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441  Economy / Speculation / Re: Wall Observer BTC/USD - Bitcoin price movement tracking & discussion on: December 17, 2014, 12:46:53 AM
Why don't some of the industry big shots set up a bitcoin stabilization fund?

Because it would mean buying bitcoins at price X when the rest of the market thinks that the price should be less than X.  Why would they put their money in a fund to have it invested in a way that they don't feel like investing on their own?
442  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: [ESHOP launched] Trezor: Bitcoin hardware wallet on: December 17, 2014, 12:27:12 AM
A simpler way by which a malicious fake hardware wallet could steal your coins:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=581411.msg9856659#msg9856659


I would hope that RFC6979 deterministic signatures would be the standard for hardware wallets (that's what Trezor uses). Anyway, I doubt this would be used as an attack vector, since it's not guaranteed that the attacker would be the one claiming the funds (see: white hat returning lost BC.i funds).

If I read that paper correctly, with that attack the attacker (the person who wrote the malicious tx-signing code) would be the only person able to recover the private key from the transaction signature (or even to notice that the signature is leaking the key).  Thus, that attack it is more subtle than the BCI fiasco -- where everybody had a copy of the faulty RNG, and thus could reproduce the k values, identify the compromised addresses, and sweep them.

If you read the paper correctly would you like to place a numerical estimate on how likely this attack is ...e.g. 50%, 10%, 1%, 0.001%?

Thanks in advance for reducing the FUD spreading.

Trezor is open source and running only the signed firmware. This attack is not feasible in such circumstances, because everybody would see the "malicious tx-signing code" on github.

Also, RFC6979 is the answer to this problem that Trezor implements. With it, there is not a choice of k, thus the attack is not possible.

With a piece of software writing skills, you can initialize Trezor, use it to sign a couple of transactions, then import master private key into bip32.org, generate all private keys and verify that RFC6979 was used. This can be used with real or fake inputs in "blackbox testing" OR it can be used after some coins go missing to prove the maliciousness of the firmware...

Trezor is well designed and certainly better than using a PC, even an off-line PC with air gap.  But it is not 100% safe.  I already explained how a criminal can get around its safety features, by using social engineering or fake malicious hardware.  The fact that people keep denying those risks only makes those risks more significant.
443  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: [ESHOP launched] Trezor: Bitcoin hardware wallet on: December 17, 2014, 12:21:46 AM
A simpler way by which a malicious fake hardware wallet could steal your coins:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=581411.msg9856659#msg9856659


I would hope that RFC6979 deterministic signatures would be the standard for hardware wallets (that's what Trezor uses). Anyway, I doubt this would be used as an attack vector, since it's not guaranteed that the attacker would be the one claiming the funds (see: white hat returning lost BC.i funds).

If I read that paper correctly, with that attack the attacker (the person who wrote the malicious tx-signing code) would be the only person able to recover the private key from the transaction signature (or even to notice that the signature is leaking the key).  Thus, that attack it is more subtle than the BCI fiasco -- where everybody had a copy of the faulty RNG, and thus could reproduce the k values, identify the compromised addresses, and sweep them.

If you read the paper correctly would you like to place a numerical estimate on how likely this attack is ...e.g. 50%, 10%, 1%, 0.001%?

Thanks in advance for reducing the FUD spreading.

I would say 90% chance that someone will try that attack sometime in the next 10 years, either a blanket attack (sell hundreds of fake devices on eBay or on a local eletronics store, then scoop whatever falls into the net) or an attack directed against some specific fat target.
444  Economy / Speculation / Re: SecondMarket Bitcoin Investment Trust Observer on: December 17, 2014, 12:15:34 AM
Can you point to specifically where you're able to find your numbers on the bitcointrust website?
On the homepage http://www.bitcointrust.co/  Just scroll down a few screenfuls until the chart of BTC price.
The Net Assets amount is at the bottom left of the chart.
Other quantities tabulated here are computed as described on page 1 of this thread.
I cannot see a date on that page, but the chart goes to Dec/10.

There is a fact sheet
http://bitcointrust.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Fact-Sheet_Dec.pdf
but it has no extra data that I can see, and it is updated only monthly it seems.
445  Other / Off-topic / Re: Answer the question above with a question. on: December 17, 2014, 12:07:22 AM
Sure!: Would you like a bacon sandwich?
Have Lean Hogs hit bottom ?
Has the Bitcoin price hit bottom?
Have you looked at the charts?
446  Economy / Speculation / Re: Wall Observer BTC/USD - Bitcoin price movement tracking & discussion on: December 16, 2014, 07:45:07 PM

However, the available BTC on the sidelines may jump in and that would require up to 91.7k+335k BTC = 640M USD.

Now, I don’t have data for finex, okcoin, btce and other exchanges but they surely would add quite something to that amount.
Also, I’m not sure if I recall correctly that someone posted the stamp wallet a couple of times since May and it was at around 260k then it grew close to 300k. That would require revising the above figures upwards.

Maybe someone will take it from here but I don’t think 100M USD will do anything visible to the price. Remember that finex has more than 22M in longs and it seems that it couldn’t even stop the downtrend let alone to increase the price even so slightly. So, to get a 4-5x increase in price I suspect we need on the order of 1B USD or more. Yes, there will be a rush in of fresh money but also a rush in of old coins too…
Good part is I think it is still doable of having 100k newcomers each bringing in a fresh 10K USD (in average).

Thanks. An input of 1 G$ is obviously less likely than 100 M$, but still way less than the 600 G$ estimated earlier from the total coins.   Not impossible, I woudl think.

By the way, the market cap is not very relevant for bitcoin because the vast majority of the coins was bought at such low price, and if they were to be sold the price might crash to single digits again.  It would be more interesting to estimate the amount V of USD that people invested buying the 113.6 M existing coins.  

An estimate of V would be the sum of the bitcoins in each unspent transaction output (UTXO) in the blockchain, times the USD/BTC price on the date of that transaction.  Thus, for example Satoshi's million bitcoins would count as a few dollars, rather than ~300 M dollars.  Anyone would care to compute that?  That number would be only a rough estimate of V, more likely on the high side, since the last transaction for some UTXO may not have been a sale.
447  Economy / Speculation / Re: Wall Observer BTC/USD - Bitcoin price movement tracking & discussion on: December 16, 2014, 07:27:50 PM

On their homepage I still see only the same option as always (the "top-up card")
https://www.huobi.com/
I see no announcement (usually important news are in the "red bulb" link below the header gif).

If it is true, there may be a rally.
448  Bitcoin / Hardware / Re: BFL fucked us over again on: December 16, 2014, 06:30:49 PM
Which was the transaction that paid for Josh's house?

We believe it was this one:
http://www.walletexplorer.com/txid/470dd9660d62b60ce8451c22392ba119b1c0b97d0927d6d5ef3ee0c2da043585
2014-04-28 22:08:49 UTC +1060.77600000
Took 1013.33 BTC from address 1Gmn7to4T8ZgBgbnRyS83NDr1vNdTqhKoc
Topped it with 47.446 BTC from 1BkuugvWi7Gjmwf84rgQ94Qucohs2fSDip
Sent 1060.776 to "BitPay.com"
Sent the remainder of 1BKuu... (change-back?) to 1BoykhKtyibN12Fr2cTMvEnP1EN52LzHK2

The date is a couple of days before the date of the sale, as reported in the media (May 1st).
Presumably it is the time needed for the deposit from BiTPay to appear in the account of the sellers.
There are no other inputs to the "BitPay.com" account around May 1st with suitable amounts.

The BTC price on 2014-04-28 UTC ranged from 424$ to 452$, which gives about 450 k$ to 479 k$.
On May 1st it ranged from 448$ to 466$, which means about 475 k$ to 494 k$.
To make 500'000 USD, the price would have to be ~471 $/BTC.

EDIT: the 1013.33 BTC came from 1Drt3c8pSdrkyjuBiwVcSSixZwQtMZ3Tew by this transaction
http://www.walletexplorer.com/txid/a6422b8787cf702bd57077041ba3ee63ddc8d372f280bf8df37676dc82b95077
dated 2014-04-24 17:46:45

That transaction has a long list of outputs going to disparate wallets.  It may be an outlet of some entity that processed a batch of payouts to many clients. That is, the 1013.33 BTC may have been withdrawn from Bitstamp, say. One would have to follow the coins back to see whether it looks like they went into an exchange not many steps before.

The address 1BkuugvWi7Gjmwf84rgQ94Qucohs2fSDip where the 47.446 BTC "top off" was taken is more confusing.  Tracing back from it we get to a transaction that merged a few 200 BTC (exact) outputs and some other odd amounts. I haven't followed further upstream.
449  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: [ESHOP launched] Trezor: Bitcoin hardware wallet on: December 16, 2014, 06:12:14 PM
A simpler way by which a malicious fake hardware wallet could steal your coins:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=581411.msg9856659#msg9856659


I would hope that RFC6979 deterministic signatures would be the standard for hardware wallets (that's what Trezor uses). Anyway, I doubt this would be used as an attack vector, since it's not guaranteed that the attacker would be the one claiming the funds (see: white hat returning lost BC.i funds).

If I read that paper correctly, with that attack the attacker (the person who wrote the malicious tx-signing code) would be the only person able to recover the private key from the transaction signature (or even to notice that the signature is leaking the key).  Thus, that attack it is more subtle than the BCI fiasco -- where everybody had a copy of the faulty RNG, and thus could reproduce the k values, identify the compromised addresses, and sweep them.
450  Other / Off-topic / Re: Answer the question above with a question. on: December 16, 2014, 03:24:32 PM
Have you noticed that every sentence everyone else has said ends in a question mark?
Right, and also: have you ever wondered why '?' is called 'question mark'?
maybe because of this?

Now, isn't that interesting?
451  Other / Off-topic / Re: Answer the question above with a question. on: December 16, 2014, 03:00:43 PM
Have you noticed that every sentence everyone else has said ends in a question mark?
Right, and also: have you ever wondered why '?' is called 'question mark'?
452  Economy / Speculation / Re: Wall Observer BTC/USD - Bitcoin price movement tracking & discussion on: December 16, 2014, 02:58:32 PM
Time Magazine now accepts dollars even from bitcoiners who decide to sell their bitcoin:
https://www.coindesk.com/time-inc-becomes-first-major-magazine-publisher-accept-bitcoin/

Will it have the same effect on price as the Microsoft news?  Grin
453  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Reused R values again on: December 16, 2014, 02:43:05 PM

Wow...

Understandably, harware wallet manufacturers tend to present their products as 100% safe, and hide or dismiss their risks.  But, at the very least, you must trust the manufacturer (and trust that they didn't hire that programmer that BCI just fired  Grin), as well as all the people who may have access to it along the path from the factory to your pocket.  As customers grow confident in such devices, the payoff for an attack via malicious fake devices could be huge, and criminals may invest proportionally in carrying out the attack.
454  Bitcoin / Project Development / Re: [ESHOP launched] Trezor: Bitcoin hardware wallet on: December 16, 2014, 02:31:38 PM
A simpler way by which a malicious fake hardware wallet could steal your coins:

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=581411.msg9856659#msg9856659
455  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Reused R values again on: December 16, 2014, 01:09:01 PM
If someone would have done it intentionally he would have swept the 590 BTC that I found this week-end.

I do not think malice is likely, but I won't exclude it either.  There may be several reasons why a malicious programmer failed to sweep those coins. E. g. after the bug was discovered, he may have been afraid of being caught (especially if he is some BCI staff, hence a natural suspect, hence with his internet connections under watch).
456  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Reused R values again on: December 16, 2014, 11:05:55 AM
Quote
The bug was caught after a few hours, perhaps he did not have enough time to get home and start sweeping.

This bug is visible in blockchain since september.

Is that so? I thought that the earlier occurrences in the blockchain were due to some other project (Counterparty?), not BCI.
457  Bitcoin / Development & Technical Discussion / Re: Reused R values again on: December 16, 2014, 10:43:58 AM
There may not have been malice by the Blockchain.info management, but maybe there was malice by some programmer who had access to the code and intended to sweep the affected addresses once they had enough bitcoins in them .  While the bug looks just like an accidental omission, that appearance may be intentional too.

And the 500+ BTC johoe swept was not enough for that mythical in-house programmer, he was waiting for more hoping nobody will notice reused R values on the blockchain? What you are saying makes no sense, let alone it is impossible because every commit to the code is tracked on the GitHub and such a criminal programmer would be caught. There was no malice from the Blockchain.info side. Just look at the bug, uninitiated variable used as array index failing that array to empty without throwing an exception, it looks like a bug.

The bug was caught after a few hours, perhaps he did not have enough time to get home and start sweeping. 

Why would a thief settle for 500 BTC if he could wait a day and sweep 5'000 or more.

There was a claim of 100 BTC being swept by someone else than @johoe.  A thief would avoid sweeping small amounts since the more people affected the greater the risk of the attack being discovered and blocked.

A malicious programmer would have tried to make the bug look like an accidental error, to excuse himself.

The programmer who did the commit was innocent, but a malicious colleague or hacker broke into his computer and removed the initialization statement without him noticing.

There are many possibilities...  but I admit: as Napoleon said, never attribute to malice what can be satisfactorily explained by incompetence...


458  Bitcoin / Hardware / Re: BFL fucked us over again on: December 16, 2014, 06:07:44 AM
I have two odd questions regarding notation and text formatting after reading the posts here. Sorry if it's a bit off topic but I'm stumped.

1. I don't understand the notational use of "1mm" for a million dollars, what's up with this?

2. I don't understand the use of double spaces "  " between sentences, why is this done?

1. In Romance languages 1000 and 1,000,000 both start with "m".  Using "mm" for "million" makes it clear that it is not 1000.

2. Double spaces after sentence-final "." is supposed to make the text more readable.  That rule comes from the days of mechancial typewriters.
459  Bitcoin / Hardware / Re: BFL fucked us over again on: December 16, 2014, 04:12:43 AM
Now you roughly know when to look up the BWA that gave up those 5,000+ BTC. (10-21-2013)

Must be this one:

http://www.walletexplorer.com/txid/1b6ea350c094071412df1f801651263fd65ffa0b89ad6c8626ceeca8755f50bc

460  Economy / Speculation / Re: Wall Observer BTC/USD - Bitcoin price movement tracking & discussion on: December 16, 2014, 03:50:22 AM
Then I will try to figure out who will provide the necessary 335-350 billions USD for that to happen...
13,6 mil (bitcoins in circulation already) multiplied by 24650USD (25000/target price -350/actual price)
Don't forget to add 3600 fresh btc/day (from mining) multiplied by 200...350days

However, only a fraction of those 13.6 M BTC are available in the market (in the exchanges, or out in wallets of traders who would move them in if the price starts to rise).  The rest is being held by long-term holders who may have rather high "sell thresholds".

I would guess that a convincing "next big bubble" could be pumped up with much less than that.  Perhaps 100 M USD would be enough to buy those "loosely held" bicoins and  lift the price to a point when other opportunistic speculators would rush in and bring further millions.

How much would it take to buy all the coins on the ask books of all exchanges up to (say) 1500 $/BTC? 

(Of course that number would be only a very, very rough estimate, since the asks will be pulled up once the price starts to rise, and on the other hand there will be more bitcoins entering the exchanges.)

Perhaps the June/2014 mini-bubble was an attempt by some whales to do just that -- a pump that was meant to get the "next big bubble" started?
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