Conceptually you have a single BitX chain with several bit-app chains weaving in and out of it. Generating a BitX block will then allow you to generate a bitcoin block, a bitDNS block, a bit-foo block, etc.
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The BitX chain is straight-forward although a key observation here is that BitX blocks should never be rejected for bit-app reasons, i.e. a client should be able to accept/reject a BitX block without ever downloading app blocks
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The BitX chain is straight-forward although a key observation here is that BitX blocks should never be rejected for bit-app reasons, i.e. a client should be able to accept/reject a BitX block without ever downloading app blocks
Quick reaction: what stops malicious or lazy BitX chain generator from implementing a type of denial-of-service attack against some bit-app they either don't like or don't know about? If BitX blocks are never rejected for bit-app reasons, then what is the incentive for main-BitX chain generators to include only (or any!) valid bit-app hashes? What stops me from constantly flooding the BitX network with bogus bit-app hashes and asking them to be included in BitX blocks?