advantage or that of the commonwealth. Hence
the Apostle says, on behalf of himself and all the apostles and all
the prelates of the Church: "For we can not do anything against
truth but only for the truth... I write while I am away so that when
I am present I will not act severely in using the power the Lord has
given me for building up, not for tearing down" (2 Corinthians
13[:8, 10]). From these words we gather that the apostles did not
have any power from God over the faithful except where it was to the
advantage of those faithful. Hence Christian law, which introduces no
subjection except where it is to the advantage of the one subjected
or of any community, is also subject to few divine sacraments.
Deservedly should it be called a law of perfect freedom -- especially
with respect to the Mosaic law which entangles those subject to it in
very many sacraments and ceremonies that can scarcely be borne -- yet
it is not called the law of /most/ perfect freedom, because in
perfection there are grades, since not every perfection should be
regarded as the most perfect. The most perfect freedom, however, will
not be had in this mortal life.
@end {en32m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 8
@section 2 {c8}
@section 2 {c8}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 8
@section 3 {en33d}
{Student:} So that I can understand the nature of the
preceding argument still more fully, I want to hear some arguments
besides the ones written above to prove that not all men are slaves
of the highest pontiff, from which those of that opinion try to infer
that the pope does not have such fullness of power by Christ's ordination.
@end {en33d}
@section 3 {en34m}
{Master:} It is shown in many ways that not all
Christians are slaves of the highest pontiff in the strictest sense
of the word "slave" (which nonetheless would follow
according to them if the pope were to have this sort of fullness of
power in both temporal and spiritual matters). For a slave can have
no ownership or lordship of any temporal thing at all while he
remains a slave, because whatever a slave acquires he acquires for
his lord and it is that lord's. Kings, princes and very many other
Christians, however, have lordship and ownership of very many
temporal things. Not all men are slaves of the pope, therefore, in
that sense of the word "slave" in which a lord can sell,
give and transfer his slave and at will take from him every temporal
thing. This would follow, however, if the pope were to have such
fullness of power in temporal matters.
@end {en34m}
@section 3 {en35d}
{Student:} How is it proved that kings, princes and
many other Christians have ownership and lordship of temporal things?
@end {en35d}
@section 3 {en36m}
{Master:} This is shown in many ways. For they have
lordship and ownership of temporal things by whose temporal laws they
are possessed. [But temporal things are possessed by the laws of
emperors and kings] (di. 8, /Quo iure / ). Emperors and kings,
therefore, have lordship and ownership of temporal things.
Further, they have ownership and lordship of temporal things whose
laws even highest pontiffs use for the course of temporal things. But
highest pontiffs use the laws of emperors and kings for the course of
temporal things (di. 10, /Quoniam idem / and di. 96, /Cum ad verum/ ).
Emperors and kings, therefore, have ownership and lordship of
temporal things.
Again, bishops sometimes have things of their own apart from things
of the church (12, q. 1, c. /Episcopi/ , c. /Manifesta/ ,
c. /Certe/ and c. /Sint manifeste/ ). Therefore others
besides the pope can possess ownership and lordship of temporal things.
Besides, kings, princes and other faithful laymen give temporal
things to churches. Therefore they have ownership and lordship of
temporal things.
Again, Jews and infidels have ownership of temporal things. Therefore
much more do Christian kings and princes have ownership of things of
this kind.
@end {en36m}
@section 3 {en37d}
{Student:} That is so widely known, both in civil and
canon law and in the common opinion of men, that I do not care to
have more arguments adduced for it. I could ask about it, however,
whether it is heretical to say that no Christian has ownership of
temporal things, but I propose to reserve this to the tract about the
rights of the Roman Empire. Revert, therefore, to proving that not
all Christians are slaves of the pope.
@end {en37d}
@section 3 {en38m}
{Master:} This is proved in another way as follows. A
slave can not have another slave, but many laymen have slaves (di.
54, c. 1. [ /Nullus/ ] and c. 2. [ /Nulli/ ] and c. [5] /Quicumque
/ and in many other chapters). Therefore not all men are slaves
of the pope.
Further, many obtain freedom from the church (12, q. 2, c. /Si
quos de servis ecclesie / and c. /Episcopus / and c. /Liberti
/ and in many other chapters). Therefore not all men are slaves
of the highest pontiff. Therefore many men are free. The Saviour
seems to attest to this when he says in Matthew 17[:25], "The
children are free." The apostle also says in Galatians 4[:1-2]:
"Heirs, as long as they are minors, are no better than slaves,
though they are the owners of all the property; but they remain under
guardians and trustees until the date set by the father." From
these words we gather that he differs from a slave when the date set
by the father comes and at that time, as a consequence, he is the
slave neither of the pope nor of another.
@end {en38m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 9
@section 2 {c9}
@section 2 {c9}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 9
@section 3 {en39d}
{Student:} I think I perceive how they try to prove by
means of the freedom of Christians that the pope does not have such
fullness of power, especially in temporal matters. Therefore try to
argue again for that opinion in another way.
@end {en39d}
@section 3 {en40m}
{Master:} This seems provable in other ways. For a
vicar, in so far as he is a vicar, does not have greater power than
him whose vicar he is. Therefore the pope, in so far as he is the
vicar of Christ, does not have greater power in temporal matters than
Christ had, in so far as he was a mortal man able to suffer. But
Christ, in so far as he was a mortal man able to suffer, did not have
power of this kind in temporal matters, since he did not have
lordship of all temporal things and others were not his slaves in the
strict sense of the word "slaves". He attests to this
himself, as we read in John 15[:15], where he said to the apostles,
"I will not now call you servants [slaves], because a servant
does not know what his lord does." Therefore the pope does not
have this kind of fullness of power.
@end {en40m}
@section 3 {en41d}
{Student:} We will be able to find out enough about the
basis of that argument in the fourth tract of the second part of the
dialogue where it is appropriate to examine carefully the poverty of
Christ. Putting it aside, therefore, bring forward some other [arguments].
@end {en41d}
@section 3 {en42m}
{Master:} The same point is proved in another way as
follows. He who ought not involve himself in secular occupations
ought not have such fullness of power in secular matters. The pope,
however, ought not involve himself in secular occupations. Therefore
he does not have, and ought not have, such fullness of power in
secular matters.
The major [premise] is proved because power is given to someone in
vain if he ought not exercise it. For this reason too kings who
receive power from God to judge and to provide justice and make
judgements who do not do these things are often censured in sacred
letters. Thus Wisdom 6[:4-5] says to kings who carry out their duty
as king wrongly or negligently, "Power was given you by the
Lord, and strength by the Most High; he will examine your works and
search out your thoughts. Because as servants of his kingdom you did
not judge rightly ... etc." There the Gloss says, "Note
that everyone ought to do those things which are suitable to his
condition"; and, consequently, anyone ought especially to do
those things for the doing of which he received power by the special
ordination of God. Therefore he who specifically received fullness of
power in secular matters by the decree and ordination of Christ ought
most of all to involve himself in secular occupations even beyond all
others, lest he show himself in the power committed to him negligent
and idle.
The minor [premise], that is that the pope
ought not involve himself in secular occupations, seems to be clearly
shown by the Apostle, who says in 2 Timothy 2[:4], "No one
serving as a soldier of God involves himself in secular occupations,
so that he may please him with whom he has enlisted." Therefore
since the pope especially, among all men, ought to serve as a soldier
of God so that he may please him, he ought to involve himself in
secular occupations less than others. Hence, as we read in di. 88, c. /Episcopus/ ,
we find this taken from a canon of the apostles: "Let not a
bishop, priest or deacon, take on secular cares; if they do
otherwise, let them be deposed." And it is written as follows in
c. /Episcopus nullam/ : "Let not a bishop call back on
himself any household care, but let him devote himself only to
reading, prayer, and the preaching of the word." And in 21, q.
5, c. 1 [rather 21, q. 3, c. 2] we read as follows: "There are
statutes of the apostles that say 'No one serving as a soldier of God
involves himself in secular occupations'; therefore, let clerics not
sue for possession of houses or those who sue not hold clerical
office." From these and very many other sacred canons (found in
16, q. 1, /Sunt nonulli / and the whole of di. 88, and 21, q.
3, c. /Placuit / and c. / Cyprianus / and c. /Mollitiis / and
c. /Hii qui / and c. /Sacerdotum / and the whole of /Extra,
Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus se negotiis immisceant/ , and
in very many other places) we gather that clerics and bishops ought
not involve themselves in secular occupations. Consequently the pope
particularly ought to abstain from such things, both because he is
foremost and first among bishops and clerics and ought especially to
be occupied with spiritual matters, and because he particularly
occupies the place of the apostles, and especially of the leader of
the apostles, who taught and did this and whom he principally ought
to imitate.
@end {en42m}
@section 3 {en43d}
{Student:} It is not necessary for the highest pontiff
to conform himself in everything to the apostolic life, because the
apostles renounced ownership of temporal goods ( /Extra, De
verborum significatione, Exiit/ , li. 6) and yet the pope can have
property. Similarly, therefore, the pope can involve himself in many
secular occupations in which the apostles did not involve themselves.
@end {en43d}
@section 3 {en44m}
{Master:} To this they reply that although the pope is
not bound to conform himself in everything to the apostolic life, yet
nothing that would be opposed to the apostolic life has been
especially enjoined on him by Christ; and since, therefore,
involvement in secular occupations is opposed to the apostolic life,
they infer that this has not been especially enjoined on the pope by
Christ. And therefore fullness of power in secular matters has not
been especially given to him by Christ, since he would be bound to
exercise power that he has especially by the ordination and
institution of Christ.
@end {en44m}
@section 3 {en45d}
{Student:} Would you try to give another argument for
that opinion?
@end {en45d}
@section 3 {en46m}
{Master:} That the pope does not have such fullness of
power in spiritual and temporal matters is shown. For he who is less
than and the servant and slave of others, over whom he ought not
exercise power, does not have over them fullness of power in both
spiritual and temporal matters. For he who has such fullness of power
over others is their lord, since no lord can have more power than
fullness of power over everyone. And no one is slave and lord with
respect to the same person. Also, he who has fullness of power over
others especially can and ought to exercise power over them. The
pope, however, is less than and the servant and slave of Christians,
over whom he ought not exercise power, as Christ attested when he
said to the apostles in Matthew 20[:25-7]: "You know that the
rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them and their great ones
exercise power over them. It will not be so among you; but whoever
wishes to become greater among you must be your servant, and whoever
wishes to be first among you will be your slave." And in Matthew
23[:11] Christ said: "The greater among you will be your
servant." And in Mark 9[:34] he said, "Whoever wants to be
first will be last of all and servant of all." And in Mark 10[:42-4]:
"You know that those who seem to rule the Gentiles lord it over
them and their princes have power over them. But it is not so among
you; but whoever wishes to become greater will be your servant, and
whoever wishes to be first will be the slave of all." And we
read in Luke 22[:25-6] that Christ said to the apostles, "The
kings of the Gentiles lord it over them and those who have power over
them are called benefactors. But not so with you; the greater among
you should become like the lesser and the leader like one who
serves." From these it is clear that he who is spiritually first
among Christians, that is the pope, is less than and the servant and
slave of others, over whom he ought not exercise power. Therefore he
does not have such fullness of power.
@end {en46m}
@section 3 {en47d}
{Student:} An argument like that one has been
considered a little more fully in chapter 3 of book 6 of the first
part of this dialogue. Leaving it aside, therefore, would you
endeavour to bring forward some others?
@end {en47d}
@section 3 {en48m}
{Master:} That the pope does not have such fullness of
power is proved as follows. For whoever has not been established by
Christ as a judge of secular matters does not have from Christ such
fullness of power in secular matters. The pope has not been
established by Christ as a judge of secular matters, as blessed Peter
testifies in the letter of Clement which is found in 11, q. 1, /Te quidem/ .
He says, "It does indeed behove you to live unblamably and to
strive with the greatest zeal to cast aside all the business of this
life: do not be a guarantor, do not become an advocate in law suits
and, in short, do not in any occupation be found entangled in the
occasion of a worldly court case. For Christ does not wish to appoint
you today as either a judge or an advocate in secular cases."
Therefore the pope does not have such fullness of power especially in
secular matters.
Also, he who is not the lord of clerics does not have fullness of
power over them. The pope is not the lord of clerics, however, as
blessed Peter testifies in the fifth chapter of his first letter. He
says: "Not as one lording it over the clergy" [1 Peter
5:3]. Therefore the pope does not have such fullness of power even
over the clergy.
Further, the pope has greater power in lands subject to his temporal
jurisdiction than in other lands not subject to his temporal
jurisdiction. Therefore he does not in all [lands] have such fullness
of power.
@end {en48m}
@section 3 {en49d}
{Student:} The holders of the first opinion would say
that all lands are subject to the temporal jurisdiction of the pope.
@end {en49d}
@section 3 {en50m}
{Master:} Innocent III seems to oppose this. As we read
in /Extra, De hereticis, Vergentis/ , he distinguishes the
lands subject to his temporal jurisdiction from others. He says,
"We decree that the goods of heretics in lands subject to our
temporal jurisdiction are confiscated, and in other [lands] we
command that the same thing be done by the secular powers and princes."
@end {en50m}
@section 3 {en51d}
{Student:} Bring forward yet another argument.
@end {en51d}
@section 3 {en52m}
{Master:} It is proved in another way that the pope
does not have such fullness of power specifically in temporal
matters, because from one who has fullness of power in temporal
matters, such that he can do everything in temporal matters that is
not opposed to divine law or the law of nature, all power in temporal
matters derives. But imperial and royal power and the power of other
lay rulers does not derive from the pope -- and thus the king of
France does not acknowledge a superior in temporal matters ( /Extra,
Qui filii sint legitimi,/ c. /Per venerabilem/).
Therefore the pope does not have such fullness of power in temporal matters.
@end {en52m}
@section 3 {en53d}
{Student:} We will consider fully in the second tract
of this third part of our dialogue the distinction between spiritual
and secular powers and whether secular power is from the pope. Would
you therefore bring forward another argument.
@end {en53d}
@section 3 {en54m}
{Master:} That the pope does not have such fullness of
power in temporal matters is shown, because no prescription runs
against one who has such fullness of power in temporal matters.
However prescription, at least the one hundred year prescription,
runs against the pope ( /Extra, De prescriptionibus/ , c. /Si diligenti)/ .
Therefore the pope does not have fullness of power of this kind in
temporal matters.
@end {en54m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 10
@section 2 {c10}
@section 2 {c10}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 10
@section 3 {en55d}
{Student:} Let this be enough now about the first
opinion which you recorded in chapter 1 above. Turn, therefore, to
the second opinion recorded in that chapter.
@end {en55d}
@section 3 {en56m}
{Master:} That opinion contains two parts, one
affirmative and the other negative. The first is that the pope has by
Christ's decree such fullness of power in spiritual matters. The
second is that he does not have by Christ's decree such fullness of
power in temporal matters.
@end {en56m}
@section 3 {en57d}
{Student:} Argue for the first part first.
@end {en57d}
@section 3 {en58m}
{Master:} That the pope has by Christ's decree such
fullness of power in spiritual matters is proved because, just as
those things which are secular ought to be managed by a secular
ruler, so those things which are spiritual should be ordered and
managed by the highest pontiff. But the supreme secular ruler has
fullness of power in secular matters.
Further, Christ gave Peter fullness of power when he said to him,
"Whatever you bind on earth", etc.; but he did not give him
fullness of power in temporal matters; therefore he gave him fullness
of power in spiritual matters.
Again, he who can reprove every man for any sin at all and can
restrain them by an appropriate punishment has fullness of power in
spiritual matters; but the pope can reprove every man for sin ( /Extra,
De iudiciis/ , c. /Novit/ ); therefore the pope has
fullness of power in spiritual matters.
Again, all spiritual matters can be reduced to causes [legal actions]
of God; but all God's causes pertain to the highest pontiff because
they pertain to bishops and clerics (di. 96, c. /Si imperator/ ),
and the pope is first among bishops; all God's causes, therefore,
pertain to him. Therefore he has fullness of power in spiritual
matters. Pope Julius seems to think this. As we read in di. 11, c. /Nolite/ ,
he says: "For it is quite improper for anyone, whether a bishop
or of a lower order, to resist this rule which he sees that the see
of blessed Peter follows and teaches. For it is most appropriate that
the whole body of the church agree in this observance, which derives
its authority from where the Lord placed the rulership of the whole
church." And Pope Nicholas says in the same distinction, c. /Consequens/ ,
"The result is that what is enacted with full authority by the
rulers of this see is not removed by the hindering occasion of any
custom, [with others] following their own wills alone". Here the
gloss on the word "full" says: "The authority of the
pope is called full; that of other bishops is half-full." We
gather from these words that, at least in spiritual matters, the pope
has from Christ fullness of power.
@end {en58m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 11
@section 2 {c11}
@section 2 {c11}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 11
@section 3 {en59d}
{Student:} If the pope has from Christ fullness of
power in both spiritual and temporal matters, there is no doubt that
he has from Christ fullness of power in spiritual matters. The
arguments that were brought forward for the first opinion in chapters
[2], 3 and 4 above can therefore also be brought forward for the
first part of the second opinion, and so I do not want to hear more
arguments for it at the moment. Likewise for the second part of that
second opinion [denying that the pope has fullness of power in
temporal matters] many points touched on in chapters 5, 7, 8, and 9
can be adduced. Leaving aside that [second] opinion, therefore, us
try to discuss the third one which was touched
on in chapter 1 above. About it I wish to hear first the manner in
which it is asserted.
@end {en59d}
@section 3 {en60m}
{Master:} That opinion asserts that the pope has in
both temporal and spiritual matters such fullness of power, partly by
Christ's decree, partly by human decree, saying that the pope has
directly from Christ full power in the area of penance, according to
the words in Matthew 16[:19], "Whatever you bind on earth",
etc. He also has from Christ the power of teaching all the Christian
people, according to the words in John 21[:17], "Feed my
sheep." He also has from Christ the power of distributing and
conferring ecclesiastical offices, according to Christ's words to
Peter in John 1[:42], "You will be called Cephas", that is
head: for from the fact that he is head he has the power to act upon
the members by conferring on them different offices. He also has it
from Christ, by virtue of the fact that he constituted him head of
the others, that the more important business of the church should be
referred to him. From general councils, however, he has power with
respect to all things pertaining to the rule of all Christian people
in which power was not specifically granted to him by Christ.
@end {en60m}
@section 3 {en61d}
{Student:} Concerning that opinion many points would have to be
discussed which (or many of which) have been touched on in the things
said in connection with the first opinion or will be touched on when
we analyse the last opinion set down in chapter one above. I want
you, therefore, to try to support with some arguments only one thing
that that opinion asserts, namely that the pope has received some
power from general councils. For this seems to conflict with those
texts which say that general councils obtain strength and authority
from the Roman church.
@end {en61d}
@section 3 {en62m}
{Master:} That the pope received some power from
general councils seems provable as follows. The pope has some power
from the canons, and only from the canons of general councils;
therefore he has some power from general councils.
The first [premise] seems provable from various texts of the saints.
For Pope Julius, writing to the bishops of the east says, as we read
in di. 17, c. /Regula/ , "Your rule neither has nor can
have any strength, since this council was not held by orthodox
bishops nor was there a legate of the Roman church present, despite
the canons ordering that councils ought not to be held without its
authority." We gather from these words that it has been ordered
by the canons that the pope alone has the authority to assemble councils.
Also, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. /Ipsi/ , Pope Gelasius says,
"Those are canons which have willed that appeals from the whole
church be brought for examination to this holy see. They have enacted
that there ought not be any appeal at all from this see to anywhere
else, and, accordingly, that this see should judge the whole church
and should fall under no one's judgement. And they have ordered that
its judgement should never be judged and they have decreed that its
sentence must not be dissolved; rather they have commanded that its
decrees should be followed." We gather from these words that it
belongs to the pope from the canons, not from Christ immediately,
that everyone is permitted to appeal to him and that it is not
permissible to appeal from him, that he can judge concerning the
whole church, that he is subject to no one's judgement, that his
sentence should be upheld in all matters, and, consequently, that his
commands should be obeyed in everything and by everyone. From this it
is inferred that the pope has from general councils fullness of power
in respect of everything not granted him directly by Christ.
Also, as we read in 2, q. 6, c. /Decreto/ , Gregory says,
"Let diocesans be permitted, after a hearing by their primate,
to appeal, if necessary, to us and by our authority carry on and
determine their litigation, in accordance with the decrees of the
Fathers, either before us or through legates sent from our side."
We are given to understand by these words that it is by the decrees
of the Fathers that it belongs to the pope that others are permitted
to appeal to him.
Also, as we read in di. 17, c. /Multis/ , Pope Pelagius says:
"As holy synod determines and blessed custom demands, let
greater and more difficult questions always be referred to the
apostolic see." We gather from these words that it is from synod
and by custom and not directly from Christ that it belongs to the
pope that greater cases are referred to him.
Also, as we read in 2, q. 6, c. /Arguta/ , Pope Nicholas says,
"You ought not have handed over to oblivion, however, the
privileges of the apostolic see, by which venerable canons order that
the judgements of the whole church are to be referred to this
see." By these words it seems to be established that the pope
has received power from the canons.
Also, blessed Peter received power from the college of apostles (di.
21, /In novo/ , di. 17, /Hinc etiam/ and 3, q. 6, /Dudum/ ).
Therefore the pope can also receive power from a general council.
@end {en62m}
@section 3 {en63d}
{Student:} Would you now try to prove that the pope has
fullness of power either from Christ or by human decree.
@end {en63d}
@section 3 {en64m}
{Master:} It seems that this can be shown from many
texts of the holy Fathers. For Gregory seems to attest to this in 2,
q. 6, c. /Decreto / and Pope Julius in the same cause and
question c. /Qui se / . Innocent III also seems clearly to
assert it in a general council, as we read in /Extra, De
poenitentia et remissione/ , c. /Cum ex eo/ .
It is also proved by argument, because he who should be obeyed in
everything has fullness of power, either by Christ's decree or by
human decree, or partly from one and partly from the other; but the
pope should be obeyed in everything, as Gregory attests. As we read
in di. 19, c. /Nulli/ , he says: "It is not right for
anyone either to wish to or to be able to transgress the commands of
the apostolic see or the administration of our dispensation ... And
let him be deprived of divine and episcopal office who refuses to
obey apostolic commands." Pope Stephen seems to assert this too,
as we read in the same distinction, c. /Enimvero/ , which was
cited above. And as we read in 25, q. 2, c. /Amputato/ , Pope
Julius says: "Let not those things that have been established by
the apostles and their successors be neglected out of any idleness,
profaned by any disagreement or disturbed by any dispute." We
gather from these [texts] that the pope should be obeyed in
everything. Therefore he has fullness of power, either directly by
Christ's institution or by human decree, or partly by one and partly
by the other.
@end {en64m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 12
@section 2 {c12}
@section 2 {c12}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 12
@section 3 {en65d}
{Student:} Try to argue against that opinion [i.e., the
third opinion].
@end {en65d}
@section 3 {en66m}
{Master:} There are some people who do not regard that
opinion as heretical like the first, yet consider it to be false,
irrational and dangerous. They consider it false, indeed, because
from it, as from the first, it follows that all Christians are slaves
of the highest pontiff, taking the word "slaves" in its
strictest sense as it is understood and used in the legal sciences.
For whoever has -- whether by divine decree or by human decree, or
partly from the one and partly from the other -- fullness of power
over all Christians in both temporal and spiritual matters, so that
he can do anything which is not against the law of God or against the
law of nature, so that no one could by any human act withdraw himself
from that person's power in any action not of itself illicit in its
kind, has as much temporal lordship over all Christians as any lord
has had or could have had over his slave. If therefore the pope were
to have such fullness of power over all Christians, the pope would
have the fullest power in temporal matters over all kings and princes
and everyone else and all would be his slaves, and out of the
fullness of his power he could deprive any king at all, without any
fault [on the king's part] and without any reason, of his kingdom and
give it to any pagan; he could make a king subject to any rustic at
all just as his own will decided, and if he did so, it would hold de
facto, and no king at all would be able licitly to resist him in such
matters or similar ones. They regard this as false and absurd.
@end {en66m}
@section 3 {en67d}
{Student:} Tell me why they do not regard that opinion
as heretical, since it asserts that all Christians are slaves, and
divine Scripture asserts that gospel law is a law of freedom, and
consequently that opinion conflicts with divine Scripture. It seems,
therefore, that according to them that opinion should be adjudged
heretical like the first.
@end {en67d}
@section 3 {en68m}
{Master:} They say that your objection should be
answered by means of some things said above.
For the texts of divine Scripture which establish that Christian law
is a law of freedom should be understood negatively, and the first
opinion is therefore heretical according to them because it follows
from it that all Christians have become slaves of the highest pontiff
through gospel law, and gospel law, as a consequence, could not be
called either negatively or positively a law of freedom but would be
a law of the most horrendous servitude. This third opinion, however,
does not assert that all Christians have been made slaves of the
highest pontiff by gospel law, but it only follows from it that all
Christians have become slaves of the highest pontiff by voluntary
submission. For it holds that all Christians have willingly and
voluntarily submitted themselves in all things to the pope's power,
which was not granted to him directly by Christ. And Christians would
indeed be able to do this, at least in some case. Thus any king, too,
would be able to make himself the slave of the highest pontiff, at
least in some case, by handing over his kingdom and subjecting
himself to the pope's power in everything. If, also, there were only
ten or twelve Christians or a few more they could all make themselves
slaves of the pope. However, according to them this has never been
done, and therefore that opinion is not heretical but false. That
this has never been done and that this opinion is false is proved by
innumerable civil and canon laws which assert that some people are
slaves and some are free.
@end {en68m}
@section 3 {en69d}
{Student:} Why do they say that the above opinion is dangerous?
@end {en69d}
@section 3 {en70m}
{Master:} They say this because if the pope were to
have power of this kind danger could easily threaten the whole
community of Christians. For if the pope were to become a secret
heretic or were to become secretly zealous for the sect of Sarracens
or some other [sect] of infidels, he could easily expose the whole of
Christianity to danger. For by his command alone he could plunder all
Christians of their possessions, that is of their arms, defences and
other things with which they might be defended against their enemies.
Once this was done, the infidels, called by the pope at first
secretly zealous for them and then publicly agreeing with them, could
easily occupy all the land of the faithful.
@end {en70m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 13
@section 2 {c13}
@section 2 {c13}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 13
@section 3 {en71d}
{Student:} Let us now look at the fourth
opinion touched on in chapter one above.
@end {en71d}
@section 3 {en72m}
{Master:} That opinion holds that the pope does not
have such fullness of power, either by Christ's institution or by
human decree, regularly or occasionally. But it is put by different
people in different ways. For some say that the pope has no more
power from Christ than other priests; however, like other priests, he
has some power over others, yet, outside the penitential tribunal, no
coercive power, but, like other priests, he has power to teach and
inform the laity. He does, however, have some, but not full, coercive
power, from the community of the faithful, who willingly, and not by
constraint, bestowed on the Roman pontiff and on no other priest some
power over the whole community of the faithful.
Some say, on the other hand, that the pope has directly from Christ
some power over all Christians, yet not full power in everything,
either in spiritual or in temporal matters. From faithful men, on the
other hand, he received no power, either full or not full.
Some say, on the other hand, that in spiritual matters the pope has
power from Christ alone, yet not full power. In temporal matters, on
the other hand, he has no special power from Christ but from the
faithful alone, but though it is not full but limited in the way the
faithful have wanted to limit it.
@end {en72m}
@section 3 {en73d}
{Student:} Those ways of putting it contain many things
which, if we were to discuss them at length, would make it necessary
for us to engender boredom, perhaps, in our readers. Let us,
therefore, pass over them quickly, especially since when the
opportunity arises we will touch on all of them below in different
places. First of all, therefore, tell me what motivates the first
group who say that the pope has no more power from Christ than other priests.
@end {en73d}
@section 3 {en74m}
{Master:} They say that on the basis of the texts [of
Jerome] found in di. 93, c. /Legimus / and di. 95, c. /Olim,/
which I quoted above in chapter 18 [rather, chapter 17] of book 5 of
the first part of this dialogue. In these Jerome seems to affirm
expressly that by the decree or institution of Christ no priest is
greater than another, either in order or in administration. This also
seems provable by the fact that the apostles were equal in power to
blessed Peter as far as Christ's decree was concerned (di. 21, c. /In
novo / ; 24, q. 1, c. /Loquitur/ ; 2, q. 7, c. /Paulus)/ ,
and the apostles did not have from Christ any power over other
priests. Therefore, as far as Christ's special decree is concerned,
all priests are equal to the successors of blessed Peter.
@end {en74m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 14
@section 2 {c14}
@section 2 {c14}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 14
@section 3 {en75d}
{Student:} Say briefly whether some people try to
reject that assertion.
@end {en75d}
@section 3 {en76m}
{Master:} Some people do regard this as erroneous and
as clearly conflicting with the sacred canons found in di. 21, c. /Quamvis
/ and [di. 22,] c. /Sacrosancta/ and 9, q. 3, c. /Cuncta
/ and 24, q. 1, c. / Cum beatissimus,/
which I also quoted in chapter 10 of book 5 of the first part of this
dialogue. This assertion also seems opposed to Innocent III who, as
we find in /Extra, De maioritate et obedientia/ , c. /Solite / [rather,
Extra, /De iudiciis/ , /Novit/ ] which was quoted above,
says that he relies not on human decree but on divine power;
therefore the pope has directly from God some power over all Christians.
This is also proved by argument, because no community, especially a
large one, which does not have a head is well and appropriately
ordered, since, as Solomon attests in Proverbs 11[:14], "Where
there is no governor the people goes to ruin." But the community
of the faithful has been ordered by Christ in the best and most
suitable way. Christ therefore gave the community of the faithful a
head, and none but blessed Peter. Therefore Peter was appointed by
Christ as head of all the faithful.
Further, the Christian people have not been less suitably and
usefully ordered by Christ than were the Hebrew people; but by divine
decree that people had a head, at least in spiritual matters, that is
the chief priest, who was superior to all other priests. The
Christian people too, therefore, have by Christ's decree one head who
is superior to all other Christian priests. Pope Marcellus, as we
read in 24, q. 1, c. /Rogamus/ , and Innocent III in /Extra,
De translatione/ , c. 1, and all the holy Fathers also seem to
hold this.
@end {en76m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 15
@section 2 {c15}
@section 2 {c15}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 15
@section 3 {en77d}
{Student:} Say now why the people holding that opinion
say that the pope received no coercive power from Christ.
@end {en77d}
@section 3 {en78m}
{Master:} They say this because, according to them, the
whole community of the faithful ought to be subject to one single
supreme judge who has coercive power. All other judges should receive
coercive power from him. This person, however, should not be the
pope, because then all lay jurisdiction would be lost. Therefore the
pope received no coercive power from Christ.
@end {en78m}
@section 3 {en79d}
{Student:} I will try to discuss that material with you
in the tract on the rights of the Roman emperor [ /Dialogus / 3.2],
and so, leaving that and some other points aside, would you try to
argue briefly for the last statement, namely that in temporal matters
the pope has no special power directly from Christ, but [has power]
from his faithful, yet not full [power] but limited, just as the
faithful wanted to limit it.
@end {en79d}
@section 3 {en80m}
{Master:} It seems provable in various ways that in
temporal matters the pope has no power directly from Christ. For just
as the emperor is related to temporal matters, so the pope is related
to spiritual matters in so far as he received power directly from
Christ. But the emperor has no power in spiritual matters. Therefore
in temporal matters the pope has no power directly from Christ.
Further, as was argued in chapter 9 above,
according to the sacred Scriptures and the canons, the pope should
not involve himself in secular business, and consequently he has not
been specially commissioned by Christ to involve himself in secular
business. It seems, therefore, that he did not receive any power in
temporal matters directly from Christ.
@end {en80m}
@section 3 {en81d}
{Student:} How is it proved that in temporal matters
the pope has some power from the faithful?
@end {en81d}
@section 3 {en82m}
{Master:} This is asserted because of sacred canons
which establish that in many cases the pope does intervene in
temporal matters. In /Extra, De foro competenti/ , c. /Licet,/ /Extra,
De iudiciis/ , c. /Novit,/ /Extra, Qui
filii sunt legitimi / c. /Per venerabilem,/
and in innumerable other places, we read that the pope exercises
temporal jurisdiction. Yet he does not have it from Christ, as is
said above to have been proved; therefore he has it from the faithful.
This is proved by the following argument. The pope does not have
directly from Christ greater jurisdiction in one region than in
another, but in fact and in law he does exercise greater jurisdiction
in temporal matters in one region than in another. He does not have
that power directly from Christ, therefore, and so he has it from
someone else, and this can only be the faithful. In temporal matters,
therefore, he has some power from the faithful -- not full power,
however, but limited, because in handing over power in temporal
matters the faithful did not make themselves his slaves. Therefore
they did not confer on him fullness of power.
@end {en82m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 16
@section 2 {c16}
@section 2 {c16}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 16
@section 3 {en83d}
{Student:} Let us pass over to the fifth
opinion touched on in chapter 1 above. Would you first try to
set it out and then explain how it should be understood.
@end {en83d}
@section 3 {en84m}
{Master:} That opinion holds, as I said, that in
temporal and spiritual matters the pope has such fullness of power
that either by ordained power or by absolute power he can do anything
that is not against divine law or the natural law. He does not have
this regularly and simply, either by divine law or by human law, but
by Christ's decree or divine law he has such fullness of power
occasionally or in a particular case and conditionally ( /secundum quid/ ).
According to some this should be understood as follows. By divine
law or by Christ's decree the pope should not intervene in the
management of temporal matters as long as temporal matters are being
managed fittingly and appropriately by the laity, except by accepting
temporal goods from the laity for his own sustenance and the carrying
out of his duty; and therefore he does not have power from Christ
regularly to manage and order temporal matters, which are known to
pertain to kings, princes and other laymen. Occasionally, however, or
in a particular case -- namely when temporal matters were being
handled by others to the danger of the community of Christians or to
the subversion of faith, or in a similar case were being turned to
evil, and there was no layman willing or able to prevent such dangers
-- the pope would have by divine law power to do anything in temporal
matters that right reason would dictate as necessarily to be done for
the common good and the preservation of the faith and to meet dangers
of this kind. And thus in such a case he would have fullness of power
in a certain way and conditionally ( /secundum quid/ ) over
temporal matters, not because the temporal goods would then be made
his with respect to lordship and ownership, nor because he can manage
them according to his pleasure, but because there is nothing any king
or other layman can do about any temporal matter at all that the pope
could not then do, if it were advantageous that this be done and
there was no one else by whom it could appropriately be done; and
thus even in such a case he would not have in temporal matters
fullness of power simply but only /secundum quid/ .
In spiritual matters, similarly, he does not by divine law have
regularly and simply such fullness of power, because he cannot,
without fault [on their part] and without a reason, enjoin on the
faithful things that are supererogatory, nor indeed many other things
as well. For he cannot, without fault or reason, force a layman to
contract a marriage or to make a vow of virginity or chastity, and
yet neither of these is against divine law or against the law of
nature, rather each can licitly be done; and so it is of many other
permissible [acts] that pertain to spiritual matters and over which
the pope by divine law does not regularly and simply have fullness of
power. Yet over these he does occasionally have fullness of power /secundum
quid/ , because in a particular case, either by reason of a crime
or on account of some notable necessity or utility, he can, when no
danger would be threatened by his command, enjoin on anyone at all
anything in spiritual matters which is not against the law of God or
against the law of nature.
And so, they say, both in temporal and in spiritual matters the pope
occasionally has by divine law fullness of power, not simply but /secundum
quid/ . Although this power is not the fullest, it is,
nevertheless, abundant, singular and very great. For through it he
can in a particular case transfer empires and kingdoms, deprive
kings, princes and any other layman at all of temporal rights and
goods and confer them on others. In spiritual matters he can also do
all things, in a particular case. It is not easy, however, to state,
explicitly and in particular, all the cases in which he can do the
aforesaid things, or some of them. And perhaps no universal teaching
can be given about them by which it may be known with certainty and
without error, especially by the simple, when the pope can do such
things and when he cannot, and what kind of things he can do in one
case and what kind in another -- for there are many such things that
he can do in one case but cannot do in another.
@end {en84m}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 17
@section 2 {c17}
@section 2 {c17}
@section 3 {tt}
Capitulum 17
@section 3 {en85d}
{Student:} Although some of the above is unclear to me,
and perhaps later when the opportunity arises you will explain it,
yet for now do not trouble to explain more fully the unclear points
in that opinion. But since you have briefly stated, according to that
opinion, which power Christ did /not/ give regularly to
blessed Peter and his successors and which he gave him occasionally
or in a particular case, briefly relate now, according to that same
opinion, the power or jurisdiction which Christ /did/ give
regularly to blessed Peter and, in him, to his successors.
@end {en85d}
@section 3 {en86m}
{Master:} It is said that Christ established blessed
Peter as the head, chief and prelate of the other apostles and of all
the faithful, giving to him regularly in spiritual matters, in
respect of everything that should of necessity be done or of
necessity be omitted for the rule of the community of the faithful as
it concerns good customs and any spiritual necessities of the
faithful at all, all power in such matters as could be committed to
one man not dangerously but prudently and to the common advantage,
and [giving him] freedom, and coercive jurisdiction also, without any
detriment or notable and significant cost to those temporal rights of
emperors, kings, princes and any other laymen at all, or of clerics,
that pertained to them, before or after the establishment of gospel
law, by the law of nature or by the law of nations or by civil law.
In temporal matters, however, he gave him regularly only the right of
seeking temporal goods for his own sustenance and the performance of
his duties. And this power the successors of blessed Peter, that is
the Roman pontiffs, have now, whether in temporal or spiritual
matters, regularly by divine law. But any further power that the
highest pontiffs regularly have had, or have, they have obtained, and
obtain, by human decree, concession or voluntary submission, or by
express or tacit consent, or because of the weakness, negligence or
evil of other men, or by custom, or in whatever way by human law.
@end {en86m}
@section 3 {en87d}
{Student:} That account contains many things that are
unclear to me. So that I might better understand whether they are
true or false, would you strive to explain them to me and make clear
how that opinion is distinguished from the others.
@end {en87d}
@section 3 {en88m}
{Master:} In saying that Christ established blessed
Peter "as head, chief and prelate of the other apostles and all
the faithful" it intends to destroy the opinion which holds that
Peter was head of the church not by Christ's institution but only by
the election or institution of the apostles or the other faithful.
And by the "spiritual matters" to which it refers it means
those things which by the institution of gospel law are proper to
gospel law, being found in no other law (at least no human law) or
sect, things such as the administering of the sacraments of the new
law, the ordination of priests and clerics, the institution or
promotion of those who ought to rule and instruct the Christian
people, especially in things that pertain to faith and divine
worship, and similar things.
When it says Christ gave blessed Peter power with respect to
spiritual matters "that should of necessity be done or of
necessity be omitted", it intends to exclude from the regular
power of Peter those spiritual matters that are supererogatory, that
is, those which are a matter of advice not command, and, all
together, everything without which Christian people can be ruled
appropriately and without which, whether they are done or omitted,
neither faith nor good customs are exposed to danger. And therefore
the pope cannot regularly order a Christian to preserve his
virginity, to contract a marriage, to take on poverty, to retain and
possess wealth or, when he is not bound by a command of God, to give
or not give alms, though in a particular case he could order many
such things; and if he orders such things outside of a case of
utility, or orders many such things, his order does not hold but is
null, and that person to whom it is given is not bound to obey it
even if he excommunicates him on that account -- such a sentence
would be null as containing an intolerable error and ought not to be
feared nor of necessity observed.
And when it says, "giving him all power in such matters as could
be committed to one man not dangerously but prudently and to the
common advantage", it intends to exclude from the regular power
of the pope all power which, if it were regularly committed to one
man, could easily threaten a notable danger to the whole community of
the faithful that could not be prevented without a miracle or [only]
with the greatest difficulty. For this reason, although someone will
of necessity succeed the highest pontiff, nevertheless the pope does
not have the power of arranging who ought to succeed him. This is
also the reason for a certain opinion which holds that although an
election of a highest pontiff must be held, nevertheless the pope
does not have from Christ the power of regularly arranging how and by
whom the highest pontiff should be elected: for if the pope were
regularly to have such power directly from Christ he could easily,
from negligence or evil -- since the pope, a sinful man like everyone
else, can be ensnared by errors, wicked passions, negligence, evil
and villainy -- leave the whole of Christianity without the power to
elect a highest pontiff, and by this the common good would be
endangered. For he could for some reason or for some fault deprive
the cardinals of the power and right to elect a highest pontiff, and,
having done so, he could, either through neglect or delay due to
malice or through not having enough time to arrange it, die before
arrangements about the supreme pontiff's electors were made. And thus
to the peril and detriment of the common good all Christianity would
remain without the power and right to elect a highest pontiff. And
therefore, according to that opinion, such power was not regularly
granted by Christ to the highest pontiff, nor any other power,
either, which it would be dangerous to grant to one person. For this
reason, according to them, he is in no way the lord of all temporal
things, because such lordship would be too dangerous to the faithful.
When it holds that Christ gave to the pope "freedom . . .
without any detriment or notable and significant cost to those
temporal rights of emperors", etc., it intends to assert that
every pope is free with respect to his person and is not regularly
subject to any man at all, even if before his election he had been of
servile condition or had been subject in another way to an emperor or
a king or other Christian or non-Christian, because the freedom of
one man with respect to his person is not notably injurious to an
emperor or to another. And therefore, however much he had been a
slave, the pope is delivered into freedom by the very fact that he is
pope or has been elected pope. Occasionally, however -- if, for
instance, he becomes a heretic or seems to be incorrigible in any
crime and the church is made to stumble because of him -- the pope is
subject to human judgement and ought to be judged by man and undergo
the due punishment of the law.
And when it says that with respect to things of this kind Christ gave
regularly to blessed Peter some "coercive jurisdiction also,
without any detriment or notable and significant cost to those
temporal rights of emperors", etc., it intends to say that the
pope has regularly from Christ the power to punish purely
ecclesiastical crimes, that is those that are committed directly
against Christian law and are proper to Christian law and are not
considered crimes by other sects, yet in such a way that the
punishment is not to the notable detriment or prejudice of others who
have not sinned. And if anyone's slave commits an ecclesiastical
crime the pope can punish him, yet in such a way that the slave's
master, without blame on his part, does not incur a notable loss.
And when it says that Christ gave blessed Peter and his successors
freedom, jurisdiction and power of this kind "without any
detriment or notable and significant cost to those temporal rights of
emperors, kings" and others "that pertained to them, before
or after the establishment of gospel law, by the law of nature or by
the law of nations or by civil law," it intends to assert that
by the fact that blessed Peter and his successors have been and will
be raised to the highest priesthood, emperors, kings and others, both
believers and unbelievers, whether they lived before or after the
establishment of gospel law, were not deprived of their temporal
rights, but retained them and were not regularly subject to the pope
in temporal matters, but remained, as before, true emperors and kings
and lords of their temporal possessions and slaves and of those
subject to them, and were not made slaves of anyone, and were not
bound regularly to obey the commands of the pope with respect to
temporal matters. And a sentence of excommunication or any other
[sentence] passed by the pope against the emperor or another because
he does not obey such commands or defends his rights does not
regularly hold, but, as containing an intolerable error, ought to be
regarded as completely null and not to be feared, however much it is
not observed.
And when it says that in temporal matters Christ gave blessed Peter
"only the right of seeking temporal goods for his own sustenance
and for the performance of his duties" it means to exclude every
opinion which holds that in temporal matters the pope regularly has
fullness of power or also the power of managing temporal matters or
any temporal jurisdiction at all over the Empire or any other region,
and also the opinion that holds that the pope does not have any right
of demanding any temporal goods at all.
And when it says finally that "any further power that the
highest pontiffs regularly have had, or have, [they have obtained]
from human decree", etc., it intends that although the
successors of blessed Peter have not exceeded him in any power they
have had by Christ's decree alone and by divine law, yet they have
acquired by human law great power in temporal and spiritual matters
which blessed Peter did not have, and that the power of the pope from
human law can be increased, and that one highest pontiff has or can
have greater or better power than another.
@end {en88m}