# FROM: http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/t31d1new.html 2004-02-17
# TWilliam of Ockham, Dialogus
# TPart 3, tract 1, book 1
# TCopyright © 1999, The British Academy
# The text and translation of 3.1 /Dialogus/1 were prepared by
# John Scott and revised by John Kilcullen. The draft was commented on
# by George Knysh, who suggested a number of corrections and improvements.

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Prologue
@section 1 {3.1.1}
@section 2 {c0} 
@section 3 {tt}

    Prologus



@section 3 {en1d}
  {Student:} Following in some way the footsteps of 
    Solomon, "I have proposed in my mind to inquire about and to 
    investigate wisely everything that is being done under the sun" 
    [Ecclesiastes 1:13], that is in the church militant, concerning which 
    not all Christians these days think in the same way. For since some 
    people quarrel about the catholic faith, calling each other heretics, 
    some of them think that the true church militant exists among certain 
    people, others that it exists among others. Let us therefore turn our 
    attention -- so far as our occupations and studies are in accord with 
    the quality of the present time (because, as blessed Augustine 
    asserts [in his letter] to Count Boniface, as found in 23, q. 4, c.  /Si
    ecclesia/ , "Everything should be suitable to its 
    times") -- to the third part of our dialogue, which from the 
    beginning I have wanted to be entitled, "Of the actions of those 
    who are quarrelling about the orthodox faith". I want it to be 
    divided into nine tractates, each of which I believe should be 
    divided into various books. The first two will be preparatory and a 
    preamble to those that follow, in which we will examine the deeds of 
    various Christians,

    (*) the first, therefore, discussing the power of the pope and the clergy;

    (*) the second the power and rights of the Roman Empire, and in this 
    we will consider many things about the rights of kings and princes 
    and also some laymen;

    (*) the third the deeds of John XXII, who some people think was 
    deprived for heretical wickedness of all ecclesiastical dignity long 
    before he departed this world, and others that he was a Catholic and 
    ended his days as a true pope;

    (*) the fourth the deeds of the lord Lewis of Bavaria, whom some 
    people do not regard as a true emperor, while others think the opposite;

    (*) the fifth the deeds of Benedict XII, whom many people, but not 
    all, reverence as a true supreme pontiff;

    (*) the sixth the deeds of brother Michael of Cesena,

    (*) the seventh the deeds and teaching of Guiral Ot, one of whom some 
    affirm to be the true general of the order of Friars Minor and others 
    the other;

    (*) the eighth the deeds of brother William of Ockham;

    (*) the ninth the deeds of other Christians -- kings, princes and 
    prelates and their subjects, laity and clergy, secular and religious, 
    Friars Minor and others -- who adhere to, obey, agree with, are 
    united with, favour or are known in any way to offer advice or help 
    to, any one or ones of the above named people, or who persecute, 
    attack, harass or condemn them, or some of them, as blamable.
@end {en1d}



@section 3 {en2m}
  {Master:} Both your urgency and a desire to be useful 
    persuade me to undertake the above, but fear of incurring the 
    accusation of those who will perhaps say that I am daring to dispute 
    illicitly about the power of the highest pontiff dissuades me, 
    especially since both canon and civil laws seem to assert that 
    whoever presumes to dispute about the authority of the ruler commits 
    a sacrilege. If it is acceptable to you, therefore, I will not 
    involve myself in the matters above, especially since I can not, I 
    believe, get access to the necessary books.
@end {en2m}



@section 3 {en3d}
  {Student:} Do not let that fear hold you back, because 
    just as we see catholics disputing as an exercise about the faith 
    without risk of just accusation (for doctors of sacred theology 
    publicly dispute about the faith in the schools, and arguing as 
    sharply as they know how against the truth of faith they incur no 
    charge, though neither at the time nor ever afterwards do they 
    determine the truth of the disputed question; bachelors also and 
    lawyers bring forward arguments and authorities against the truth as 
    strongly as they can without blame, indeed often praiseworthily), so 
    it is possible praiseworthily to dispute as an exercise about the 
    power of the highest pontiff. Since, therefore, you would not be 
    going to say anything against the power of the pope as an assertion 
    or as an expression of doubt but only as a recital, as has been done 
    between us in the whole of this dialogue from the beginning, you 
    should not be afraid to investigate the power of the pope and all the 
    other things I have mentioned as requiring discussion, especially 
    since I know you are ready to confess in private and in public, at an 
    opportune place and time, when it will be beneficial, every truth 
    about the power of the pope, and any other [truth] that you are bound 
    to believe explicitly. And do not let lack of books hinder you, 
    because even if you can not make a perfect work, yet to produce 
    something will not be useless, because you will give those who have a 
    supply of books occasion to produce finished works.
@end {en3d}



@section 3 {en4m}
  {Master:} It can be shown in many ways that it is 
    permissible to recite falsities without assertion or doubt and to 
    state them in the person of others, and that it is not necessary on 
    every occasion to confess with one's mouth even catholic truth (since 
    this falls under an affirmative precept, which always obliges but not 
    for always). And therefore, disregarding the calumnies of the wicked, 
    I will acquiesce in your urging and, to exercise the wits of the 
    studious both about the power of the pope and about the other matters 
    which you have considered should be inquired into, I will recite even 
    views and opinions which I regard as wrong, even heretical. I will 
    argue for these as strongly as I can, and you can also do this 
    sometimes if you see fit. So begin the first tractate without delay.
@end {en4m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 1
@section 2 {c1}
@section 2 {c1}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 1 



@section 3 {en5d}
  {Student:} The multitude of Christians does not doubt, 
    I believe, that the keys of the kingdom of heaven were given by 
    Christ to the Roman pontiff, that is to blessed Peter: they do not 
    doubt, therefore, that some power was granted by Christ. Many texts 
    of the holy fathers also seem to assert that he received some power 
    by human decree. About both of these powers, if he does have both, I 
    will ask many questions: Namely, what power does he have, and by what 
    right [or law] (divine or human), over spiritual matters and 
    ecclesiastical persons? What power, and by what right, over the laity 
    in spiritual matters? What power, and by what right, over the 
    possessions and temporal rights that pertain to the Roman church 
    alone? What power, and by what right, over the possessions and 
    temporal rights known to pertain to other clerics? What power, and by 
    what right, over the persons, possessions and temporal rights of the 
    believing laity? What power, and by what right, over the possessions 
    of unbelievers, and even over their persons?

    Later, moreover, I propose to examine some similar [questions] about 
    the power of the clergy. First of all, however, I have decided to ask 
    //whether
    the power of the pope extends to everything which is not against 
    divine law or natural law//, for this question seems to 
    comprehend all the questions above about the power of the pope, and 
    the judgments and opinions about it which you will strive to set 
    forth will perhaps give me occasion to inquire about each of them in particular.
@end {en5d}



@section 3 {en6m}
  {Master:} On this question we find diverse and 
    conflicting opinions.

    (*) One is that the pope has by Christ's decree such fullness of power, 
    both in temporal and spiritual matters, that he can do anything, 
    regularly and in every case, which is not expressly against the law 
    of God or against natural law.

    (*) Another [opinion] is that by divine law he 
    has such fullness of power in spiritual matters but not in temporal matters.

    (*) A third opinion is that he has such fullness 
    of power partly by Christ's decree and partly by human decree.

    (*) A fourth [opinion] is that he does not have 
    such fullness of power, either by divine law or by human law, either 
    regularly or occasionally or in some case; and there are different 
    ways of putting this [view].

    (*) A fifth [opinion] is that he does not have 
    such fullness of power simply and regularly, either by divine law or 
    by human law, but by divine law or by a special decree of Christ he 
    does have such fullness of power occasionally or in some case.
@end {en6m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 2
@section 2 {c2}
@section 2 {c2}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 2 



@section 3 {en7d}
  {Student:} Let us discuss those opinions so that we 
    can understand the truth more sharply and profoundly. So bring 
    forward some arguments for the first.
@end {en7d}



@section 3 {en8m}
  {Master:} The first opinion seems to be based on the 
    words of the Gospel, indeed of Christ himself, who said to Peter, as 
    we read in Matthew 16[:19]: "I will give you the keys of heaven 
    and whatever you bind on earth will be bound also in heaven and 
    whatever you loose on earth will be loosed also in heaven." From 
    these words we gather that Christ gave to blessed Peter, and so to 
    his successors, fullness of power without any exception, so that he 
    is able to do anything -- because everything should be embraced by a 
    general statement (di. 19,  /Si Romanorum/  and 1, q. 1,  /Sunt
    nonulli/  and 14, q. 3,  /Putant/ .)
@end {en8m}



@section 3 {en9d}
  {Student:} It seems that that argument can be 
    attacked, for often a general statement should not be understood 
    generally ( /Extra, De iureiurando, Ad nostram/  and 1, q. 1,  /Duces/  
    [i.e.  /Iudices/ ]). Thus also "a general statement is 
    often restricted", as the gloss on  /Extra, De 
    appellationibus, Sua nobis/  notes. Very many examples of this are 
    found in the divine Scriptures. For in Matthew 3[:5-6] it is said 
    that "all the region about the Jordan went out to him and they 
    were baptised by him in the Jordan", and yet many did not go out 
    and were not baptised by John. Luke 3[:15] too says "everyone 
    was thinking about John that perhaps he was The Anointed One", 
    and yet many did not think this, for example those who did not 
    believe in an "Anointed One" and those who did not think 
    that John was a prophet. Numerous other examples can be brought 
    forward in which a general statement should not be understood 
    generally but should be restricted.

    Let us leave aside for the moment, however, all except some few
    which speak about power and subjection, in addition to the
    words of Christ set down above. Now the Apostle says in
    Ephesians 5[:24] that "as the church is subject to Christ, so
    are wives in all things to their husbands", where the words "in
    all things" should not be understood generally without any
    exception even with respect to things that are licit, because
    wives are not subject to their husbands in everything that is
    licit, since in respect to many licit things husband and wife
    are judged equals ( /Extra, De divortiis, / c. / Gaudemus/ ).

    The Apostle also says in Colossians 3[:20,22], "Sons, be 
    obedient to your parents in everything", and "Slaves, be 
    obedient to your earthly masters in everything", and in 
    Ephesians 6[:5] he says "Slaves, be obedient to your earthly 
    masters with all fear and trembling", and in 1 Tim. 6[:1], 
    "Those who are under the yoke of slavery are to consider their 
    masters worthy of all honour", and in Titus 2[:9], "[Tell] 
    slaves to be subject to their masters, pleasing them in 
    everything", and in 1 Peter 2[:13,18] we read, "Be subject 
    to every human being for God's sake", and "Slaves, be 
    subject in all fear to your masters, not only to those who are good 
    and gentle but even to those who are bad-tempered". And in 1 
    Tim. 2[:11] the Apostle says, "Let a woman learn in silence with 
    all submission". In all these [examples] the general words 
    should not be understood generally and without any exception, because 
    in many matters wives are not subject to husbands, nor sons to 
    parents, nor slaves to masters nor the faithful to all human beings. 
    Similarly, therefore, from the fact that Christ said to Peter, 
    "Whatever you bind", etc, it can not be inferred that all 
    mortals are subject in everything without any exception to the 
    successors of blessed Peter in such a way that they [Peter's 
    successors] have in all things licit in themselves fullness of power 
    over all men, both in temporal and spiritual matters.
@end {en9d}



@section 3 {en10m}
  {Master:} That objection is rejected in two ways. 
    First, because if, according to the sacred canons, we should not 
    exclude, limit or determine when a canon does not exclude, limit or 
    determine (31, q. 1,  /Quod si dormierit/ ; 2, q. 5,  /Consuluisti/ ;
    di. 55,  /Si evangelica/ ), so much more should we not exclude, 
    limit or determine when the Lord does not exclude, limit or 
    determine. But Christ did not exclude, limit or determine anything in 
    granting power over everyone to Peter, but said indiscriminately and 
    generally, "Whatever you bind", etc. Neither should we, 
    therefore, exclude anything from his power, or limit or determine it 
    in any way. Therefore Peter received fullness of power from Christ in 
    all temporal and spiritual matters.

    Further, a benefit given by a prince should be interpreted very 
    broadly ( /Extra, De simonia/  last chapter,  /Extra, De 
    decimis, Ex parte/ ). The power conferred on Peter by Christ, the 
    prince of princes, should therefore also be interpreted very broadly 
    so that nothing at all is removed from his power, either in spiritual 
    or temporal matters.

    The above objection is rejected in a second way by an authoritative 
    text of Innocent III, who says, as we read in  /Extra, De 
    maioritate et obedientia/ , c.  /Solite/ , "The Lord 
    said to Peter, and in Peter to his successors, 'Whatever you bind on 
    earth will also be bound in heaven', etc. He who said 'Whatever' 
    excepted nothing." From these words we gather that nothing in 
    either temporal or spiritual matters should be excepted from the 
    power given by Christ to blessed Peter and his successors. The pope 
    has such fullness of power, therefore, from Christ.
@end {en10m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 3
@section 2 {c3}
@section 2 {c3}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 3 



@section 3 {en11d}
  {Student:} We will return later to this saying of the 
    Saviour. Would you, therefore, bring forward some other arguments?
@end {en11d}



@section 3 {en12m}
  {Master:} It is proved [as follows] that the pope has 
    such fullness of power in temporal and spiritual matters. That man 
    who should by divine precept be obeyed in everything and not resisted 
    at all in anything has fullness of power of this kind immediately 
    from God. The pope, however, should by divine precept be obeyed in 
    everything and not resisted at all in anything, as Gregory attests, 
    saying in di. 12, c.  /Preceptis/ , "Let not apostolic 
    precepts be resisted with unbending pride, but, through obedience, 
    let those things that by the holy Roman church and apostolic 
    authority are commanded salutarily be carried out"; and later, 
    "Let all priests who do not want to be separated from the 
    strength of the apostolic rock upon which Christ founded the 
    universal church maintain the decree of its authority." We 
    gather from these words that because of the authority granted by 
    Christ to the Roman church it should be obeyed in everything and not 
    resisted at all in anything.

    Pope Stephen seems to assert this too, as we read in di. 19, c.  /Enimvero/ ,
    when he says, "For indeed, since the holy Roman church, which 
    Christ wished us to rule over, [has been put forward] as a mirror and 
    an example, whatever it has enacted and whatever it has ordained 
    should be observed perpetually and inviolably by everyone", etc. 
    We gather from these words that because of Christ's decree the Roman 
    church should be obeyed in everything.

    Hence, as we read in the same distinction, c.  /Ita dominus/ , 
    Pope Leo says, "The Lord wanted the sacrament of this gift so to 
    pertain to the office of all the apostles that he located it chiefly 
    in most blessed Peter, the highest of all the apostles, so that 
    through him, as head, he [the Lord] might pour out his gifts on the 
    whole body"; and later, "If anyone tries to infringe its 
    power, he is intending with most impious presumption to violate the 
    most sacred strength of this rock, built up as we have said by God's 
    work". We are given to understand by these words that anyone who 
    is found disobedient in any way to the power of Peter and his 
    successors is infringing a decree of God. It is by the decree of 
    Christ, therefore, that the pope should be obeyed in everything.

    This is also proved by argument, because that person should by 
    Christ's decree be obeyed in everything whose every teaching should 
    be received as if uttered by the divine voice; but all the precepts 
    of the pope, just as also his laws, should be received as if uttered 
    by the divine voice (di. 19,  /Sic omnes/ ); by God's decree, 
    therefore, he should be obeyed in everything.

    Further, by God's precept that person should be obeyed in everything 
    who without heresy [i.e., without his being a heretic] cannot be a 
    schismatic while all others can be schismatic by being divided from 
    that one. But the pope can not be schismatic unless he becomes a 
    heretic, whereas all others can be schismatic even if they are not 
    immediately heretical. By God's precept, therefore, the pope should 
    be obeyed in everything.

    The major [premise] is proved by this, that someone who does not by 
    God's precept have to be obeyed in everything can command many things 
    in which others are not bound to obey him. On account of commands of 
    this kind, therefore, in which they are not bound to obey him, there 
    can arise between the one giving the orders and the ones to whom they 
    are given discord, division, dissension and tearing, and, as a 
    result, schism, because schism, which is a Greek word, denotes 
    tearing (24, q. 1,  /Scisma/ ). In such a case, therefore, 
    either the one giving the commands or those to whom commands of this 
    kind are given are schismatic; but those to whom such commands are 
    given are not schismatic because they are not entangled in any crime 
    by not obeying, since they are not bound to obey. The one giving the 
    commands, therefore, must be regarded as schismatic because of unjust 
    commands, even if he does not become a heretic.

    The first part of the minor [premise], that is that the pope cannot 
    be schismatic without heresy, is proved by the fact that a schismatic 
    is defined as one who withdraws from the unity of the universal 
    church (24, q. 1,  /Scisma/ , c.  /Loquitur dominus/ , c.  /Alienus/  
    and c.  /Quia ex sola/ ). But unless he becomes a heretic the 
    pope does not withdraw from the unity of the universal church, since, 
    as long as he remains in the faith of Peter, the unity of the 
    universal church begins from him (24, q. 1,  /Loquitur dominus/ ).
    Unless he becomes a heretic, therefore, the pope cannot be schismatic.

    The second part of the minor [premise] is quite clear because 
    everyone other than the pope can become schismatic without heresy, at 
    least in the beginning, by not obeying the universal church in those 
    matters in which he is bound.

    From these [points] we gather that by God's precept or by the decree 
    of Christ Peter and his successors should be obeyed in everything and 
    not resisted at all in anything. By the decree of Christ, therefore, 
    the pope has in both temporal and spiritual matters fullness of power 
    to be able to do all things not of themselves illicit, so that these 
    things cannot be made illicit solely by human decree or will [i.e. be 
    made illicit for him by the will of others].
@end {en12m}



@section 3 {en13d}
  {Student:} Before you go on to other arguments, relate 
    why it is said that by the decree of Christ the pope can do all 
    things "not of themselves illicit", etc.
@end {en13d}



@section 3 {en14m}
  {Master:} This is said on account of the vows, oaths, 
    promises, pacts and any other means by which men bind themselves to 
    things to which they are otherwise not bound, because by such means 
    there is no derogation of the power of the pope at all, but rather, 
    not withstanding all such things, he can do anything and should be 
    obeyed in everything, because in all such cases the power and 
    authority of the pope are understood always to be excepted ( /Extra/ ,
    /De iureiurando, / c.  /Veniens/ ,  /Extra, De 
    electione, / c.  /Significasti/ ).
@end {en14m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 4
@section 2 {c4}
@section 2 {c4}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 4 



@section 3 {en15d}
  {Student:} We will touch on that matter in particular 
    in various places. so would you bring forward some other arguments?
@end {en15d}



@section 3 {en16m}
  {Master:} That the pope has such fullness of power by God's decree is
    proved. For anyone who is freed from all positive laws has such
    fullness of power, since someone who does not have this
    fullness of power can be restrained by some human law, because
    he does not have power over all human laws. The pope, however,
    is freed from laws so that he is above all human laws since he
    can dissolve even imperial laws, as many canons seem to assert
    (di. 9, c. 1. para. / Quicumque/ , col. 16). Therefore by God's
    decree the pope has such fullness of power.

    Further, the vicar of Christ has fullness of power by the decree of 
    Christ himself, since Christ had such fullness of power and, in 
    commissioning Peter as his substitute, forbad him nothing in such 
    matters. The pope has such fullness of power, therefore, by Christ's 
    decree, since he is Christ's vicar.

    Again, the pope has fullness of power and does not have any power 
    from man; therefore he has fullness of power from the decree of God 
    alone. The major [premise] is gathered and established from various 
    sacred canons (2, q. 6, c.  /Decreto/  and c.  /Qui se scit/ ).
    Diverse sacred canons also seem to assert [the minor]. Thus 
    Innocent III says, as we find in  /Extra, De iudiciis/ ,  /Novit/ :
    "For since we rely not on a human constitution but rather on a 
    divine one, because our power is not from man but from God, no one 
    who is of sound mind does not know that it pertains to our office to 
    correct any Christian for any mortal sin." And, as we read in 
    di. 22, c.  /Sacrosancta/ , blessed Anacletus says, "This 
    apostolic see, the head and the hinge [of all churches], was indeed 
    constituted, as has been said before, by the Lord and not by anyone 
    else", etc. From these words we gather that the pope has no 
    power from man.

    This also seems provable by argument. For no one should be called a 
    heretic because he denies to anyone power he is known to have from 
    man alone, because even if such a person errs yet he does not err 
    against sacred Scripture, which is not from man but from God. But 
    anyone who denies the pope his power should be regarded as a heretic, 
    as Pope Nicholas attests, as we read in di. 22, c. 1. The pope, 
    therefore, receives his power from God alone.

    Again, that the pope has fullness of power from God is shown. For it 
    is from the same [source] that the Roman pontiff has fullness of 
    power and the power of granting indulgences, as is intimated in  /Extra,
    De penitentiis et remissionibus, Cum ex eo/ , near the end. But 
    the Roman pontiff has the power of granting indulgences from God 
    alone and not from man. Therefore he has fullness of power from God alone.

    Again, anyone whose judgement and power it is not permitted to judge, 
    or even to dispute by calling his power into doubt, has fullness of 
    power from God. For men are permitted to dispute about the power of 
    someone who does not have fullness of power from God and to examine 
    as a matter of doubt what power he has and does not have; about a 
    judgement of such a person it is also permitted to judge whether he 
    has presumed to judge not according to the power conceded to him but 
    according to power he has usurped. But no one is permitted to judge 
    or even to dispute as a matter of doubt the judgement and power of 
    the highest pontiff. Therefore he has fullness of power from God.

    The major [premise] seems evident, the minor is shown by various 
    authorities. For as we read in 9, q. 3,  /Patet/ , Pope Nicholas 
    says, "It is perfectly clear that a judgement of the apostolic 
    see, than whose authority there is none greater, should not be 
    reviewed by anyone; nor is anyone permitted to judge one of its 
    judgements." Pope Gelasius also, as we find in the same Cause 
    and Question, c.  /Ipsi/ , says, "And they have ordered 
    that its judgement should never be judged and they have decreed that 
    its sentence must not be dissolved; rather they have commanded that 
    its decrees should be followed." And in 17, q. 4,  /Qui autem/  
    it is written as follows, "No one is permitted to dispute the 
    judgement of the highest pontiff"; and in the same place we read 
    thus, "They also commit a sacrilege who either commit something 
    against the holiness of divine law through not knowing it, or violate 
    and offend it by neglect, or contend and dispute about the ruler's 
    judgement." And in the same Cause and Question, c.  /Nemini/ ,
    Pope Nicholas says, "No one is permitted to judge a judgement 
    of the apostolic See or review its sentence, and this because the 
    primacy of the Roman church was by a gift of Christ divinely located 
    in Peter, the blessed apostle." We gather from these and many 
    other [canons] that no one is permitted to judge or dispute a 
    judgement or the power of the Roman church because its power was 
    granted to it by Christ. Therefore it has fullness of power from Christ.

    This is proved again by the following argument. The pope has fullness 
    of power from the same person as the one from whom he has the keys to 
    the kingdom of heaven. But he has the keys to the kingdom of heaven 
    from Christ. Therefore, he also has fullness of power from Christ. 
    The minor [premise] is clearly established by the words of Christ 
    when he said to Peter, "I will give you the keys of the kingdom 
    of heaven." (Matt. 16[:19]) The major [premise] is proved 
    because all the power which the pope has pertains to his keys, in 
    that all the pope's power is by reason of order or of jurisdiction. 
    The power which he has by reason of order, however, pertains 
    according to everyone to the keys. The power which he has by reason 
    of jurisdiction also pertains to the keys, as Augustine attests, who 
    writes to Boniface, as we find in di. 50, c.  /Ut constitueretur/ ,
    "That it was established in the Church that after penance for 
    some crime no one should receive, return to or remain in holy orders 
    was not done from despair of pardon but out of firmness of 
    discipline; otherwise there will be disputation against the keys 
    given to the Church, about which it was said, 'Whatever you bind on 
    earth will also be bound in heaven.'" We gather from these words 
    that the power of punishing criminals which belongs to the Roman 
    Church by reason of jurisdiction, not order, pertains to the keys of 
    the Church. By a similar argument, therefore, every other power which 
    belongs to the Church by reason of jurisdiction pertains to those 
    same keys.

    In addition to this, it is proved that the pope has fullness of
    power immediately from Christ, because anyone to whom the
    greater has been granted by someone seems to have been granted
    by the same person also the lesser ( /Extra, De decimis, Ex
    parte/ [col. 565]; 27, q. 2, /Sunt qui dicunt/ [col. 1067); but
    it is a greater thing to dispense against the Lord and against
    the Apostle than to be able to do those things which are
    neither against divine law nor against the law of nature. The
    pope has power from Christ, however, to dispense against the
    Lord and against the Apostle, as the gloss on 25, q. 1, c.
    /Sunt quidam/ attests when it says, "It can be adequately
    maintained that the pope dispenses against the apostle -- yet
    not in those matters which pertain to the articles of faith;
    and in the same way he dispenses in connection with the gospel
    by interpreting it, as in /Extra, De testibus / c. /Licet./ ,
    near the end." It [the gloss] proves this also by
    examples. For the pope dispenses against the Lord in the case
    of an oath and a vow. For the Lord says through the prophet,
    "Vow and perform" [Psalm 75:12], and in Matthew
    5[:33], "Carry out your oaths to the Lord", and yet
    the pope dispenses in these matters (15, q. 6, /Iuratos/ ;
    /Extra, De voto/ in many chapters). Much more is it the case,
    therefore, that the pope can do anything which is not against
    the law of God or against natural law.

    Moreover, someone whose sentence should be feared whether it is
    unjust or just has fullness of power so that he is able to do
    all things; for if his sentence should be feared whether it is
    unjust or just, his command should be feared and kept, whether
    it is just or unjust. But the sentence of a pope should be
    feared, whether it is just or unjust (11, q. 3, /Sententia / );
    the pope, therefore, can do all things.

    Further, he who ought not be rebuked by anyone for any deed at
    all has fullness of power from Christ so that he is able to do
    all things. For if he did not have such fullness of power he
    could exceed his power and consequently sin in such matters.
    Any sinner, however, even a prelate, can and should be
    corrected and rebuked for every sin, especially if there is no
    probable fear that he will become worse because of the
    correction. This follows from the words of the gospel, "If
    your brother has sinned against you, go and correct him when
    the two of you are alone", etc. [Matthew 18:15], which
    extend to everyone, as we gather from the sacred canons. The
    pope, however, should not be rebuked or corrected by anyone
    (di. 40, /Si papa / ). Therefore, the pope has fullness of
    power so that he is able to do all things. But he does not have
    such fullness of power from man. He has it, therefore, from
    Christ.

    Further, he who can not err against the faith has fullness of
    power from God so that he is able to do all things, because he
    who can not err against the faith can not err against good
    morals and, consequently, whatever he does is beyond blame and
    done permissibly, and so he can do anything he wants to do. The
    pope, however, can not err against faith. Many arguments were
    brought forward to prove this in chapter 4 of book 5 of the
    first part of this dialogue. The pope, therefore, has fullness
    of power from Christ.

    Moreover, he who has from Christ fullness of power over a
    general council also has, /a fortiori/ , fullness of power from
    Christ over all others. The pope, however, has from Christ
    fullness of power over a general council. Yet he does not have
    this power from a general council, since one council can not
    impose a law or obedience on another because an equal does not
    have power over an equal. If he has it, therefore, he has it
    from someone who is superior to a general council. It has no
    superior, however, except Christ. If the pope has such fullness
    of power, therefore, over a general council, he has it from
    Christ.

    It remains to prove, therefore, that the pope has such power
    over a general council, and this seems to be shown by clear
    authorities. For, as we read in /Extra, De electione, / c.
    /Significasti/ , Pope Paschasius says, "... since it is by
    the authority of the Roman church that all councils have been
    held and have received their strength, and [since] in their
    statutes the authority of the bishop of Rome is clearly
    excepted"; and Gratian says in 25, q. 1, /Si ergo/ ,
    "The sacred canons establish something in such a way that
    they reserve to the holy Roman church the authority to
    interpret them, for they alone can interpret the canons who
    have the right of making them. Hence in some chapters of the
    councils when it is determined that something should be
    observed it is immediately added, 'Unless the authority of the
    Roman church [has commanded otherwise]', or 'Saving, however,
    in all things, the apostolic authority'". We gather from
    these and very many others that the pope has fullness of power
    over a general council. /A fortiori/ , therefore, he has
    fullness of power over all others.

    Moreover, anyone who has power from Christ over those things
    which are against natural equity /a fortiori/ has power from
    Christ over everything licit which is not opposed to natural
    equity, because, as was touched on before, anyone to whom the greater has been
    granted seems also to have been granted the lesser thing. But
    the pope has power over things that are opposed to natural
    equity; therefore he has fullness of power from Christ so that
    he is able to do anything which is licit and not opposed to
    natural equity.

    The major [premise] does not seem to need proof. The minor is
    proved, because it is opposed to natural equity for boys who do
    not know how to rule themselves to have the care and rule of
    souls. For natural reason directs that no one who does not know
    how to rule himself should govern others. Indeed gospel truth
    also suggests this, when Christ says in Matthew 15[:14],
    "If the blind leads the blind, however, they both fall
    into a ditch". Alexander III, following a direction of
    right reason, seems to imply this as well, as we read in
    /Extra, De etate et qualitate preficiendorum/ , c. /Indecorum/
    , where he says: "It is shameful that those who have not
    learnt to govern themselves should rule churches, since those
    admitted to the rule of churches should be persons of
    outstanding discretion and conspicuous honesty of life."
    Gregory IX seems to agree with this when he says, as we read in
    /Extra, De electione, Cum in magistrum/ , "... since no
    one should be appointed to mastership who has not taken on the
    role of disciple, and no one should be set above others who has
    not known what it is to be under another", etc. It is
    clear from these and very many other [authorities] that natural
    equity demands that boys, who do not know how to rule
    themselves or others, should not be appointed to the rule and
    care of souls. And yet the pope can issue orders against this
    natural equity, as the gloss on /Extra, De etate et qualitate
    preficiendorum/ c. /Eam te/ testifies when it says, "If
    the pope should write with certain knowledge on behalf of a
    minor, his mandate should be obeyed, because it is a kind of
    sacrilege to doubt whether someone the ruler has chosen is
    worthy (17, q. 4, para. /Qui autem / and /Code/ , /De crimine
    sacrilegii/ , law 2." Alexander III also seems to have
    commanded this, as we read in /Extra, De etate et qualitate
    preficiendorum, Ex ratione/ , since he does not remove the boys
    appointed under ten years old from the churches granted to them
    by the bishop of Coventry, but knowingly tolerates them and
    orders that they be tolerated.

@end {en16m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 5
@section 2 {c5}
@section 2 {c5}
    Capitulum 5 



@section 3 {en17d}
  {Student:} You have touched on arguments, very strong ones I think,
    for the above opinion. For the moment, therefore, do not bring
    forward any others in support of it, because those will be
    clearly refuted and perhaps the others could easily be
    answered.
@end {en17d}



@section 3 {en18m}
  {Master:} 
    There are some who regard the above opinion as false,
    dangerous, pernicious and heretical, and they try to prove
    this in many ways. For Christian law is, by Christ's
    institution, a law of freedom with respect to the old law,
    which was, with respect to the new law, a law of servitude.
    But if the pope had from Christ such fullness of power that he
    can do anything not contrary to divine law or the law of
    nature, the Christian law would be, by Christ's institution, a
    law of unbearable servitude, and of much greater servitude
    than the old law was. The pope therefore does not have from
    Christ such fullness of power in both spiritual and temporal
    matters.

    The major [premise] seems provable by very clear texts of
    divine Scripture, for blessed James in his letter (1:25) calls
    it the law of perfect freedom when he says, "Whoever
    looks into the law of perfect freedom and perseveres in it,
    being not a hearer who forgets but a doer who acts, will be
    blessed in his doing." And the Apostle says in Galatians
    (2:3-5), "Nor was Titus, who was with me, being a
    gentile, forced to be circumcised. But because of false
    brothers who were brought in and came to spy on the freedom we
    have in Christ Jesus in order to bring us back into servitude
    -- we did not submit to them for a moment, so that the gospel
    truth would remain with you." By these words we are given
    to understand that the law of the gospel is a law of freedom
    by which Christians have been snatched from servitude, not to
    be led further into slavery. The Apostle also seems to assert
    this in [Galatians] 5[:12-13], when he says, "I wish that
    those who unsettle you were cut off. For you, brothers, were
    called into freedom; only do not use your freedom as an
    opportunity for the flesh, but in love help one another."

    Again, as we read in Acts 15[:10], blessed Peter says,
    "Why are you putting God to the test by placing on the
    neck of the disciples a yoke which neither our fathers nor we
    have been able to bear?" From these words we gather that
    not so heavy a yoke of servitude has been put on Christians as
    was put on the Jews. Thus also blessed James said, just after
    the words of Peter in the same place (Acts 15:19-20), "I
    judge that we should not trouble those gentiles turning to
    God, but should write to them to abstain from the pollutions
    of idols, from fornication, from what has been strangled and
    from blood." And this opinion of James was approved by
    the apostles and the elders, indeed by the Holy Spirit. Whence
    there follows, in the same place [Acts 15:22-3], "Then
    the apostles and elders, together with the whole church,
    decided to choose men from among themselves to send to Antioch
    with Paul and Barnabas. They sent Judas, surnamed Bersabas,
    and Silas, leaders among the brethren, who carried a letter
    that began "The brothers, both the apostles and the
    elders", and continued further down: "It has seemed
    [good] to the holy spirit and to us to impose no further
    burden on you than these essentials, that you abstain from
    things sacrificed to idols, from blood, from what has been
    strangled and from fornication. If you keep yourself from
    these you will do well" [Acts 15:28- 29]. We gather from
    these words that Christians have by gospel law been freed from
    manifold servitude and that gospel law is a law of less
    servitude than was the old law. Augustine seems clearly to
    imply this when, as we read in di. 12, c. /Omnia/ , he says in
    response to the questions of Januarius about people who had
    oppressed the Christian religion with excessive servitude:
    "Now although it can not be found that they are against
    the faith, yet they oppress that religion, which God's mercy
    willed to be free and to have the fewest and most easily
    celebrated sacraments, with servile burdens, so much that the
    condition of the Jews is more bearable: for even if they have
    not recognised the time of freedom, yet it is the sacraments
    of the Law to which they are subject, not human
    presumptions."

    Again, the Apostle [writes] to the Galatians, "We are
    children not of the slave but of the free woman. By this
    freedom Christ has set us free. Stand firm and do not be
    curbed again by the yoke of servitude" [4:31-5:1]. And
    the Apostle [writes] in 2 Corinthians 3[:17], "Where the
    spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom." We gather from
    all these that the new law is of greater freedom than the old
    law.

    The minor [premise] of the above argument
    -- namely that the new or gospel law would be of more
    unbearable and greater servitude than the old law was, if the
    pope by Christ's institution had such fullness of power in
    both spiritual and temporal matters -- seems to need no proof.
    For if this were so, all Christians would be slaves and no
    one's condition would be free. For all would be slaves of the
    highest pontiff, with the result that the highest pontiff
    would have as great a power in temporal matters over the
    emperor, kings, princes, all the laity and over absolutely
    every Christian, both as to their persons and as to their
    possessions, as any temporal lord ever had or could have over
    any slave, so that the pope could freely deprive kings,
    princes and all other Christians of their kingdoms and all
    their possessions and could keep them himself or confer them
    on another, and he could subject kings and princes to anyone
    else at all and make them slaves of those people. For these
    and similar things are against neither divine law nor the law
    of nature, because if they were against divine law or the law
    of nature, they would not be permitted to kings themselves or
    other Christians and, as a result, no one would be permitted
    to give his goods to another or submit himself to the power of
    another. And so it is certain that with respect to temporal
    matters Christian law would be of greater servitude than the
    old law, if the pope were to have in temporal matters fullness
    of power of this kind. For those who were under the Mosaic law
    were not in such a way subject to any mortal in temporal
    matters, because neither the king nor the chief priest had
    such lordship; and thus Naboth praiseworthily refused to give
    and sell his vineyard to the king who wanted to buy it. [See 3
    Kings 21.]

    Also with respect to spiritual matters, or with respect to
    those things that pertain or can pertain to outward divine
    worship, the gospel law would be of greater servitude than was
    the law of Moses. For the pope would have this kind of
    fullness of power in spiritual matters, and out of this
    fullness of power the pope could impose on
    kings, princes and all Christians more and heavier corporal 
    observances of this kind than were ordained in the old law, and no 
    Christian would be permitted not to obey him in matters of this kind, 
    if the pope had such fullness of power.

    From these [points] it follows that the above opinion about the
    highest pontiff's fullness of power should be regarded not only
    as false but also as heretical, since it is clearly against
    sacred Scripture, which asserts that the Christian law is a law
    of freedom, and consequently Christians are not made the slaves
    of any mortal by Christian law but are free, as far as the
    nature of gospel law is concerned. It is also, they say,
    pernicious and dangerous, because if the pope made use of such
    power by depriving kings and other Christians of their kingdoms
    and possessions, just on the authority of his own will, and
    subjecting them to servitude or servile works, then schisms,
    dissensions, wars and battles would arise among Christians, and
    peril and cost to the whole of Christianity.
@end {en18m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 6
@section 2 {c6}
@section 2 {c6}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 6 



@section 3 {en19d}
  {Student:} Because that [argument] is, I think, the 
    chief basis or reason, or one of the main ones, why some people say 
    that the pope does not have such fullness of power, I want to object 
    against it, so that from the replies you will report to the 
    objections against it, its character will become more clear.

    [1] Thus it seems that Christian law is not 
    called a law of freedom in the sacred Scriptures because by it 
    Christians become free in the sense that they are not subject to the 
    highest pontiff in all things, as the preceding reasoning implies, 
    but it is called a law of freedom because through it Christians are 
    made free from the servitude of sin or of the Mosaic law. And thus 
    many of the texts you brought forward speak explicitly about freedom 
    from the servitude of the Mosaic law, for example those from 
    Galatians 2 and 5, from Acts 15 and from Galatians 4. And other texts 
    can be understood as referring to freedom from the servitude of sin. 
    Through these it can not be proved, therefore, that by Christian law 
    Christians are made free from the servitude by which they are bound 
    to the highest pontiff, that is, so as not to be subject to him in 
    all temporal and spiritual matters not against God's law or the law 
    of nature.

    [2] Thus it is also proved by argument that 
    the texts of divine Scripture should not be understood as referring 
    to the freedom and subjection by which Christians are subject to the 
    highest pontiff. For if Christian law were the law of freedom in this 
    sense, no one would be permitted to subject himself to the highest 
    pontiff (or to any other mortal at all) [in things] that are not 
    against God's law or the law of nature, because no one is permitted 
    to act against Christian law.

    [3] And thus if, as some people say, the Friars 
    Minor are bound by their rule to obey the highest pontiff in 
    everything, their rule would be heretical, because it would be 
    against Christian law, which is a law of freedom liberating 
    Christians so that they are not subject to any man.

    [4] Further, according to blessed James, as 
    quoted above, Christian law is a law of perfect 
    freedom. Perfect freedom, however, is opposed to all servitude. If 
    Christian law is a law of freedom, liberating Christians so that they 
    are not subject to any man, it follows therefore that no one should 
    be the slave of any man at all. And so kings, princes and other 
    laymen, and also the church, would have no slaves. This clearly 
    conflicts with the civil laws and the sacred canons.

    For these reasons it seems that the above argument does not prove 
    that the pope does not have fullness of power in both spiritual and 
    temporal matters. But would you explain how a reply is made to them?

@end {en19d}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 7
@section 2 {c7}
@section 2 {c7}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 7 



@section 3 {en20m}
  {Master:} It is said in response to the first
    of these that although some texts make special mention of freedom 
    from the servitude of Mosaic law, nonetheless they should all be 
    understood as being about freedom from any servitude as great as was 
    the servitude of Mosaic law. At least with 
    respect to some matters this [is to be taken] negatively, that is, 
    with the meaning that no one is obliged by the gospel law to as great 
    a servitude as was the servitude of the old law, although some 
    Christians, by reason of a fault, or of their own will, or for any 
    other reason -- not by gospel law -- may be held bound by a servitude 
    as great or even greater.

    For if through gospel law Christians were bound, with respect to 
    exterior works, by any servitude as great as or greater than the 
    servitude of the old law, gospel law could not be said to be more a 
    law of freedom than the Mosaic law, however much Christians had been 
    liberated from the servitude of the Mosaic law. For someone liberated 
    from one servitude and oppressed with another as great or greater is 
    not freer than he had been before, just as someone freed from one 
    bodily bond and bound with another equal or stronger has not been 
    freed but more bound. Now since, according to the truth of divine 
    Scripture, gospel law is more a law of freedom than the old law was, 
    Christians are subjected through gospel law neither to the servitude 
    of Mosaic law nor to any other exterior servitude greater than or as 
    great as the servitude of the old law was. Therefore those texts also 
    which speak about the freedom of Christians in the context of the 
    servitude of the old law should be understood to mean freedom from 
    any servitude as great as the servitude of the old law was. Since the 
    servitude by which someone is obliged to obey another in everything 
    not contrary to divine law or the law of nature is greater than the 
    servitude of the old law was, the texts quoted above should be 
    understood, therefore, to mean freedom also from that servitude. And 
    so, they say, it is clearly proved by those [texts] that the 
    aforesaid opinion about the highest pontiff's fullness of power is 
    heretical, as being contrary to divine Scripture.
@end {en20m}



@section 3 {en21d}
  {Student:} Before I go on, I raise an objection against 
    that. For it does not seem that even if the pope had such fullness of 
    power Christians would be oppressed by servitude greater than or as 
    great as the servitude of the old law was. For some religious 
    superiors have, or can have, such power over their brethren, because 
    some religious can promise obedience to their superiors in 
    everything, and yet those religious would not be oppressed by 
    servitude as great as the servitude of the old law was because such 
    religious would not be slaves -- for religious are not slaves of 
    their superiors, nor are the superiors lords of their brethren.
@end {en21d}



@section 3 {en22m}
  {Master:} The answer to this is that although the pope 
    can have such power over someone who wishes to become his slave and 
    subject himself to the pope's power in everything, yet neither the 
    pope nor any religious superior has such power over any religious at 
    all -- that is, over those who vow or have vowed obedience, poverty 
    and chastity. For any such religious are bound to observe the rule 
    that they vow. For this reason, neither the pope nor anyone else has 
    such fullness of power over them, and they are not the slaves of the 
    pope or of any other superior, as the word "slave" is often 
    taken in the legal sciences, because neither the pope nor any other 
    can employ them in servile tasks, abandoning the things that belong 
    to the substance of their rule, or order them to own property or 
    contract marriage; yet these things are licit in themselves, although 
    they have become illicit for religious because of the vow they have 
    voluntarily taken.
@end {en22m}



@section 3 {en23d}
  {Student:} We will examine the power of the pope over 
    religious later, so do not speak any more about that at the moment. 
    But say whether, according to them, it can be proved not only through 
    the fact that the texts brought forward affirm that Christian law is 
    a law of freedom but also through other words found in those texts 
    that by gospel law Christians are not bound to as great a servitude 
    as the servitude of the old law was.
@end {en23d}



@section 3 {en24m}
  {Master:} They say that this could be proved through 
    all the aforesaid texts, though not equally clearly through them all.
@end {en24m}



@section 3 {en25d}
  {Student:} Tell me through which ones, according to 
    them, this can be proved more clearly.
@end {en25d}



@section 3 {en26m}
  {Master:} They say that this is clearly proved by means 
    of the text taken from Acts 15. For at the inspiration of the holy 
    spirit the apostles announced to the gentiles freedom from the yoke 
    of servitude, as a consolation for them and so that they would not 
    lament that they were troubled with burdensome servitude. Thus, in a 
    passage quoted, James said [Acts 15:19], "I judge that we should 
    not trouble those gentiles turning to God"; and about those 
    gentiles who had turned to God, when they received the letter from 
    the apostles and elders about the freedom we have been talking about, 
    it is written in the same chapter [Acts 15:31]: "When they had 
    read it they rejoiced at its consolation". But if these gentile 
    converts had been freed from the servitude of God's law and subjected 
    to a greater servitude to Peter and his successors, they would have 
    both lamented justifiably their greater trouble and not had material 
    of consolation. They were freed, therefore, from any servitude 
    greater than or as great as the servitude of the Mosaic law. This is 
    implied in the words of the apostles, when they say [Acts 15:28-9], 
    "It has seemed good to the holy spirit and to us to impose on 
    you no further burden than these essentials: that you abstain", 
    etc. For if they wanted to impose "no further burden" on 
    them they did not want to impose on them either a servitude greater 
    than or a servitude as great as the servitude of the old law.
@end {en26m}



@section 3 {en27d}
  {Student:} It seems that those words, "to impose 
    on you no further burden", should not be understood so 
    generally. For although the apostles did not impose the burdens of 
    the old law on Christians, they did nonetheless impose on them many 
    things besides those named in the above words. For they made many 
    canons in which they commanded many things besides those enumerated 
    in the words above, as is clear in the  /Decreta/  di. 16, c.  /Propter/  
    and 12, q. 1, c.  /Dilectissimis/ , c.  /Sint manifeste/  
    and c.  /Ex hiis/ . The words from Acts 15 quoted above, 
    therefore, should be understood only to refer to the burden of the 
    Mosaic law.
@end {en27d}



@section 3 {en28m}
  {Master:} The reply to this is that although the 
    apostles made many canons and commanded many things besides those 
    enumerated in Acts 15, yet they did not command anything to subjects 
    who had not been asked and were not consenting, except things that 
    were of divine law and natural law and things that necessity or 
    public utility demanded, the commanding of which could not be 
    neglected without damage. It is in things of this kind that the 
    highest pontiff has power now.
@end {en28m}



@section 3 {en29d}
  {Student:} That last statement, I think, can not be 
    explained briefly in the meaning of those who make it, so, because we 
    will consider it later, let us put it aside for the moment. Tell me 
    whether they say that it is clearly provable through any other text 
    already brought forward that when Scripture speaks about the freedom 
    of gospel law it should be understood to be referring also to freedom 
    from some other servitude besides the servitude of Mosaic law.
@end {en29d}



@section 3 {en30m}
  {Master:} They say that this can be shown from the text 
    of the Apostle when he says in 2 Corinthians 3[:17], "Where the 
    spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom." For in that place the 
    Apostle is not speaking about freedom from the servitude of the Old 
    Law in particular, but [is speaking] more generally. The Apostle 
    means, therefore, that where the spirit of the Lord is, not only is 
    there freedom from the servitude of the Old Law but also there is 
    freedom from any servitude with respect to exterior works that is as 
    great as the servitude of the old law.

    This is shown by texts from the holy fathers. For the holy fathers 
    prove by that text from the Apostle that clerics are permitted to 
    become monks even if their bishops are unwilling. For, as we read in 
    19, q. 2, c.  /Due/ , Pope Urban says, "Those who are 
    driven by the Spirit of God are led by the law of God, and who is 
    there who can worthily resist the holy spirit? Let anyone, therefore, 
    who is led by this spirit, even if his bishop opposes him, go free 
    with our authority. For the law has not been laid down for the just. 
    But 'where the spirit of God is, there is freedom', and if you are 
    led by the Spirit of God you are not under the law." And 
    Innocent III says in  /Extra, De regularibus/ , c.  /Licet/ ,
    "It is permitted to certain monks. . . Yet because 'where the 
    spirit of God is, there is freedom' and those who are driven by the 
    spirit of God are not under the law, and because the law has not been 
    laid down for the just, it seems to have been granted to them for 
    this reason, and not that anyone under the pretext of greater 
    religion should rashly or lightly flit across to another order to the 
    detriment or injury of his own order." From these we gather that 
    through the freedom granted to Christians it is proved that clerics 
    are allowed to cross over into a religious order and religious to 
    cross to a stricter order. Yet this could not be proved if by the 
    "freedom of Christians" the apostle meant only freedom from 
    the servitude of the Mosaic law. This also seems explicitly provable 
    from the text of Augustine quoted above. For 
    in those words Augustine judges, through the freedom which by God's 
    mercy the Christian religion has acquired, that they should be 
    reproved who were so oppressing that religion with various burdens 
    "that the condition of the Jews is more tolerable" than 
    that of Christians -- yet it was not with the burdens of Mosaic law 
    that they were oppressing Christians. Augustine thought, therefore, 
    that the Christian religion has not only been liberated from the 
    burdens of the old law but also from other burdens that would oppress 
    as much as or more than the burdens of Mosaic law.
@end {en30m}



@section 3 {en31d}
  {Student:} Tell me how reply is made to the arguments 
    in chapter 6 above that I used to prove that the texts adduced in 
    chapter 5 should not be understood of the freedom from that 
    subjection by which, according to the first opinion, Christians are 
    subject to the highest pontiff.
@end {en31d}



@section 3 {en32m}
  {Master:} According to some people the reply to the first of
    these is that texts about the freedom of gospel law should not, with 
    respect to all of them, be understood affirmatively but, with respect 
    to many of them, should be understood negatively, as was mentioned before,
    just as the words of the apostle, "Let there be one spirit"
    in husband and wife [1 Corintians 6:16-17], and the words of the 
    Saviour, "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word will 
    stand" [Matthew 18:16], and many other [texts] should be 
    understood negatively. For it is not the case that those who were 
    slaves before their conversion to the faith became free because of 
    that conversion. But no one was led by gospel law into greater 
    servitude than the servitude of the old law and, therefore, no one 
    may become the slave of the pope by gospel law. However, without 
    transgressing that law, anyone can make himself the slave of the pope 
    if he wants to do so of his own free will; or if for some other just 
    and licit reason he becomes the slave of the pope, there is no 
    derogation of gospel law. For although the gospel law does not lead 
    one into this kind of servitude, it does not, on the other hand, 
    prohibit it.

    They say, moreover, that it is false when it is said in the same 
    place [above] that the Friars Minor are bound 
    to obey the pope in everything -- although certain Friars Minor, it 
    is reported, do not maintain this view, asserting that they would be 
    permitted, even bound, to take wives if the pope at his will alone 
    were to command this. We will treat these matters later in this tract 
    and also in the ninth tract of this third part of our dialogue. For 
    the Friars Minor are not bound to obey the pope when he orders 
    something against the substance of their rule, and their rule should 
    be considered, therefore, not heretical but catholic.

    The reply to the fourth argument
    you put is that Christian law is not called a law of freedom because 
    it frees Christians from every servitude but because it does not 
    oppress Christians with as great a servitude as that by which the 
    Jews were oppressed; and kings and other Christians, therefore, are 
    allowed to have slaves, though no Christian becomes anyone's slave 
    through Christian law. To blessed James it is said that he does not 
    mean that Christian law is a law of perfect freedom in the sense that 
    no Christian is subject to any man at all, for Christians are subject 
    to the pope and many of them are subject to princes and other 
    Christians. But he says that it is a law of perfect freedom because 
    through it the Christian religion is subject by divine institution to 
    few sacraments, sacramentals or ceremonies, and through it no 
    Christian is made the slave of any mortal and, also, is not subjected 
    to the power of any man, except in those matters which pertain to 
    necessity or to his own advantage or that of the commonwealth. Hence 
    the Apostle says, on behalf of himself and all the apostles and all 
    the prelates of the Church: "For we can not do anything against 
    truth but only for the truth... I write while I am away so that when 
    I am present I will not act severely in using the power the Lord has 
    given me for building up, not for tearing down" (2 Corinthians 
    13[:8, 10]). From these words we gather that the apostles did not 
    have any power from God over the faithful except where it was to the 
    advantage of those faithful. Hence Christian law, which introduces no 
    subjection except where it is to the advantage of the one subjected 
    or of any community, is also subject to few divine sacraments. 
    Deservedly should it be called a law of perfect freedom -- especially 
    with respect to the Mosaic law which entangles those subject to it in 
    very many sacraments and ceremonies that can scarcely be borne -- yet 
    it is not called the law of  /most/  perfect freedom, because in 
    perfection there are grades, since not every perfection should be 
    regarded as the most perfect. The most perfect freedom, however, will 
    not be had in this mortal life.
@end {en32m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 8
@section 2 {c8}
@section 2 {c8}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 8 



@section 3 {en33d}
  {Student:} So that I can understand the nature of the 
    preceding argument still more fully, I want to hear some arguments 
    besides the ones written above to prove that not all men are slaves 
    of the highest pontiff, from which those of that opinion try to infer 
    that the pope does not have such fullness of power by Christ's ordination.
@end {en33d}



@section 3 {en34m}
  {Master:} It is shown in many ways that not all 
    Christians are slaves of the highest pontiff in the strictest sense 
    of the word "slave" (which nonetheless would follow 
    according to them if the pope were to have this sort of fullness of 
    power in both temporal and spiritual matters). For a slave can have 
    no ownership or lordship of any temporal thing at all while he 
    remains a slave, because whatever a slave acquires he acquires for 
    his lord and it is that lord's. Kings, princes and very many other 
    Christians, however, have lordship and ownership of very many 
    temporal things. Not all men are slaves of the pope, therefore, in 
    that sense of the word "slave" in which a lord can sell, 
    give and transfer his slave and at will take from him every temporal 
    thing. This would follow, however, if the pope were to have such 
    fullness of power in temporal matters.
@end {en34m}



@section 3 {en35d}
  {Student:} How is it proved that kings, princes and 
    many other Christians have ownership and lordship of temporal things?
@end {en35d}



@section 3 {en36m}
  {Master:} This is shown in many ways. For they have 
    lordship and ownership of temporal things by whose temporal laws they 
    are possessed. [But temporal things are possessed by the laws of 
    emperors and kings] (di. 8,  /Quo iure / ). Emperors and kings, 
    therefore, have lordship and ownership of temporal things.

    Further, they have ownership and lordship of temporal things whose 
    laws even highest pontiffs use for the course of temporal things. But 
    highest pontiffs use the laws of emperors and kings for the course of 
    temporal things (di. 10,  /Quoniam idem / and di. 96,  /Cum ad verum/ ).
    Emperors and kings, therefore, have ownership and lordship of 
    temporal things.

    Again, bishops sometimes have things of their own apart from things 
    of the church (12, q. 1, c.  /Episcopi/ , c.  /Manifesta/ , 
    c.  /Certe/  and c.  /Sint manifeste/ ). Therefore others 
    besides the pope can possess ownership and lordship of temporal things.

    Besides, kings, princes and other faithful laymen give temporal 
    things to churches. Therefore they have ownership and lordship of 
    temporal things.

    Again, Jews and infidels have ownership of temporal things. Therefore 
    much more do Christian kings and princes have ownership of things of 
    this kind.
@end {en36m}



@section 3 {en37d}
  {Student:} That is so widely known, both in civil and 
    canon law and in the common opinion of men, that I do not care to 
    have more arguments adduced for it. I could ask about it, however, 
    whether it is heretical to say that no Christian has ownership of 
    temporal things, but I propose to reserve this to the tract about the 
    rights of the Roman Empire. Revert, therefore, to proving that not 
    all Christians are slaves of the pope.
@end {en37d}



@section 3 {en38m}
  {Master:} This is proved in another way as follows. A 
    slave can not have another slave, but many laymen have slaves (di. 
    54, c. 1. [ /Nullus/ ] and c. 2. [ /Nulli/ ] and c. [5]  /Quicumque
    / and in many other chapters). Therefore not all men are slaves 
    of the pope.

    Further, many obtain freedom from the church (12, q. 2, c.  /Si 
    quos de servis ecclesie / and c.  /Episcopus / and c.  /Liberti
    / and in many other chapters). Therefore not all men are slaves 
    of the highest pontiff. Therefore many men are free. The Saviour 
    seems to attest to this when he says in Matthew 17[:25], "The 
    children are free." The apostle also says in Galatians 4[:1-2]: 
    "Heirs, as long as they are minors, are no better than slaves, 
    though they are the owners of all the property; but they remain under 
    guardians and trustees until the date set by the father." From 
    these words we gather that he differs from a slave when the date set 
    by the father comes and at that time, as a consequence, he is the 
    slave neither of the pope nor of another.
@end {en38m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 9
@section 2 {c9}
@section 2 {c9}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 9 



@section 3 {en39d}
  {Student:} I think I perceive how they try to prove by 
    means of the freedom of Christians that the pope does not have such 
    fullness of power, especially in temporal matters. Therefore try to 
    argue again for that opinion in another way.
@end {en39d}



@section 3 {en40m}
  {Master:} This seems provable in other ways. For a 
    vicar, in so far as he is a vicar, does not have greater power than 
    him whose vicar he is. Therefore the pope, in so far as he is the 
    vicar of Christ, does not have greater power in temporal matters than 
    Christ had, in so far as he was a mortal man able to suffer. But 
    Christ, in so far as he was a mortal man able to suffer, did not have 
    power of this kind in temporal matters, since he did not have 
    lordship of all temporal things and others were not his slaves in the 
    strict sense of the word "slaves". He attests to this 
    himself, as we read in John 15[:15], where he said to the apostles, 
    "I will not now call you servants [slaves], because a servant 
    does not know what his lord does." Therefore the pope does not 
    have this kind of fullness of power.
@end {en40m}



@section 3 {en41d}
  {Student:} We will be able to find out enough about the 
    basis of that argument in the fourth tract of the second part of the 
    dialogue where it is appropriate to examine carefully the poverty of 
    Christ. Putting it aside, therefore, bring forward some other [arguments].
@end {en41d}



@section 3 {en42m}
  {Master:} The same point is proved in another way as 
    follows. He who ought not involve himself in secular occupations 
    ought not have such fullness of power in secular matters. The pope, 
    however, ought not involve himself in secular occupations. Therefore 
    he does not have, and ought not have, such fullness of power in 
    secular matters.

    The major [premise] is proved because power is given to someone in 
    vain if he ought not exercise it. For this reason too kings who 
    receive power from God to judge and to provide justice and make 
    judgements who do not do these things are often censured in sacred 
    letters. Thus Wisdom 6[:4-5] says to kings who carry out their duty 
    as king wrongly or negligently, "Power was given you by the 
    Lord, and strength by the Most High; he will examine your works and 
    search out your thoughts. Because as servants of his kingdom you did 
    not judge rightly ... etc." There the Gloss says, "Note 
    that everyone ought to do those things which are suitable to his 
    condition"; and, consequently, anyone ought especially to do 
    those things for the doing of which he received power by the special 
    ordination of God. Therefore he who specifically received fullness of 
    power in secular matters by the decree and ordination of Christ ought 
    most of all to involve himself in secular occupations even beyond all 
    others, lest he show himself in the power committed to him negligent 
    and idle.

    The minor [premise], that is that the pope 
    ought not involve himself in secular occupations, seems to be clearly 
    shown by the Apostle, who says in 2 Timothy 2[:4], "No one 
    serving as a soldier of God involves himself in secular occupations, 
    so that he may please him with whom he has enlisted." Therefore 
    since the pope especially, among all men, ought to serve as a soldier 
    of God so that he may please him, he ought to involve himself in 
    secular occupations less than others. Hence, as we read in di. 88, c.  /Episcopus/ ,
    we find this taken from a canon of the apostles: "Let not a 
    bishop, priest or deacon, take on secular cares; if they do 
    otherwise, let them be deposed." And it is written as follows in 
    c.  /Episcopus nullam/ : "Let not a bishop call back on 
    himself any household care, but let him devote himself only to 
    reading, prayer, and the preaching of the word." And in 21, q. 
    5, c. 1 [rather 21, q. 3, c. 2] we read as follows: "There are 
    statutes of the apostles that say 'No one serving as a soldier of God 
    involves himself in secular occupations'; therefore, let clerics not 
    sue for possession of houses or those who sue not hold clerical 
    office." From these and very many other sacred canons (found in 
    16, q. 1,  /Sunt nonulli / and the whole of di. 88, and 21, q. 
    3, c.  /Placuit / and c. / Cyprianus / and c.  /Mollitiis / and
    c.  /Hii qui / and c.  /Sacerdotum / and the whole of  /Extra,
    Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus se negotiis immisceant/ , and 
    in very many other places) we gather that clerics and bishops ought 
    not involve themselves in secular occupations. Consequently the pope 
    particularly ought to abstain from such things, both because he is 
    foremost and first among bishops and clerics and ought especially to 
    be occupied with spiritual matters, and because he particularly 
    occupies the place of the apostles, and especially of the leader of 
    the apostles, who taught and did this and whom he principally ought 
    to imitate.
@end {en42m}



@section 3 {en43d}
  {Student:} It is not necessary for the highest pontiff 
    to conform himself in everything to the apostolic life, because the 
    apostles renounced ownership of temporal goods ( /Extra, De 
    verborum significatione, Exiit/ , li. 6) and yet the pope can have 
    property. Similarly, therefore, the pope can involve himself in many 
    secular occupations in which the apostles did not involve themselves.
@end {en43d}



@section 3 {en44m}
  {Master:} To this they reply that although the pope is 
    not bound to conform himself in everything to the apostolic life, yet 
    nothing that would be opposed to the apostolic life has been 
    especially enjoined on him by Christ; and since, therefore, 
    involvement in secular occupations is opposed to the apostolic life, 
    they infer that this has not been especially enjoined on the pope by 
    Christ. And therefore fullness of power in secular matters has not 
    been especially given to him by Christ, since he would be bound to 
    exercise power that he has especially by the ordination and 
    institution of Christ.
@end {en44m}



@section 3 {en45d}
  {Student:} Would you try to give another argument for 
    that opinion?
@end {en45d}



@section 3 {en46m}
  {Master:} That the pope does not have such fullness of 
    power in spiritual and temporal matters is shown. For he who is less 
    than and the servant and slave of others, over whom he ought not 
    exercise power, does not have over them fullness of power in both 
    spiritual and temporal matters. For he who has such fullness of power 
    over others is their lord, since no lord can have more power than 
    fullness of power over everyone. And no one is slave and lord with 
    respect to the same person. Also, he who has fullness of power over 
    others especially can and ought to exercise power over them. The 
    pope, however, is less than and the servant and slave of Christians, 
    over whom he ought not exercise power, as Christ attested when he 
    said to the apostles in Matthew 20[:25-7]: "You know that the 
    rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them and their great ones 
    exercise power over them. It will not be so among you; but whoever 
    wishes to become greater among you must be your servant, and whoever 
    wishes to be first among you will be your slave." And in Matthew 
    23[:11] Christ said: "The greater among you will be your 
    servant." And in Mark 9[:34] he said, "Whoever wants to be 
    first will be last of all and servant of all." And in Mark 10[:42-4]:
    "You know that those who seem to rule the Gentiles lord it over 
    them and their princes have power over them. But it is not so among 
    you; but whoever wishes to become greater will be your servant, and 
    whoever wishes to be first will be the slave of all." And we 
    read in Luke 22[:25-6] that Christ said to the apostles, "The 
    kings of the Gentiles lord it over them and those who have power over 
    them are called benefactors. But not so with you; the greater among 
    you should become like the lesser and the leader like one who 
    serves." From these it is clear that he who is spiritually first 
    among Christians, that is the pope, is less than and the servant and 
    slave of others, over whom he ought not exercise power. Therefore he 
    does not have such fullness of power.
@end {en46m}



@section 3 {en47d}
  {Student:} An argument like that one has been 
    considered a little more fully in chapter 3 of book 6 of the first 
    part of this dialogue. Leaving it aside, therefore, would you 
    endeavour to bring forward some others?
@end {en47d}



@section 3 {en48m}
  {Master:} That the pope does not have such fullness of 
    power is proved as follows. For whoever has not been established by 
    Christ as a judge of secular matters does not have from Christ such 
    fullness of power in secular matters. The pope has not been 
    established by Christ as a judge of secular matters, as blessed Peter 
    testifies in the letter of Clement which is found in 11, q. 1,  /Te quidem/ .
    He says, "It does indeed behove you to live unblamably and to 
    strive with the greatest zeal to cast aside all the business of this 
    life: do not be a guarantor, do not become an advocate in law suits 
    and, in short, do not in any occupation be found entangled in the 
    occasion of a worldly court case. For Christ does not wish to appoint 
    you today as either a judge or an advocate in secular cases." 
    Therefore the pope does not have such fullness of power especially in 
    secular matters.

    Also, he who is not the lord of clerics does not have fullness of 
    power over them. The pope is not the lord of clerics, however, as 
    blessed Peter testifies in the fifth chapter of his first letter. He 
    says: "Not as one lording it over the clergy" [1 Peter 
    5:3]. Therefore the pope does not have such fullness of power even 
    over the clergy.

    Further, the pope has greater power in lands subject to his temporal 
    jurisdiction than in other lands not subject to his temporal 
    jurisdiction. Therefore he does not in all [lands] have such fullness 
    of power.
@end {en48m}



@section 3 {en49d}
  {Student:} The holders of the first opinion would say 
    that all lands are subject to the temporal jurisdiction of the pope.
@end {en49d}



@section 3 {en50m}
  {Master:} Innocent III seems to oppose this. As we read 
    in  /Extra, De hereticis, Vergentis/ , he distinguishes the 
    lands subject to his temporal jurisdiction from others. He says, 
    "We decree that the goods of heretics in lands subject to our 
    temporal jurisdiction are confiscated, and in other [lands] we 
    command that the same thing be done by the secular powers and princes."
@end {en50m}



@section 3 {en51d}
  {Student:} Bring forward yet another argument.
@end {en51d}



@section 3 {en52m}
  {Master:} It is proved in another way that the pope 
    does not have such fullness of power specifically in temporal 
    matters, because from one who has fullness of power in temporal 
    matters, such that he can do everything in temporal matters that is 
    not opposed to divine law or the law of nature, all power in temporal 
    matters derives. But imperial and royal power and the power of other 
    lay rulers does not derive from the pope -- and thus the king of 
    France does not acknowledge a superior in temporal matters ( /Extra,
    Qui filii sint legitimi,/  c. /Per venerabilem/).
    Therefore the pope does not have such fullness of power in temporal matters.
@end {en52m}



@section 3 {en53d}
  {Student:} We will consider fully in the second tract 
    of this third part of our dialogue the distinction between spiritual 
    and secular powers and whether secular power is from the pope. Would 
    you therefore bring forward another argument.
@end {en53d}



@section 3 {en54m}
  {Master:} That the pope does not have such fullness of 
    power in temporal matters is shown, because no prescription runs 
    against one who has such fullness of power in temporal matters. 
    However prescription, at least the one hundred year prescription, 
    runs against the pope ( /Extra, De prescriptionibus/ , c.  /Si diligenti)/ .
    Therefore the pope does not have fullness of power of this kind in 
    temporal matters.
@end {en54m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 10
@section 2 {c10}
@section 2 {c10}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 10 



@section 3 {en55d}
  {Student:} Let this be enough now about the first 
    opinion which you recorded in chapter 1 above. Turn, therefore, to 
    the second opinion recorded in that chapter.
@end {en55d}



@section 3 {en56m}
  {Master:} That opinion contains two parts, one 
    affirmative and the other negative. The first is that the pope has by 
    Christ's decree such fullness of power in spiritual matters. The 
    second is that he does not have by Christ's decree such fullness of 
    power in temporal matters.
@end {en56m}



@section 3 {en57d}
  {Student:} Argue for the first part first.
@end {en57d}



@section 3 {en58m}
  {Master:} That the pope has by Christ's decree such 
    fullness of power in spiritual matters is proved because, just as 
    those things which are secular ought to be managed by a secular 
    ruler, so those things which are spiritual should be ordered and 
    managed by the highest pontiff. But the supreme secular ruler has 
    fullness of power in secular matters.

    Further, Christ gave Peter fullness of power when he said to him, 
    "Whatever you bind on earth", etc.; but he did not give him 
    fullness of power in temporal matters; therefore he gave him fullness 
    of power in spiritual matters.

    Again, he who can reprove every man for any sin at all and can 
    restrain them by an appropriate punishment has fullness of power in 
    spiritual matters; but the pope can reprove every man for sin ( /Extra,
    De iudiciis/ , c.  /Novit/ ); therefore the pope has 
    fullness of power in spiritual matters.

    Again, all spiritual matters can be reduced to causes [legal actions] 
    of God; but all God's causes pertain to the highest pontiff because 
    they pertain to bishops and clerics (di. 96, c.  /Si imperator/ ),
    and the pope is first among bishops; all God's causes, therefore, 
    pertain to him. Therefore he has fullness of power in spiritual 
    matters. Pope Julius seems to think this. As we read in di. 11, c.  /Nolite/ ,
    he says: "For it is quite improper for anyone, whether a bishop 
    or of a lower order, to resist this rule which he sees that the see 
    of blessed Peter follows and teaches. For it is most appropriate that 
    the whole body of the church agree in this observance, which derives 
    its authority from where the Lord placed the rulership of the whole 
    church." And Pope Nicholas says in the same distinction, c.  /Consequens/ ,
    "The result is that what is enacted with full authority by the 
    rulers of this see is not removed by the hindering occasion of any 
    custom, [with others] following their own wills alone". Here the 
    gloss on the word "full" says: "The authority of the 
    pope is called full; that of other bishops is half-full." We 
    gather from these words that, at least in spiritual matters, the pope 
    has from Christ fullness of power.
@end {en58m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 11
@section 2 {c11}
@section 2 {c11}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 11 



@section 3 {en59d}
  {Student:} If the pope has from Christ fullness of 
    power in both spiritual and temporal matters, there is no doubt that 
    he has from Christ fullness of power in spiritual matters. The 
    arguments that were brought forward for the first opinion in chapters 
    [2], 3 and 4 above can therefore also be brought forward for the 
    first part of the second opinion, and so I do not want to hear more 
    arguments for it at the moment. Likewise for the second part of that 
    second opinion [denying that the pope has fullness of power in 
    temporal matters] many points touched on in chapters 5, 7, 8, and 9 
    can be adduced. Leaving aside that [second] opinion, therefore, us 
    try to discuss the third one which was touched 
    on in chapter 1 above. About it I wish to hear first the manner in 
    which it is asserted.
@end {en59d}



@section 3 {en60m}
  {Master:} That opinion asserts that the pope has in 
    both temporal and spiritual matters such fullness of power, partly by 
    Christ's decree, partly by human decree, saying that the pope has 
    directly from Christ full power in the area of penance, according to 
    the words in Matthew 16[:19], "Whatever you bind on earth", 
    etc. He also has from Christ the power of teaching all the Christian 
    people, according to the words in John 21[:17], "Feed my 
    sheep." He also has from Christ the power of distributing and 
    conferring ecclesiastical offices, according to Christ's words to 
    Peter in John 1[:42], "You will be called Cephas", that is 
    head: for from the fact that he is head he has the power to act upon 
    the members by conferring on them different offices. He also has it 
    from Christ, by virtue of the fact that he constituted him head of 
    the others, that the more important business of the church should be 
    referred to him. From general councils, however, he has power with 
    respect to all things pertaining to the rule of all Christian people 
    in which power was not specifically granted to him by Christ.
@end {en60m}



@section 3 {en61d}
  {Student:} Concerning that opinion many points would have to be 
    discussed which (or many of which) have been touched on in the things 
    said in connection with the first opinion or will be touched on when 
    we analyse the last opinion set down in chapter one above. I want 
    you, therefore, to try to support with some arguments only one thing 
    that that opinion asserts, namely that the pope has received some 
    power from general councils. For this seems to conflict with those 
    texts which say that general councils obtain strength and authority 
    from the Roman church.
@end {en61d}



@section 3 {en62m}
  {Master:} That the pope received some power from 
    general councils seems provable as follows. The pope has some power 
    from the canons, and only from the canons of general councils; 
    therefore he has some power from general councils.

    The first [premise] seems provable from various texts of the saints. 
    For Pope Julius, writing to the bishops of the east says, as we read 
    in di. 17, c.  /Regula/ , "Your rule neither has nor can 
    have any strength, since this council was not held by orthodox 
    bishops nor was there a legate of the Roman church present, despite 
    the canons ordering that councils ought not to be held without its 
    authority." We gather from these words that it has been ordered 
    by the canons that the pope alone has the authority to assemble councils.

    Also, as we read in 9, q. 3, c.  /Ipsi/ , Pope Gelasius says, 
    "Those are canons which have willed that appeals from the whole 
    church be brought for examination to this holy see. They have enacted 
    that there ought not be any appeal at all from this see to anywhere 
    else, and, accordingly, that this see should judge the whole church 
    and should fall under no one's judgement. And they have ordered that 
    its judgement should never be judged and they have decreed that its 
    sentence must not be dissolved; rather they have commanded that its 
    decrees should be followed." We gather from these words that it 
    belongs to the pope from the canons, not from Christ immediately, 
    that everyone is permitted to appeal to him and that it is not 
    permissible to appeal from him, that he can judge concerning the 
    whole church, that he is subject to no one's judgement, that his 
    sentence should be upheld in all matters, and, consequently, that his 
    commands should be obeyed in everything and by everyone. From this it 
    is inferred that the pope has from general councils fullness of power 
    in respect of everything not granted him directly by Christ.

    Also, as we read in 2, q. 6, c.  /Decreto/ , Gregory says, 
    "Let diocesans be permitted, after a hearing by their primate, 
    to appeal, if necessary, to us and by our authority carry on and 
    determine their litigation, in accordance with the decrees of the 
    Fathers, either before us or through legates sent from our side."
    We are given to understand by these words that it is by the decrees 
    of the Fathers that it belongs to the pope that others are permitted 
    to appeal to him.

    Also, as we read in di. 17, c.  /Multis/ , Pope Pelagius says: 
    "As holy synod determines and blessed custom demands, let 
    greater and more difficult questions always be referred to the 
    apostolic see." We gather from these words that it is from synod 
    and by custom and not directly from Christ that it belongs to the 
    pope that greater cases are referred to him.

    Also, as we read in 2, q. 6, c.  /Arguta/ , Pope Nicholas says, 
    "You ought not have handed over to oblivion, however, the 
    privileges of the apostolic see, by which venerable canons order that 
    the judgements of the whole church are to be referred to this 
    see." By these words it seems to be established that the pope 
    has received power from the canons.

    Also, blessed Peter received power from the college of apostles (di. 
    21,  /In novo/ , di. 17,  /Hinc etiam/  and 3, q. 6,  /Dudum/ ).
    Therefore the pope can also receive power from a general council.
@end {en62m}



@section 3 {en63d}
  {Student:} Would you now try to prove that the pope has 
    fullness of power either from Christ or by human decree.
@end {en63d}



@section 3 {en64m}
  {Master:} It seems that this can be shown from many 
    texts of the holy Fathers. For Gregory seems to attest to this in 2, 
    q. 6, c.  /Decreto / and Pope Julius in the same cause and 
    question c.  /Qui se / . Innocent III also seems clearly to 
    assert it in a general council, as we read in  /Extra, De 
    poenitentia et remissione/ , c.  /Cum ex eo/ .

    It is also proved by argument, because he who should be obeyed in 
    everything has fullness of power, either by Christ's decree or by 
    human decree, or partly from one and partly from the other; but the 
    pope should be obeyed in everything, as Gregory attests. As we read 
    in di. 19, c.  /Nulli/ , he says: "It is not right for 
    anyone either to wish to or to be able to transgress the commands of 
    the apostolic see or the administration of our dispensation ... And 
    let him be deprived of divine and episcopal office who refuses to 
    obey apostolic commands." Pope Stephen seems to assert this too, 
    as we read in the same distinction, c.  /Enimvero/ , which was 
    cited above. And as we read in 25, q. 2, c.  /Amputato/ , Pope 
    Julius says: "Let not those things that have been established by 
    the apostles and their successors be neglected out of any idleness, 
    profaned by any disagreement or disturbed by any dispute." We 
    gather from these [texts] that the pope should be obeyed in 
    everything. Therefore he has fullness of power, either directly by 
    Christ's institution or by human decree, or partly by one and partly 
    by the other.
@end {en64m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 12
@section 2 {c12}
@section 2 {c12}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 12 



@section 3 {en65d}
  {Student:} Try to argue against that opinion [i.e., the 
    third opinion].
@end {en65d}



@section 3 {en66m}
  {Master:} There are some people who do not regard that 
    opinion as heretical like the first, yet consider it to be false, 
    irrational and dangerous. They consider it false, indeed, because 
    from it, as from the first, it follows that all Christians are slaves 
    of the highest pontiff, taking the word "slaves" in its 
    strictest sense as it is understood and used in the legal sciences. 
    For whoever has -- whether by divine decree or by human decree, or 
    partly from the one and partly from the other -- fullness of power 
    over all Christians in both temporal and spiritual matters, so that 
    he can do anything which is not against the law of God or against the 
    law of nature, so that no one could by any human act withdraw himself 
    from that person's power in any action not of itself illicit in its 
    kind, has as much temporal lordship over all Christians as any lord 
    has had or could have had over his slave. If therefore the pope were 
    to have such fullness of power over all Christians, the pope would 
    have the fullest power in temporal matters over all kings and princes 
    and everyone else and all would be his slaves, and out of the 
    fullness of his power he could deprive any king at all, without any 
    fault [on the king's part] and without any reason, of his kingdom and 
    give it to any pagan; he could make a king subject to any rustic at 
    all just as his own will decided, and if he did so, it would hold de 
    facto, and no king at all would be able licitly to resist him in such 
    matters or similar ones. They regard this as false and absurd.
@end {en66m}



@section 3 {en67d}
  {Student:} Tell me why they do not regard that opinion 
    as heretical, since it asserts that all Christians are slaves, and 
    divine Scripture asserts that gospel law is a law of freedom, and 
    consequently that opinion conflicts with divine Scripture. It seems, 
    therefore, that according to them that opinion should be adjudged 
    heretical like the first.
@end {en67d}



@section 3 {en68m}
  {Master:} They say that your objection should be 
    answered by means of some things said above. 
    For the texts of divine Scripture which establish that Christian law 
    is a law of freedom should be understood negatively, and the first 
    opinion is therefore heretical according to them because it follows 
    from it that all Christians have become slaves of the highest pontiff 
    through gospel law, and gospel law, as a consequence, could not be 
    called either negatively or positively a law of freedom but would be 
    a law of the most horrendous servitude. This third opinion, however, 
    does not assert that all Christians have been made slaves of the 
    highest pontiff by gospel law, but it only follows from it that all 
    Christians have become slaves of the highest pontiff by voluntary 
    submission. For it holds that all Christians have willingly and 
    voluntarily submitted themselves in all things to the pope's power, 
    which was not granted to him directly by Christ. And Christians would 
    indeed be able to do this, at least in some case. Thus any king, too, 
    would be able to make himself the slave of the highest pontiff, at 
    least in some case, by handing over his kingdom and subjecting 
    himself to the pope's power in everything. If, also, there were only 
    ten or twelve Christians or a few more they could all make themselves 
    slaves of the pope. However, according to them this has never been 
    done, and therefore that opinion is not heretical but false. That 
    this has never been done and that this opinion is false is proved by 
    innumerable civil and canon laws which assert that some people are 
    slaves and some are free.
@end {en68m}



@section 3 {en69d}
  {Student:} Why do they say that the above opinion is dangerous?
@end {en69d}



@section 3 {en70m}
  {Master:} They say this because if the pope were to 
    have power of this kind danger could easily threaten the whole 
    community of Christians. For if the pope were to become a secret 
    heretic or were to become secretly zealous for the sect of Sarracens 
    or some other [sect] of infidels, he could easily expose the whole of 
    Christianity to danger. For by his command alone he could plunder all 
    Christians of their possessions, that is of their arms, defences and 
    other things with which they might be defended against their enemies. 
    Once this was done, the infidels, called by the pope at first 
    secretly zealous for them and then publicly agreeing with them, could 
    easily occupy all the land of the faithful.
@end {en70m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 13
@section 2 {c13}
@section 2 {c13}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 13 



@section 3 {en71d}
  {Student:} Let us now look at the fourth
    opinion touched on in chapter one above.
@end {en71d}



@section 3 {en72m}
  {Master:} That opinion holds that the pope does not 
    have such fullness of power, either by Christ's institution or by 
    human decree, regularly or occasionally. But it is put by different 
    people in different ways. For some say that the pope has no more 
    power from Christ than other priests; however, like other priests, he 
    has some power over others, yet, outside the penitential tribunal, no 
    coercive power, but, like other priests, he has power to teach and 
    inform the laity. He does, however, have some, but not full, coercive 
    power, from the community of the faithful, who willingly, and not by 
    constraint, bestowed on the Roman pontiff and on no other priest some 
    power over the whole community of the faithful.

    Some say, on the other hand, that the pope has directly from Christ 
    some power over all Christians, yet not full power in everything, 
    either in spiritual or in temporal matters. From faithful men, on the 
    other hand, he received no power, either full or not full.

    Some say, on the other hand, that in spiritual matters the pope has 
    power from Christ alone, yet not full power. In temporal matters, on 
    the other hand, he has no special power from Christ but from the 
    faithful alone, but though it is not full but limited in the way the 
    faithful have wanted to limit it.
@end {en72m}



@section 3 {en73d}
  {Student:} Those ways of putting it contain many things 
    which, if we were to discuss them at length, would make it necessary 
    for us to engender boredom, perhaps, in our readers. Let us, 
    therefore, pass over them quickly, especially since when the 
    opportunity arises we will touch on all of them below in different 
    places. First of all, therefore, tell me what motivates the first 
    group who say that the pope has no more power from Christ than other priests.
@end {en73d}



@section 3 {en74m}
  {Master:} They say that on the basis of the texts [of 
    Jerome] found in di. 93, c.  /Legimus / and di. 95, c.  /Olim,/  
    which I quoted above in chapter 18 [rather, chapter 17] of book 5 of 
    the first part of this dialogue. In these Jerome seems to affirm 
    expressly that by the decree or institution of Christ no priest is 
    greater than another, either in order or in administration. This also 
    seems provable by the fact that the apostles were equal in power to 
    blessed Peter as far as Christ's decree was concerned (di. 21, c.  /In
    novo / ; 24, q. 1, c.  /Loquitur/  ; 2, q. 7, c.  /Paulus)/ ,
    and the apostles did not have from Christ any power over other 
    priests. Therefore, as far as Christ's special decree is concerned, 
    all priests are equal to the successors of blessed Peter.
@end {en74m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 14
@section 2 {c14}
@section 2 {c14}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 14 



@section 3 {en75d}
  {Student:} Say briefly whether some people try to 
    reject that assertion.
@end {en75d}



@section 3 {en76m}
  {Master:} Some people do regard this as erroneous and 
    as clearly conflicting with the sacred canons found in di. 21, c.  /Quamvis
    / and [di. 22,] c.  /Sacrosancta/  and 9, q. 3, c.  /Cuncta
    / and 24, q. 1, c. / Cum beatissimus,/  
    which I also quoted in chapter 10 of book 5 of the first part of this 
    dialogue. This assertion also seems opposed to Innocent III who, as 
    we find in  /Extra, De maioritate et obedientia/ , c.  /Solite / [rather,
    Extra,  /De iudiciis/ ,  /Novit/ ] which was quoted above,
    says that he relies not on human decree but on divine power; 
    therefore the pope has directly from God some power over all Christians.

    This is also proved by argument, because no community, especially a 
    large one, which does not have a head is well and appropriately 
    ordered, since, as Solomon attests in Proverbs 11[:14], "Where 
    there is no governor the people goes to ruin." But the community 
    of the faithful has been ordered by Christ in the best and most 
    suitable way. Christ therefore gave the community of the faithful a 
    head, and none but blessed Peter. Therefore Peter was appointed by 
    Christ as head of all the faithful.

    Further, the Christian people have not been less suitably and 
    usefully ordered by Christ than were the Hebrew people; but by divine 
    decree that people had a head, at least in spiritual matters, that is 
    the chief priest, who was superior to all other priests. The 
    Christian people too, therefore, have by Christ's decree one head who 
    is superior to all other Christian priests. Pope Marcellus, as we 
    read in 24, q. 1, c.  /Rogamus/ , and Innocent III in  /Extra, 
    De translatione/ , c. 1, and all the holy Fathers also seem to 
    hold this.
@end {en76m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 15
@section 2 {c15}
@section 2 {c15}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 15 



@section 3 {en77d}
  {Student:} Say now why the people holding that opinion 
    say that the pope received no coercive power from Christ.
@end {en77d}



@section 3 {en78m}
  {Master:} They say this because, according to them, the 
    whole community of the faithful ought to be subject to one single 
    supreme judge who has coercive power. All other judges should receive 
    coercive power from him. This person, however, should not be the 
    pope, because then all lay jurisdiction would be lost. Therefore the 
    pope received no coercive power from Christ.
@end {en78m}



@section 3 {en79d}
  {Student:} I will try to discuss that material with you 
    in the tract on the rights of the Roman emperor [ /Dialogus / 3.2],
    and so, leaving that and some other points aside, would you try to 
    argue briefly for the last statement, namely that in temporal matters 
    the pope has no special power directly from Christ, but [has power] 
    from his faithful, yet not full [power] but limited, just as the 
    faithful wanted to limit it.
@end {en79d}



@section 3 {en80m}
  {Master:} It seems provable in various ways that in 
    temporal matters the pope has no power directly from Christ. For just 
    as the emperor is related to temporal matters, so the pope is related 
    to spiritual matters in so far as he received power directly from 
    Christ. But the emperor has no power in spiritual matters. Therefore 
    in temporal matters the pope has no power directly from Christ.

    Further, as was argued in chapter 9 above, 
    according to the sacred Scriptures and the canons, the pope should 
    not involve himself in secular business, and consequently he has not 
    been specially commissioned by Christ to involve himself in secular 
    business. It seems, therefore, that he did not receive any power in 
    temporal matters directly from Christ.
@end {en80m}

@section 3 {en81d}
  {Student:} How is it proved that in temporal matters 
    the pope has some power from the faithful?
@end {en81d}



@section 3 {en82m}
  {Master:} This is asserted because of sacred canons 
    which establish that in many cases the pope does intervene in 
    temporal matters. In  /Extra, De foro competenti/ , c.  /Licet,/   /Extra,
    De iudiciis/ , c.  /Novit,/   /Extra, Qui 
    filii sunt legitimi / c.  /Per venerabilem,/  
    and in innumerable other places, we read that the pope exercises 
    temporal jurisdiction. Yet he does not have it from Christ, as is 
    said above to have been proved; therefore he has it from the faithful.

    This is proved by the following argument. The pope does not have 
    directly from Christ greater jurisdiction in one region than in 
    another, but in fact and in law he does exercise greater jurisdiction 
    in temporal matters in one region than in another. He does not have 
    that power directly from Christ, therefore, and so he has it from 
    someone else, and this can only be the faithful. In temporal matters, 
    therefore, he has some power from the faithful -- not full power, 
    however, but limited, because in handing over power in temporal 
    matters the faithful did not make themselves his slaves. Therefore 
    they did not confer on him fullness of power.
@end {en82m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 16
@section 2 {c16}
@section 2 {c16}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 16 



@section 3 {en83d}
  {Student:} Let us pass over to the fifth
    opinion touched on in chapter 1 above. Would you first try to 
    set it out and then explain how it should be understood.
@end {en83d}



@section 3 {en84m}
  {Master:} That opinion holds, as I said, that in 
    temporal and spiritual matters the pope has such fullness of power 
    that either by ordained power or by absolute power he can do anything 
    that is not against divine law or the natural law. He does not have 
    this regularly and simply, either by divine law or by human law, but 
    by Christ's decree or divine law he has such fullness of power 
    occasionally or in a particular case and conditionally ( /secundum quid/ ).
    According to some this should be understood as follows. By divine 
    law or by Christ's decree the pope should not intervene in the 
    management of temporal matters as long as temporal matters are being 
    managed fittingly and appropriately by the laity, except by accepting 
    temporal goods from the laity for his own sustenance and the carrying 
    out of his duty; and therefore he does not have power from Christ 
    regularly to manage and order temporal matters, which are known to 
    pertain to kings, princes and other laymen. Occasionally, however, or 
    in a particular case -- namely when temporal matters were being 
    handled by others to the danger of the community of Christians or to 
    the subversion of faith, or in a similar case were being turned to 
    evil, and there was no layman willing or able to prevent such dangers 
    -- the pope would have by divine law power to do anything in temporal 
    matters that right reason would dictate as necessarily to be done for 
    the common good and the preservation of the faith and to meet dangers 
    of this kind. And thus in such a case he would have fullness of power 
    in a certain way and conditionally ( /secundum quid/ ) over 
    temporal matters, not because the temporal goods would then be made 
    his with respect to lordship and ownership, nor because he can manage 
    them according to his pleasure, but because there is nothing any king 
    or other layman can do about any temporal matter at all that the pope 
    could not then do, if it were advantageous that this be done and 
    there was no one else by whom it could appropriately be done; and 
    thus even in such a case he would not have in temporal matters 
    fullness of power simply but only  /secundum quid/ .

    In spiritual matters, similarly, he does not by divine law have 
    regularly and simply such fullness of power, because he cannot, 
    without fault [on their part] and without a reason, enjoin on the 
    faithful things that are supererogatory, nor indeed many other things 
    as well. For he cannot, without fault or reason, force a layman to 
    contract a marriage or to make a vow of virginity or chastity, and 
    yet neither of these is against divine law or against the law of 
    nature, rather each can licitly be done; and so it is of many other 
    permissible [acts] that pertain to spiritual matters and over which 
    the pope by divine law does not regularly and simply have fullness of 
    power. Yet over these he does occasionally have fullness of power  /secundum
    quid/ , because in a particular case, either by reason of a crime 
    or on account of some notable necessity or utility, he can, when no 
    danger would be threatened by his command, enjoin on anyone at all 
    anything in spiritual matters which is not against the law of God or 
    against the law of nature.

    And so, they say, both in temporal and in spiritual matters the pope 
    occasionally has by divine law fullness of power, not simply but  /secundum
    quid/ . Although this power is not the fullest, it is, 
    nevertheless, abundant, singular and very great. For through it he 
    can in a particular case transfer empires and kingdoms, deprive 
    kings, princes and any other layman at all of temporal rights and 
    goods and confer them on others. In spiritual matters he can also do 
    all things, in a particular case. It is not easy, however, to state, 
    explicitly and in particular, all the cases in which he can do the 
    aforesaid things, or some of them. And perhaps no universal teaching 
    can be given about them by which it may be known with certainty and 
    without error, especially by the simple, when the pope can do such 
    things and when he cannot, and what kind of things he can do in one 
    case and what kind in another -- for there are many such things that 
    he can do in one case but cannot do in another.
@end {en84m}

#----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chapter 17
@section 2 {c17}
@section 2 {c17}
@section 3 {tt}
    Capitulum 17 



@section 3 {en85d}
  {Student:} Although some of the above is unclear to me, 
    and perhaps later when the opportunity arises you will explain it, 
    yet for now do not trouble to explain more fully the unclear points 
    in that opinion. But since you have briefly stated, according to that 
    opinion, which power Christ did  /not/  give regularly to 
    blessed Peter and his successors and which he gave him occasionally 
    or in a particular case, briefly relate now, according to that same 
    opinion, the power or jurisdiction which Christ  /did/  give 
    regularly to blessed Peter and, in him, to his successors.
@end {en85d}



@section 3 {en86m}
  {Master:} It is said that Christ established blessed 
    Peter as the head, chief and prelate of the other apostles and of all 
    the faithful, giving to him regularly in spiritual matters, in 
    respect of everything that should of necessity be done or of 
    necessity be omitted for the rule of the community of the faithful as 
    it concerns good customs and any spiritual necessities of the 
    faithful at all, all power in such matters as could be committed to 
    one man not dangerously but prudently and to the common advantage, 
    and [giving him] freedom, and coercive jurisdiction also, without any 
    detriment or notable and significant cost to those temporal rights of 
    emperors, kings, princes and any other laymen at all, or of clerics, 
    that pertained to them, before or after the establishment of gospel 
    law, by the law of nature or by the law of nations or by civil law. 
    In temporal matters, however, he gave him regularly only the right of 
    seeking temporal goods for his own sustenance and the performance of 
    his duties. And this power the successors of blessed Peter, that is 
    the Roman pontiffs, have now, whether in temporal or spiritual 
    matters, regularly by divine law. But any further power that the 
    highest pontiffs regularly have had, or have, they have obtained, and 
    obtain, by human decree, concession or voluntary submission, or by 
    express or tacit consent, or because of the weakness, negligence or 
    evil of other men, or by custom, or in whatever way by human law.
@end {en86m}



@section 3 {en87d}
  {Student:} That account contains many things that are 
    unclear to me. So that I might better understand whether they are 
    true or false, would you strive to explain them to me and make clear 
    how that opinion is distinguished from the others.
@end {en87d}



@section 3 {en88m}
  {Master:} In saying that Christ established blessed 
    Peter "as head, chief and prelate of the other apostles and all 
    the faithful" it intends to destroy the opinion which holds that 
    Peter was head of the church not by Christ's institution but only by 
    the election or institution of the apostles or the other faithful.

    And by the "spiritual matters" to which it refers it means 
    those things which by the institution of gospel law are proper to 
    gospel law, being found in no other law (at least no human law) or 
    sect, things such as the administering of the sacraments of the new 
    law, the ordination of priests and clerics, the institution or 
    promotion of those who ought to rule and instruct the Christian 
    people, especially in things that pertain to faith and divine 
    worship, and similar things.

    When it says Christ gave blessed Peter power with respect to 
    spiritual matters "that should of necessity be done or of 
    necessity be omitted", it intends to exclude from the regular 
    power of Peter those spiritual matters that are supererogatory, that 
    is, those which are a matter of advice not command, and, all 
    together, everything without which Christian people can be ruled 
    appropriately and without which, whether they are done or omitted, 
    neither faith nor good customs are exposed to danger. And therefore 
    the pope cannot regularly order a Christian to preserve his 
    virginity, to contract a marriage, to take on poverty, to retain and 
    possess wealth or, when he is not bound by a command of God, to give 
    or not give alms, though in a particular case he could order many 
    such things; and if he orders such things outside of a case of 
    utility, or orders many such things, his order does not hold but is 
    null, and that person to whom it is given is not bound to obey it 
    even if he excommunicates him on that account -- such a sentence 
    would be null as containing an intolerable error and ought not to be 
    feared nor of necessity observed.

    And when it says, "giving him all power in such matters as could 
    be committed to one man not dangerously but prudently and to the 
    common advantage", it intends to exclude from the regular power 
    of the pope all power which, if it were regularly committed to one 
    man, could easily threaten a notable danger to the whole community of 
    the faithful that could not be prevented without a miracle or [only] 
    with the greatest difficulty. For this reason, although someone will 
    of necessity succeed the highest pontiff, nevertheless the pope does 
    not have the power of arranging who ought to succeed him. This is 
    also the reason for a certain opinion which holds that although an 
    election of a highest pontiff must be held, nevertheless the pope 
    does not have from Christ the power of regularly arranging how and by 
    whom the highest pontiff should be elected: for if the pope were 
    regularly to have such power directly from Christ he could easily, 
    from negligence or evil -- since the pope, a sinful man like everyone 
    else, can be ensnared by errors, wicked passions, negligence, evil 
    and villainy -- leave the whole of Christianity without the power to 
    elect a highest pontiff, and by this the common good would be 
    endangered. For he could for some reason or for some fault deprive 
    the cardinals of the power and right to elect a highest pontiff, and, 
    having done so, he could, either through neglect or delay due to 
    malice or through not having enough time to arrange it, die before 
    arrangements about the supreme pontiff's electors were made. And thus 
    to the peril and detriment of the common good all Christianity would 
    remain without the power and right to elect a highest pontiff. And 
    therefore, according to that opinion, such power was not regularly 
    granted by Christ to the highest pontiff, nor any other power, 
    either, which it would be dangerous to grant to one person. For this 
    reason, according to them, he is in no way the lord of all temporal 
    things, because such lordship would be too dangerous to the faithful.

    When it holds that Christ gave to the pope "freedom . . . 
    without any detriment or notable and significant cost to those 
    temporal rights of emperors", etc., it intends to assert that 
    every pope is free with respect to his person and is not regularly 
    subject to any man at all, even if before his election he had been of 
    servile condition or had been subject in another way to an emperor or 
    a king or other Christian or non-Christian, because the freedom of 
    one man with respect to his person is not notably injurious to an 
    emperor or to another. And therefore, however much he had been a 
    slave, the pope is delivered into freedom by the very fact that he is 
    pope or has been elected pope. Occasionally, however -- if, for 
    instance, he becomes a heretic or seems to be incorrigible in any 
    crime and the church is made to stumble because of him -- the pope is 
    subject to human judgement and ought to be judged by man and undergo 
    the due punishment of the law.

    And when it says that with respect to things of this kind Christ gave 
    regularly to blessed Peter some "coercive jurisdiction also, 
    without any detriment or notable and significant cost to those 
    temporal rights of emperors", etc., it intends to say that the 
    pope has regularly from Christ the power to punish purely 
    ecclesiastical crimes, that is those that are committed directly 
    against Christian law and are proper to Christian law and are not 
    considered crimes by other sects, yet in such a way that the 
    punishment is not to the notable detriment or prejudice of others who 
    have not sinned. And if anyone's slave commits an ecclesiastical 
    crime the pope can punish him, yet in such a way that the slave's 
    master, without blame on his part, does not incur a notable loss.

    And when it says that Christ gave blessed Peter and his successors 
    freedom, jurisdiction and power of this kind "without any 
    detriment or notable and significant cost to those temporal rights of 
    emperors, kings" and others "that pertained to them, before 
    or after the establishment of gospel law, by the law of nature or by 
    the law of nations or by civil law," it intends to assert that 
    by the fact that blessed Peter and his successors have been and will 
    be raised to the highest priesthood, emperors, kings and others, both 
    believers and unbelievers, whether they lived before or after the 
    establishment of gospel law, were not deprived of their temporal 
    rights, but retained them and were not regularly subject to the pope 
    in temporal matters, but remained, as before, true emperors and kings 
    and lords of their temporal possessions and slaves and of those 
    subject to them, and were not made slaves of anyone, and were not 
    bound regularly to obey the commands of the pope with respect to 
    temporal matters. And a sentence of excommunication or any other 
    [sentence] passed by the pope against the emperor or another because 
    he does not obey such commands or defends his rights does not 
    regularly hold, but, as containing an intolerable error, ought to be 
    regarded as completely null and not to be feared, however much it is 
    not observed.

    And when it says that in temporal matters Christ gave blessed Peter 
    "only the right of seeking temporal goods for his own sustenance 
    and for the performance of his duties" it means to exclude every 
    opinion which holds that in temporal matters the pope regularly has 
    fullness of power or also the power of managing temporal matters or 
    any temporal jurisdiction at all over the Empire or any other region, 
    and also the opinion that holds that the pope does not have any right 
    of demanding any temporal goods at all.

    And when it says finally that "any further power that the 
    highest pontiffs regularly have had, or have, [they have obtained] 
    from human decree", etc., it intends that although the 
    successors of blessed Peter have not exceeded him in any power they 
    have had by Christ's decree alone and by divine law, yet they have 
    acquired by human law great power in temporal and spiritual matters 
    which blessed Peter did not have, and that the power of the pope from 
    human law can be increased, and that one highest pontiff has or can 
    have greater or better power than another.
@end {en88m}